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Theory, Praxis and the Primacy of the Object: Some Remarks on Adorno's Conception of Dialectics*

1.

At the beginning of Adorno's *Negative Dialectic* we find the following statement: «philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed» (Adorno, 1973, p. 3). In this statement, Adorno clearly expresses the tight bond, which ties up philosophy and praxis. For him, philosophy is still necessary nowadays precisely because of the absence of a freed praxis, i.e. because of the failure of the emancipatory aim of philosophy. *Such observation already testifies the central role played by this problem in Adorno's thought.*

In this contribution, I will try to shed light on the question of the relation between theory and praxis by connecting it to the seemingly pure epistemological relation between subject and object. More precisely I will focus on what Adorno – in a famous section of *Negative Dialectics* and also elsewhere – calls the “primacy of the object” and, specifically on its ethical implications. This will then lead to the attempt to display both the premises and the consequences of what is declared by Adorno in one of his last contributions, *Marginalia zur Theorie und Praxis*: namely that «the question about theory and praxis depends on the one about subject and object» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 259). Adorno suggests that this connection becomes evident if we think that «at the same time in which the Cartesian theory of two substances established the dichotomy of subject and object, the praxis was for the first time represented as problematic» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 259). However, what is it that connects precisely these two problematic issues, *aside of the historical respect?* Moreover, how can we clarify their relationship? How is the theory/praxis question bound to a seemingly pure theoretical question, like the one about subject and object? As I will try to show, answering to these questions leads to the exercise of a kind of philosophy radically focused (in an unprecedented way, so to speak) on content, that is to say, on the object.

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2.

Let us start from a quotation from *Marginalia zur Theorie und Praxis*, where Adorno points out that the «problem of praxis [...] coincides with the loss of experience, caused by the rationality of the eternally same (*Immergleiche*)» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 260). What damages the possibility of praxis is connected with the lacking constitution of a freed experience. It also seems that, in order to understand the problematic aspects of praxis, we have to start from the problem of the subject/object relationship within the constitution of experience. Indeed, the predominance of a false praxis is bounded to the predominance of a false experience: rather, they are two aspects of the same issue, which is the rationality of *Immergleiche*.

According to Adorno, « [a] simple consideration of history demonstrates just how much the question of theory and praxis depends upon the question of subject and object. At the same time as the Cartesian doctrine of two substances ratified the dichotomy of subject and object, literature for the first time portrayed praxis as a dubious undertaking on account of its tension with reflection» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 233). Therefore, the basic, underlying problem, seems to be that of the radical dichotomy of subject and object in the realm of experience. Adorno argues that the «separation [...] is both real and semblance»: real, considering the «rivenness of human condition» in reality: the subject is actually split from the object as far as its relation to it is adapted to the separation, which structures its experience. At the same time, however, *semblance – precisely as much as this separation – is something that has become [geworden]*. That is to say, this separation is something which is not immediate, but rather mediated as the result of a process: «the *pseudòs* of the separation is manifested in their being mutually mediated [...] as soon as it is fixed without mediation, the separation becomes ideology, *its normal form*» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 246). «Once radically separated from the object, subject reduces the object to itself; subject swallows object, forgetting how much it is object itself» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 246). The question of the mutual mediation between subject and object constitutes the interception point with the problem of praxis. «Indeed, one could ask whether in its indifference toward its object all nature-dominating praxis up to the present day is not in fact praxis in name only» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 259).

To clarify this point we have to analyse the contradictions that result from the distinction between the empirical subject and the transcendental one. «In epistemology, ‘subject’ is usually understood to mean the transcendental subject [that] constructs the objective world out of an undifferentiated material» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 247). This transcendental subjectivity, «which constitutes all content of experience, is in turn abstracted

from living individual human beings», but it should likewise constitute their condition of possibility. Hence, the problem is to determine which one – namely the transcendental or the empirical – produces the other: the abstract, onto-logical concept of transcendental subjectivity must assume the empirical and determined one as source and concrete basis of itself, but at the same time it also claims to constitute its transcendental precondition. As Adorno claims, «it is evident that the abstract concept of the transcendental subject [...] presupposes precisely what it promises to establish: actual, living individuals» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 248). Which means, in other words, «that the conditioned is to be justified as unconditioned, the derivative as primary» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 248).

Such vicious circle has been usually resolved with the assertion that the single empirical subject needs, in order to be conceived, the necessary condition of a transcendental subject: only the presupposition of a transcendental synthesis makes the unification of the manifold within an intuition logically possible, without which not even the empirical experience of the self could be realised. Nevertheless, this way to transcendently reconstruct the necessary preconditions of the empirical subjectivity implies the reduction of it to its objective moments. The transcendental subject is nothing else than the projection of the objective moments performed by the empirical singularity. At the same time, it is also the guarantee of its universality: how could the empirical subject *ground* objectivity without being, in a certain way, objective? «That law, which according to Kant the subject prescribes to nature, the highest elevation of objectivity in his conception, is the perfect expression of the subject as well as of its self-alienation: at the height of its formative pretension, the subject passes itself off as object» (Adorno, 2005 a, 254). The problem is not that the subject also contains in itself objective moments (in fact «the subject is [dialectically] also object»), but rather that it «merely forgets, as it becomes autonomous form, how and by what it itself is constituted» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 254). That is to say, that classical epistemology, inasmuch as it presupposes a logical abstracted subjectivity as the necessary precondition for empirical objectivity, omits the processual character of the constitution of the transcendental subject and assumes it as effectively «constitutive» and not, as it is, as something that has *become* [*geworden*], i.e. as the mere *result* of an objectivation process. At the same time, the empirical subject results in its contingency from the abstraction of its objective moments. Even the «empirical subject» cannot be assumed – as this theory would like to convince us of – as the *primus*, but rather as something, which, in turns, results from a process. The elements of universality within the transcendental subject are nothing else than the forms of objectivity that constitute the subject in its contingency: «actually, everything that is in

the subject can be attributed to the object». «The pure subjective form of traditional epistemology, according to its own concept, is always only a form of something objective, never without that objectivity, indeed not even thinkable without it» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 256).

The assumption of the transcendental subject as the pure form, which constitutes the object, implies the objectification of subjective rationality. Nonetheless, the single empirical subject as such is not involved in this process, inasmuch as its empirical, contingent moments are fully separated from its objective moments. Such hypostasis of the objective moment also contains a moment of truth: in fact, «the transcendental subject is more real, that is, it far more determines the real conduct of people and society than do those psychological individuals from whom the transcendental subject was abstracted» (Adorno, 2005 a p. 248). The objectivity is not “abstracted” from the contingent individual: it rather determines the latter, insofar as this objectivity – as concrete objectivity – determines the conduct of the single person. «The living individual person, such as he is constrained to act and for which he was even internally moulded, is as *homo oeconomicus* incarnate closer to the transcendental subject than the living individual he must immediately take himself to be» (Adorno, 2005 a p. 248). Indeed, «if the standard structure of society is the exchange form, its rationality constitutes» the empirical, contingent subjectivity too: «solidity and invariance [of the transcendental subject], which according to the transcendental philosophy engenders objects, [...] is the reflected form of the reification of human beings that has objectively occurred in the conditions of society» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 249). The Kantian formalism reflects, in this sense, the Hegelian “objective spirit”: in both cases, the subject is assumed as the “agent”, that is to say the “origin” of the objectivity, whereas it is, on the contrary, its result. Therefore, for Adorno, «[t]he more individuals are in effect degraded into functions within the societal totality as they are connected up to the system, the more the person pure and simple, as a principle, is consoled and exalted with the attributes of creative power, absolute rule, and spirit» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 248).

3.

Starting from this analysis of the problematic relationship between empirical e transcendental subjectivity, we can now better understand the previous statement about the hypostasis of the split as the typical form of ideology. The presumption of the primacy of the subject on the object, disguising the dialectical mediation between them, leads to a misleading ideological inversion: the false hypostasis of the primacy of the subject as

the constituent of the object conceals the complete subsumption of the former to the latter. This ideological fallacy has relevant consequences concerning the relationship between theory and praxis: in fact, the moment of the immediate expression of the subject turns out to be just an abstract moment of objectivity itself. Every assumption of individual freedom is mere self-deception, if the subjective element is conceived as something primary, if its freedom is conceived as a pure act of autonomy. Instead, the individual in its true spontaneity should be understood as something that has become (*ein Gewordenes*), namely as the product of the objective condition of its singularity. That the single empirical subject needs the transcendental subject as a «condition of possibility» is a fact: the «particular individual owes the possibility of his existence to the universal» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 249) and only by taking this (pre) condition into account it is possible to conceive individual spontaneity as something *concrete*.

In this sense, the dialectical relationship between empirical and transcendental subjectivity is the same one underlying, and actually constituting, the one between real and illusory praxis. The subjective element, as the transcendental condition of objectivation, is nothing else than the false re-assignment to the subjective spontaneity of the same objective logic of domination, under which the latter is rather subordinated. On this basis, it becomes problematic to conceive the immediate actions and perhaps even the individual intentions as something truly “spontaneous”, that is to say, as something substantively subjective. The subjective act, in this context, proves to be the brief appearance of a false autonomy, which allows the universal bondage to perpetuate: «Abstract subjectivity, in which the process of rationalization terminates, strictly speaking can do just as little as the transcendental subject can conceivably have precisely what is attested to have: spontaneity» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 260). Therefore, «the praxis accrues a somewhat illusory character» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 260): namely, that of the autonomous subject. The individually “free” subject is unmasked as the projection of the objective element, the internalization and universalization of the social relationship: spontaneity decays to mere reflection of social constraint. «False praxis is no praxis» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 265) because it is forced to reproduce the bondage which bonds subject and object.

Thus, in order to devise a freed praxis, according to Adorno we have to establish a new subject/object relationship. The aim of freed praxis should be to finally make freedom possible and real: that is, freedom that can be realized only after the confrontation with the object, with which the subject is irremediably tied up. Free praxis can be achieved as dialectical *Befreiung*. To set free the subject implies to also set free the object and vice versa: the basic premise for a freed praxis is the possibil-

ity of a freedom *for* and *of the* object. At this point, we must then ask ourselves what the “primacy” or “priority of the object” precisely means (see O’Connor, 2004, p. 45 ff). Surely not a «slavish confidence in the external world» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 240), i.e. not a form of naive realism; neither it means an untimely attempt to restore a pure objectivity without subject, as if the real object would consist in what remains after the subtraction of the subjective factor from the addends, as positivists seem to argue. «The primacy of the object means rather that subject for its part is object in a qualitatively different, more radical sense than object, because object cannot be known except through consciousness, hence is also subject» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 249). In this sense, to assume the primacy of the object does not mean to demise the subjective prerogatives: on the contrary, it means to determine and to practically carry out its objective moments, i.e. the ones that in a “more radical sense” *constitute* the objectivity. The goal is thus neither to establish an objective rationality, nor to affirm a subjective one, but rather to recognise their mutual intertwining: more subjectivity means more objectivity, and vice-versa. Subject and object need to be understood in a dialectical way in order to be expressed at the best *of their possibilities*. Therefore, freed praxis in the present conditions is impossible, inasmuch as it presupposes something that does not yet exist: the freed, autonomous subject. Freed praxis is neither the emergence of what the subject wants, nor its neediness: the «spontaneity [is indeed] animated [*innervierte*] by the *neediness of the object*»; this is the reason why a «praxis rightly understood», i.e. when the primacy of the object is «respected by praxis», «is [primarily] *what the object wants*: praxis follows the object’s neediness» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 265). For this reason, praxis needs theory, because only the latter, in its partial autonomy from the social, can critically determine the neediness *in its* being mediated between subject and object. In fact, «the neediness of object is mediated via the total social system; for that reason, it can be critically determined only by theory» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 265). In this sense, any simple transition from theory to praxis is currently impossible: «Just as the division between subject and object cannot be revoked immediately by a decree of thought, so an immediate unity of theory and praxis is hardly possible too: it would imitate the false identity of subject and object and would perpetuate the principle of domination that posits identity and that a true praxis must oppose» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 265). Theory is today the only *activity* where the subject, its will and its neediness can be critically determined in its qualitative difference and in its objective mediations. Furthermore, the dichotomy that opposes subject and object can be overcome only in theory: this is why only the theory can make the experience of the coexistence of what is *irreducibly to both the subject and the object*, i.e. that *non-identical* which would be set free

in the reconciled world. «Were speculation concerning the state of reconciliation allowed, then it would be impossible to conceive that state as either the undifferentiated unity of subject and object or their hostile antithesis: rather it would be the communication of what is differentiated» (Adorno, 2005 a p. 247).

This theoretical exercise should not hypostatize the dialectical intertwinement, but rather articulate the relationship itself as process. The dialectical exercise with the object means, on the one hand, an unveiling process: «knowledge of the object is brought closer by the act of the subject rending the veil it weaves about the object » (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 254). In this way, it also breaks the *Verblendungszusammenhang* that, more than anything else coerces the subjective side to reproduce the totality. The theoretical unveiling of the thing, that is its ability to tear up the *Verblendungszusammenhang*, discloses the possibility of the *Übergang zur Praxis* for both the object and the subject. In a context of objective subordination, where immediate subjective spontaneity reproduces and reinforces the objective subjugation, only the theory, by revealing the mutual mediation between subject and object, is able to restore the possibility of their practical emancipation. What resists to both the subjective reduction to mere contingency and the objective abstraction, discloses the moment of a possible praxis, inasmuch as it let emerge the non-identical moment in their mediation. The non-identical is thus determined as what is irreducible both to the subjective immediacy *and* to the objective abstraction: in this sense, the non-identical brings out the possibility of the radical new. This is why «whoever thinks, offers resistance» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 263) inasmuch as he «do not passively accept the already given» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 263). The element of the possibility in the object emerges only through its mediation with the subjective intention. Only the friction between subject and object brings out the non-identical as the determined moment for a possible praxis.

4.

In simpler words, subjective spontaneity becomes possible when it results from the clash with reality, as the trigger of their differentiation. As *reine Tathandlung*, it would hold to the false autonomous subjectivity, which guarantees the reproduction of the identical and enforces the «neediness of the object mediated via the total societal system» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 265). It is from this point of view that the subject is not constituent of the object, rather its agent. The subject is not the pure form that, once for all, predetermines the object as if they were autonomous one from another. Rather it emerges as spontaneity from its experience

of the object, articulating the qualitative difference between subjective and objective moments, critically determining the split between them. In this split, in this chasm, irreducible to both the subject and the object, is opened the possibility of praxis. This means though, that true praxis and true spontaneity should not be understood primarily as a form of subjective agency, but rather as the result of its active devotion to the object. Precisely «in the places where subjective reason senses subjective contingency, the primacy of the object shimmers through: *that in the object which is not a subjective addition* [An den Stellen, wo die subjektive Vernunft subjektive Zufälligkeit wittert, schimmert der Vorrang des Objekts durch; das an diesem, was nicht subjektive Zutat ist]» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 254). The subjective agency allows the non-identity of the object with itself, as set by the subject, to emerge: the subjective intention let thus what is irreducible to both the subjective intention and to the objective rationality to break through. Only the subject, through its agency and its self-reflection, is able to recognise what exceeds its intention – i.e. the objective moment – and thus also what can fulfil it. This «blind spot», which emerges through the mediation between subject and object, is where the non-identity is revealed as objective spontaneity: that is as concrete subjectivity. *What* is irreducible neither to the intention of the subject, nor to the abstract objectivity, constitutes the place of a possible spontaneity for both the subject and the object. And this non-identical can be discovered and determined only by theory.

Nonetheless, theory – even if considered as a form of praxis – remains irremediably tangled up in its contradictions. Theory is namely a form of postponed or, better, unfulfilled praxis (see Hammer, 2006, pp. 98 ff; Adorno and the Political. Its practical aspect consists in the disarticulation of both subjective and objective hypostasis, which is needed to make possible any true spontaneity. Nevertheless, «there is always something inappropriate to dilatory thinking about practice, even when the postponements are due to naked coercion» (Adorno, 1973, p. 245). Theory is in this sense hopeless, because it cannot achieve its fulfilment. Our contemporary condition is truly desperate [*desperate*]: on the one hand, «through praxis alone is it possible to escape the captivating spell [*Bann*] praxis imposes on people», but at the same time every form of immediate, active praxis «compulsively contributes to reinforcing the spell» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 262). To abstain from false praxis is thus the only possible praxis, which only theory allows: through its reflective attitude, it lets emerge the possibility of practical action. In this condition, doomed by unreality, by the infinite delay to the possible praxis, the condition of theory is similar to that of art: art too is indeed «the critique of praxis as unfreedom; [and] this is where its truth begins» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 262). In this sense, what is at stake in Adorno's

aesthetic is an account of the aesthetic in terms of politics or, more precisely, in terms of practical autonomy (see Ferris, 2005; Hammer, 2006, pp. 122 ff) Adorno and the Political). This does not mean that critical reflection is in any way “similar” to an artwork or that the two activities can be interchangeable: they are comparable only because of the possibility that both let shine through. In fact, the unity of the differentiated realized by the artwork is possible only thanks to its condition of appearance. It pays its synthesis without judgement through its unreality. «Reason, which in artworks effects unity even where it intends disintegration, achieves a certain guiltlessness by renouncing intervention in reality, real domination; yet even in the greatest works of aesthetic unity the echo of social violence is to be heard; indeed, through the renunciation of domination spirit also incurs guilt» (Adorno, 1997, p. 134). «Art judges exclusively by abstaining from judgment» (Adorno, 1997, p. 124), in the same way in which theory is true praxis only by abstaining from immediate praxis. However, both become at the same time guilt, precisely because of this abstention, even if their procedures radically differ one another. Critical thought works only through concepts, judgements, identification processes; that is, through the same instruments that are precluded for the work of art.

Nonetheless, both theory and art aim to set free the element of possibility. What distinguishes dialectics from other forms of theoretical procedures is its retention of the tension between identity and the non-identical. That is, the refusal both of any subject-object unity, as much as their undialectical detachment. Conversely, art exposes the subject-object unity as illusion, as *Schein*. Art realizes the synthesis not through judgement, but rather by means of appearance, semblance. Precisely by showing their actual unity as false, both art and theory let shine through their true unity as possible. In this tension to the mere possible, they can never *realize* their content without betraying their own essence. On the one hand, «thought forms tend beyond that which merely exists, is merely “given”» (Adorno, 1973, p. 19), on the other they also force the subject to experience its neediness, its insufficiency. Dialectic today lives in the tension between the absolute impossibility to represent a good life – that is to say a freed praxis – and the awareness that it would be possible. Thus theory, like art, resists against the illusion of the current positive happiness, by showing how the possibility of a good life has become problematic. Unmasking the actual (im)possibility of free praxis is the only possible form of praxis. Only by «focusing on the crucial point of the sclerotic reality, on those in which the fractures produced by the pression of the stiffening are coming to light» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 266), theory is able to emphasize «the aspects that might be able to lead beyond the given constraints» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 266).

5.

This peculiar condition affects the form of the theory itself. In the *Der Essay als Form* Adorno describes this condition in the most radical way (see Rose, 1978, p. 11): is indeed in this work that he describes what he calls the critical activity *par excellence*. That is, a kind of thought focused on content in a radical dialectical way. «The essay [...] as immanent critique of intellectual constructions, as a confrontation of what they are with their concept, it is critique of ideology» (Adorno, 1991, p. 18). The essay tries to heal the wound that the delay of praxis caused to thought, not by smoothing it, rather by renewing the laceration: this occurs by showing the inadequacy of «intellectual construction» – i.e. of concepts, judgments – with respect to their own *intention*. Dialectically speaking, this means nothing other than the “determinate negation” of a determinate conceptual *form* in the process of its unfolding, when the first is insufficient with respect to its *content*. The essay unfolds this inadequacy through its form. «The essay receives its impulse from the subjective intention», and «its weakness bears witness to the very non-identity it had to express. It also testifies to an excess of intention over object and thereby to the utopia which is blocked» (Adorno, 1991, p. 11). False praxis, as spontaneous, immediate expression of the subject, is thus unmasked in its being-mediated with the object. The essay mediates what is given as immediate by choosing its object from what is culturally mediated: it unmaskes the mediated nature of the immediate by inverting their positional value. It is «more dialectical than the dialectic» (Adorno, 1991, p. 28), because it dislocates the subject/object dichotomy also on the formal level. Its very form shows the false immediacy both of what is culturally mediated, inasmuch as of what is subjectively intended. It shows the impossibility of an immediate praxis, arisen from the spontaneity, by showing the dialectical codetermination of the subject with the object. Thus «the essay takes Hegelian logic at its word: the truth of the totality cannot be played off against individual judgments. Nor can truth made finite in the form of an individual judgment; instead, singularity’s claim to truth is taken literally, up to the point where its untruth comes evident» (Adorno, 1991, p. 19). The essay, by «reflecting the object without violence» (Adorno, 1991, p. 21), restores at the same time the possibility to express the non-identity resulting from the «excess of intention over object» (Adorno, 1991, p. 11). The essay exacerbates the conflict between subjective intention and resistance from the side of the object. Within the dialectical process it exercises that *Freiheit zum Object* that makes possible the kind of «communication of what is differentiated», which would characterize the state of reconciliation. The essay is characterized by the radical assumption of the subjective

intention over the object; but it is precisely the radical assumption of the subjective side that also enacts a peculiar *Freiheit zum Object*: the subjective intention is namely confronted with its insufficiency toward the object. By assuming the singular, individual intention and by confronting it with a cultural mediated object, «the essay mutely laments the fact that truth has betrayed happiness and itself along with it» (Adorno, 1991, p. 21). The unity of truth and happiness would namely mean the unity of theory and praxis, i.e. of objectivity and individual intention. What the essay shows instead is precisely their split. Nevertheless, thanks to its very formal construction it also let the possibility of a reconciled totality shimmer through; the essay «thinks in fragments, just as reality is fragmentary, and finds its unity in and through the breaks and not by glossing them over» (Adorno, 1991, p. 16). In other words, it «has to cause the totality to be illuminated in a partial feature, whether the feature be chosen or merely happened upon, without asserting the presence of the totality» (Adorno, 1991, p. 16). Hence, it lets the “negative happiness” of a possible reconciliation *shine*: but «even the highest manifestations of the spirit, which express this happiness, are always also guilty of obstructing happiness as long as they remain mere spirit. Hence the essay’s innermost formal law is heresy. Through violations of the orthodoxy of thought, something in the object comes visible which it is orthodoxy’s secret and objective aim to keep invisible» (Adorno, 1991, p. 23): that is, the wish of happiness, which the truth betrayed. As we already have said above, the *Übergang zur Praxis* «appears in theory, and indeed necessarily, as a blind spot» (Adorno, 2005 a, p. 278), because *it constitutes that vanishing point in which the spirit would sublimate itself and be other than itself*. This, and nothing else, is the image of redemption that compels thought to keep on thinking. As Adorno claims, «Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects – this alone is the task of thought» (Adorno, 2005 b, p. 247).

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Theory, Praxis and the Primacy of the Object: Some Remarks on Adorno's Conception of Dialectics

For Adorno, the possibility of a freed praxis is linked with the possibility of a freed experience. The aim of this contribution is to clarify this relationship: to do so, first I will consider the dialectical relationship between transcendental and empirical subjectivity within the framework of the Kantian epistemological foundation, showing how this foundation impedes the possibility of a freed praxis.

This will clarify in what sense, for Adorno, spontaneous activity and free praxis radically diverge: for him real praxis means indeed to express the «*neediness of the object*» rather than the one of the subject. Finally, I will consider the relation between the essayistic form, the artwork and the theoretical activity in Adorno as an attempt to overcome the contradiction of the presupposition of a freed praxis in our society.

KEYWORDS: Theory, Praxis, Primacy of the Object, Subject, Object, Freedom, Spontaneity.