Artefacts as Realizers: How Technology Shapes the World

Abstract

Functionalism defines artefacts as essentially functional entities, grounding their ontology in their intended (human) purpose. In this article, we propose an ontological experiment that reconceives artefacts as “realizers” that bring about corresponding “realizations.” We adopt these terms, drawing from the philosophy of mind—particularly the problem of multiple realizability—which also has implications for the philosophy of technology in a different context. We argue that functionalism, and the debates that derive from it, are mired in a series of untenable metaphysical dualisms. Our aim is to develop a metaphysic of artefacts that moves beyond function to account for the full spectrum of their effects across multiple levels of reality. We examine the challenges, limitations, and political implications of this perspective, arguing that the theory of realizers offers a richer and more productive ontological framework for understanding artefacts.