Oltre l’ammirazione: emozioni ed esemplari negativi

Abstract

It is widely acknowledged that positive moral exemplars and their capacity to elicit positive emotions, such as admiration, play a significant role in the processes of moral learning and change. In this respect, moral exemplarism presents itself as a particularly fruitful framework for moral education. However, an educational approach that relies exclusively on admirable figures and positive emotions remains partial and, ultimately, short-sighted. This article proposes to explore the counterpart of positive exemplarity by developing an account of negative educational exemplarism. The aim is to show that morally flawed or fallible agents can function as negative exemplars not merely as counterexamples or cautionary narratives, but as genuine objects of moral reflection capable of promoting learning through contrast, resistance, and critical evaluation. This perspective requires a rehabilitation of negative emotions, understood not simply as dysfunctional affects, but as epistemic–moral resources capable of informing and stimulating critical moral thinking. In this sense, negative emotions can constitute a privileged avenue of access to values and, at the same time, a powerful driver of moral change, activated through engagement with morally vicious or fallible figures.