What AI philosophers lack
pdf (Italiano)

Mots-clés

Artificial intelligence, Automation, Randomness, Aesthetic existences, Meta-sensemaking

Comment citer

Chiodo, S. (2026). What AI philosophers lack. Aesthetica Preprint, (131), 123–138. https://doi.org/10.7413/0393-85221518

Résumé

In 2023, an article was published on a rather novel use of generative artificial intelligence: testing its potential by moving from artistic creativity to another area of human creativity, i.e. philosophy, which means using generative artificial intelligence to answer complex philosophical questions. In what follows, first, I will analyse the test published in the article (section 1) and, second, I will argue that (human) philosophy cannot be traded for AI philosophy, in that the latter cannot have what the former can have: human authors who have aesthetic existences and, thus, capabilities of meta-sensemaking (section 2). Finally, I will argue that the divergence between humans’ aesthetic existences and, thus, capabilities of meta-sensemaking, on the one hand, and generative artificial intelligence, on the other hand, correlates with the divergence between autonomy and automation as a kind of randomness (section 3).

https://doi.org/10.7413/0393-85221518
pdf (Italiano)