Call for papers

Call for papers n. 9 (1/2026)
Il concetto di abitudine e il rapporto tra abitudine e autonomia / The concept of habit and the relation between habit and autonomy.
Deadline: 30.03.2026

The concept of habit occupies a central place in philosophical, psychological, and anthropological thinking: it represents both a form of adaptation and a threshold of freedom. Habit structures human life, stabilizes actions, and makes the continuity of experience possible; and yet, precisely because it is rooted in repetition and passivity, it seems to threaten autonomy and the capacity for initiative. Modern and contemporary philosophy has oscillated between these two polarities. From Aristotle to Hume, from Kant to Bergson, from Dewey to Merleau-Ponty, habit has been understood sometimes as a formative virtue, sometimes as mechanical inertia, and sometimes as the embodied condition of freedom. At a time when our habits are increasingly shaped by technologies, algorithms, and digital environments, the question becomes urgent: to what extent does habit support autonomy, and when does it erode it?

This Discussions section aims to critically explore the dialectic between habit and autonomy, considering it from different perspectives—historical, theoretical, ethical, and political—and fostering an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy, cognitive science, applied ethics, and social theory. The goal is a broad discussion that investigates whether habit should be understood as a limitation of autonomy or, on the contrary, as its practical condition: a form of “embodied reason” that makes free and stable action in the world possible.

Contributions addressing the following areas of research will be particularly appreciated:

  1. History of the concept of habit from a moral perspective, connected to the thinking of one or more authors.
  2. Habit and freedom: habit as an embodied form of practical rationality; repetition as a condition of choice and deliberation.
  3. Ethics and character formation: virtues, customs, educational practices, community ethos.
  4. Habit and power: the social and political dimension of automatism; habit as an instrument of control or resistance.
  5. Body, mind, and technique: neuroscience and philosophy of mind; the automation of gesture.
  6. Hexis, habitus, and habit: the transition from inclinations to stable dispositions and custom; nature and formation of practical identities.
  7. Habit, addiction to submission, and revolt: the relationship between habit and transformative social forces.
  8. Is personal identity just a habit?

 

Call for papers n. 10 (2/2026)
Valori tra relativismo e assolutismo. Prospettive storiche, teoriche e pratiche / Values between relativism and absolutism
Deadline: 30.09.2026

The debate on values, and in particular on the tension between relativism and absolutism, is one of the most fruitful and controversial issues in philosophical reflection. In an era marked by cultural pluralism, social transformations, and a crisis of normative certainties, the question of the foundation of values is becoming increasingly pressing: are there universal values, valid for everyone and at all times, or is every value historically and culturally determined?

Between the claim to universality and the risk of relativistic fragmentation lies the space for renewed research, capable of questioning the conditions of possibility of moral judgment, intercultural dialogue, and political coexistence. Philosophy, the history of ideas, and the humanities are called upon to reflect on how values arise, transform, and translate into concrete practices, without losing sight of human dignity.

This Discussions section aims to explore the theme from multiple perspectives—historical, theoretical, practical, and applied—encouraging comparison between philosophical, ethical, political, and anthropological approaches.

Contributions addressing the following areas of investigation, among others, will be welcome:

  1. Historical roots of relativism and absolutism of value, with particular attention to morally connoted values.
  2. Theoretical foundations of value: ontology, axiology, practical reason, metaethics, phenomenology, and hermeneutics of values.
  3. Normative ethics and values: what is the criterion of validity of values in concrete practice and in what sense are values principles of action; how conflicts between values are resolved.
  4. Value and history: the variation of values within the same culture over time, the challenge this poses to a non-relativistic interpretation of values.
  5. Value and the political and legal dimension: what role do values play in relation to political justice and the exercise of law.
  6. The concept of value in relation to contemporary scenarios of practical ethics: economic ethics, bioethics, the environment, artificial intelligence, digital communication, public and professional ethics, social ethics.
  7. Values and equality: the relationship between pluralism of values and moral and political equality.
  8. In-depth theoretical analysis of individual values or groups of values.

 

ABOUT THE JOURNAL 

The Italian Society of Moral Philosophy, following one of its statutory purposes, founded Filosofia Morale/Moral Philosophy, a new digital scientific journal, open access and subject to double-blind review. The journal intends to be a common space of research, open to the contribution of all people involved in the study of ethics and capable of promoting a sense of belonging to the scientific community of moral philosophy. 

Moral Philosophy publishes contributions in the field of moral philosophy and neighboring disciplines (politics, theory, aesthetics, language, anthropology, religion), in a pluralist perspective, open to the different traditions of thought and the different approaches that animate ethics. The journal hosts historical, theoretical, applied and interdisciplinary contributions. 

Contributions may be written in Italian, English, French, German and Spanish, provided that they are written or revised by a native speaker by the author. 

The selection criteria are the argumentative rigor, the originality of the theses and the accuracy of the documentation, as well as the correctness and respect of each person, even in the expression of objections and criticisms towards the authors. 

The journal has three sections: Articles, Discussions, and Reviews. 

The Articles section is not thematic: contributions between 30,000 and 50,000 characters (spaces, bibliography and notes included) are published on any topic that falls within the area of moral philosophy broadly understood. Proposals for contributions may be submitted throughout the year. Proposals are double-blind reviewed. Publication shall take place in the first available issue. 

The Discussions section is  thematic: contributions between 15,000 and 30,000 characters are hosted, relevant to the topic that is indicated for each issue in the Call for papers section: https://mimesisjournals.com/ojs/index.php/MF/call-for-papers. Proposals are double-blind reviewed.

The Reviews section hosts contributions of no more than 15,000 characters, with no notes or bibliography, concerning volumes of interest to moral philosophy broadly understood.