Abstract
Unprecedented insights into the idea of the nature of law can be gained by observing legal phenomena in their social manifestations. Frederick Schauer disagreed with the search for the fundamental characteristics of law and recognised the value of an empirical, multidisciplinary approach. Understanding a phenomenon requires synthesising perspectives from sociological, psychological, political, and economic domains.
This essay uses a qualitative and conceptual analysis to examine Schauer's understanding of law as a social phenomenon. On the one hand, the empiricist viewpoint directs the author towards theoretical models that accurately capture the concrete reality of law as it is reflected in legal reasoning and jurists' practices; on the other, empiricism guides him towards the recognition of legal reasoning styles that prioritise commonsense arguments over other modes of argumentation.
Schauer's philosophical programme becomes a sampler of methodological choices to be applied in legal reasoning and a warning of how others burden innovation if one assumes that the ultimate goal of philosophical and legal research is to provide ideas and models that can improve the normative and social arrangements that currently exist.
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