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*War machine and disruptive technology:  
investigation of the fringe*

*Abstract:* Deleuze and Guattari (1986) famously launched the concept of the war machine, characterized by the double externality. First, it is considered as outside of the State apparatus, challenging the sovereignty in traditional terms. Second, it is external to the military institution, without an inherent order, discipline or convergence. The main task of every State is to (re)appropriate the war machine through a set of various enunciative assemblages. On the other side, technological disruption of the State has been studied in a rather redundant manner. Clayton Christensen (1997; 2013) has been leading the school of those who scaled down disruption to the level of economic efficiency and profit-driven model. Accordingly, technology is just a rational choice of the apparatus to satisfy the need to follow the market. A different approach, a two-way process needs to be adopted to describe the interdependence of technology and state apparatus.

This paper claims that a State can't appropriate a fringe element because, at the moment when it does, it stops being fringe. War machine without being external turns out to be nothing more than a piece of the bureaucratic puzzle. Disruptive technology-adjusted to the needs of an apparatus is as fertile and systemic as it could possibly be. Both phenomena need their alienated positions to retain the purpose. Finally, it is necessary to consider a prospective dangerous romance between the war machine and disruptive technology. The former lacks capacity to challenge the cocooned sovereignty, while the latter lacks the platform upon which disruption would be disruptive. Consequently, the ultimate proposal of this paper is a mutually beneficial bricolage on the ontological periphery.

## 1. Introduction

The theory of the state has always been occupying a central place in political philosophy and social sciences. As a homogenizing factor of otherwise individualistic and egoistic human nature, the state has remained an all but unalterable cornerstone of social and political. An infinite amount of theories speaks volumes about that, ranging from divine right over the social contract to anarchist-nihilist stances (Dunleavy, O'Leary 1987; Vincent 1987). Non-state elements have traditionally been defined negatively, precisely as non-state, but never assigned a constitutive meaning. Even in the recent period labeled as a downturn of statism allegedly full of enlightening tendencies (Booth 1995), non-state structures have been constantly axiomatically judged solely on the basis of state absence. For example, increased worldwide commitments to preserve the natural environment and protect the

planet Earth is seen as positive squarely because they transcend the central role of the states, pushing them to be servants of higher ethical goals. However, what has not been acknowledged is that the absence of a statist paradigm obviously affects the overall efficiency and diminishes initially noble ideas to the level of idealistic appeals on human consciousness. Therefore, this paper seeks to address fringe elements in a rather radical manner, as ends in themselves. It is an investigation on the margins of political philosophy where the concoction of the two seemingly alien concepts can represent a viable yet dangerous alternative to the state itself. Although the primary goal of this paper is not to target state theory, as always in the social sciences gregarious motives are ubiquitous at least as the bedrock of certain constitutive concepts. Especially when the title ideas are alien to the state as we know it, mutual interactions tend to blur the importance of the former. To sum this argument up, the aim of the paper is to change the perspective of analysis in an anti-foundationalist manner, while the generic line of argumentation regarding the state theory is present just to a limited level.

The question this paper strives to answer is: what is the character of interaction between war machine and disruptive technologies? The process of unfolding the interaction starts with both the notions being put in relation to the state so that the concept of externality can be analyzed in an alternative context. However, it ends by treating them autonomously beyond the traditional interpretations. In doing so, a multidisciplinary, theoretically eclectic approach is employed. Political philosophy provides a solid basis for an examination of the intra and extra state dynamics. The post-structuralist theory of Deleuze and Guattari has served as the main inspiration for the paper, confirmed by the fact that the title concept is borrowed from their eponymic work "*Nomadology: The War Machine*" (1986) representing a part of the seminal study "*A Thousand Plateaus*" (1987[1980]). The post-structuralist framework has been confronted with the combined insights from business studies, security studies and even science and technology studies embodied in the notion of disruptive technology where a distinct and sophisticated realist approach is of critical importance (for example Christensen 1997). Nonetheless, political economy and liberal thought are necessary to assess the implications on sovereignty as the zero institution behind the abovementioned interactions. The paper is deliberately based on inductive reasoning since that perspective enables one to, equipped with valid arguments, zoom out the analysis and find systemic corollary, perhaps in an open-ended manner without the pressing need for concluding statements. In the end, political philosophy has remained a history of debatable observations, permanently challenged by the conflicting realities.

This paper is divided into four parts. First, the notion of the war machine is critically presented with the aim to transcend the externality issue and introduce a set of relational ontologies and constitutive ideas. The turmoil of war machine/state apparatus nexus is put in a relevant context. Second, disruptive technologies are being traced throughout the constraining business model of a servant to the state towards a much more inclusive two way processual character. Third, roots and modalities of cooperation between war machine and disruptive technology show how mutual vulnerability can become a surprising chance for rhizomatic creations.

Fourth, instead of a conclusion, the consequences of the dangerous romance is put in the context of new, hybrid forms of sovereignty, not anymore strictly related to the state-like elements.

## 2. Wars of the War machine

Immediately at the beginning, we encounter a crucial problem. Namely, Deleuze and Guattari explicate the essence of the war machine concept as follows: “As for the war machine in itself, it seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere” (1986 p. 4). Being irreducible to something pulls our attention towards the necessity of relating the two. On that trace, there is a point indeed in using Adorno’s assumptions about negativity where strengths of an epistemic subject are employed to avoid constitutive or constitutional subjectivity (1990, p. xx). Therefore, the ambitions of Deleuze and Guattari possibly were to deprive the war machine of its subjectivity and place it in the domain of deterritorialization and smooth space, but also to transcend being-below of the subject (*sub-jacere*) towards the concept of becoming.

In order to arrive at the point from which basic ontological assumptions can be translated to the language of notions, we need to analyze reflections of the war machine in the state apparatus and consider the character of their simultaneous existence. The basic dictum goes that the position of the war machine is that of double exteriority: it is neither state apparatus, nor military institution. In the words of authors: “[T]he war machine’s form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses” (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 16). We should make a significant distinction between being exterior and being born out of exteriority. The former is a descriptive statement about the fact of heterogeneity while the latter says much more, that exteriority is a consequence of internal divisions. War machine and state apparatus co-existed since the very beginning, taking different forms and flows: “They are not born of opposition, nor do they yield opposition; they simply go their separate, very different ways, until they happen to meet” (Cohen 2011, p. 275). In other words, they occupy different spaces but are not products of the series of binomial distinctions such as nomadic/sedentary, smooth/striated or laminar/lamellar. The opposition that really exists and is partially conditioned by exteriority is the fact that encounters of the two always result in the disappearance of one of them. But again, it does not mean that we can accept the adversarial relations as axiomatic. Deuchars claims: “[I]t should really come as no surprise that being “against the State” is not simply a negation, but the recognition of a different mode of becoming” (2018, p. 12). The modes connected to war machine are often shapeless, formed by the forces of deterritorialization. Being the invention of nomads (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 43), the war machine is a constant flow, a rhizomatic assemblage that does not need territory to be constituted, it comes from without. Having in mind that relations of exteriority and negation are redefined

and brought to the higher level, we can dedicate the attention to the challenging prospects of interaction dynamics between war machine and state apparatus.

War machine and state apparatus coexist, albeit being completely divergent. Consequently, there are no mutual relations of belonging. But that does not necessarily mean there are no tendencies or drives oriented towards the other element. In terms of state apparatus, it “has no war machine of its own; it can only appropriate one in the form of a military institution, one that will continually cause it problems” (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 7). Appropriation is the key concept because it describes a process rather than a conclusive event. The state can try to appropriate war machine (Reid 2003, p. 64), but even if it manages to do so, the result will be a continuous internal struggle, a constant redefinition of the sovereign power. If we reflect on the original state of coexistence between the war machine and state apparatus, it is obvious that the act of appropriation is generating antagonisms. The war machine engages in war solely after it has been challenged by the apparatus (Widder 2018, p. 327-328). The permissive causes of appropriation are pretty obvious, unlike the consequences. The question persists whether after the act of appropriation war machine still retains its original characteristics. In other words, chances are that the clash of the two opposites results in the creation of new meanings and socialities (Cohen 2011, p. 260). Following earlier remark that war machine lives as a set of its own metamorphosis, if they are to be imposed by an external structure, the very existence of war machine is endangered. Paradoxically, the moment of the defeat of the war machine can be a signal of its actual dominance. Namely, state appropriation of war machine makes citizen subordinated to worker and soldier (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 43-45), while war becomes subordinated to the aims of the state (p. 96-98). On the other side, the state apparatus is pushing the war machine towards its original, (self)destructive role in which warfare is the means to impede the state formation within its own loose or non-existent organization. Following that Crogan concluded that the subordination of war to the aims of the state indicates the dominance of the war machine for which warfare is but a primary source of resistance to appropriation (1999, p. 145). After we shed a light on the ontological position of the war machine as well as its interaction with the state apparatus, finally we can consider which forms the war machine takes when put in a constitutive framework.

If we are to adopt the language of levels of analysis, a war machine conditioned by its externality can be constitutive on the supra-state and sub-state level. The former is embodied in worldwide machines of multinational corporations or various religious movements, while the latter is the micro-rhizomatic mechanism of gangs or packs (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 15-20). Both levels represent an inherent danger to the functioning of the state because they are not reducible to the hierarchy. In other words, it is impossible to appropriate them. Precisely that impossibility should lead us towards the formulation of a *sui generis*, substantial war machine which gains legitimacy from the specifics of its existence (becoming). When Deleuze presented an ideal type of war machine he wrote that it is “a kind of war machine that will not re-create a state apparatus, a nomadic unit related to the outside that will not revive an internal despotic unity” (1985, p. 149). Finally, we

can conclude that the war machine is an inherent resistance towards the functioning of an arborescent apparatus.

At the very limits of the fringe stands war machine as a reflection of the Hegelian concept of the struggle for recognition (Hegel 2018; Honneth 1992). Namely, similar to a crook craving for punishment as proof of his individuality, the war machine seeks to find surplus sources of legitimacy which will at the same time be instruments of resistance to the state, but also confirmation of the nomadic structure in a positive sense. Therefore, we can compare the war machine to the Stirner's anarchist but rational structures (Newman 2001, p. 161-65) and Schmitt's partisan hidden deeply in the woods waging a conceptual war (Widder 2018, p. 5). All of the aforementioned have in common the fact that without war machine social and political domains would function in accordance with the Hegelian ideal of ethical community. However, the presence of the war machine brings power and economy into play and permanently challenges the dogmatic hierarchies.

### 3. The Scope of Technological Disruption

Comparably to the war machine, disruptive technology has been most often considered as disruptive to the state apparatus, not retaining its sovereign, constitutive characteristics. It is done through the business models and close ties with political economy. Champion of this approach is Clayton Christensen, creator of notions of disruptive innovation (1997) and disrupting class (Christensen, Johnson, Horn 2008). His approach is reductionist, constraining disruption to be applicable solely to the financial market and business sector. Obviously, the disruption then is a one-way process where services or technologies become servants of the markets or states. Christensen describes disruption as an event of a new smaller structure replacing the bigger incumbent one as the leader in a particular area (1997, p. 5-11). The most significant reflection of the process is the discrepancy between the sustaining trajectory of the incumbent and the disruptive trajectory of the new structure (Christensen, Raynor, McDonald, 2015). The relative discrepancy being higher for the disruptive trajectory means faster and more comprehensive disruption. As can be inferred, this batch of literature was not completely ground-breaking since traces can be found as deep in theories of political economy as in Schumpeter or even Kondratieff whose early quote is a self-fulfilling prophecy: "Long waves of technological change and the process of creative destruction caused by new technologies and new skill sets either creating or redefining firms and existing markets" (1935, p. 105-106). Applications of these theories which would deserve much more detailed elaboration and a bold criticism are multiple. Moving away from the business sector, the same is applicable to one service or technology introduced to the state apparatus. Claus Schwab famously described technological disruption in the so-called Fourth Industrial Age where new concepts such as artificial intelligence, robotics, internet of things, autonomous vehicles, and others are "changing the way we live, work, and relate to one another" (2016, p. 7). Particularly concerned should be state apparatuses immersed in a

non-disruptive, linear way of thinking (p. 8). The most widely spread application of disruptive technology is certainly in military studies where consequences on international relations are striking. Stephen Biddle claims that “new technology will permit faster transitions to great power status, and will systematically alter the sources of the power that underwrites that status” (1998, p. 6). Many modern revolutions in military affairs are suitable confirmations for such a claim.

As was already said, this school of disruptive technology sees it as subordinated to the needs of states or markets. The critical perspective is needed to underline that disruption cannot be systemic, but always fringe. Therefore, similarly like with the war machine, the state can try to appropriate the fringe element, but in the very moment of appropriation either it stops being fringe or the state ceases to exist as such. Scaling down disruptive technology to the level of a tool in hands of systemic hierarchies essentially means depriving it of disruption. A new model must be proposed, that of two-way, mutually constitutive relations not solely tied to the state apparatus, but as will be seen later with war machine or other structures. Before digging deeper into the proposition it is necessary to devote close attention to both notions in the phrase disruptive technology.

Technology is certainly present as a conductor of disruption, but it should not be perceived in its manifest form of tools or instruments, but rather as an onto(teo)logical notion with its essence being confrontation of human with what is always-already present, or thrown in the world. Having that in mind, (without entering into details, though, for the sake of space limitations) Heidegger must be read who took technology to a whole new level of understanding. For this research, one aspect is particularly significant: “All distances in time and space are shrinking... Yet the hasty setting aside of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in a small amount of distance” (2013, p. 58). Therefore, technology can be considered as being disruptive on at least three levels: first, its core characteristic is to negate the existing set of regulative ideas in a Kantian sense; second, it always creates a new system governed by its own merits; third, it deconstructs and is being deconstructed through a set of formally and methodologically irreconcilable, but vitally needed practices. Following Stiegler (2002) it can be said that technology reflects the experience of Kenosis (self-emptying to be able to receive faith from the Other), where it has the prosthetic role.

Disruptive technology undoubtedly affects the existing system and causes certain changes. Some examples have already been mentioned such as the revolution in military affairs which indirectly determines the outlook of the international relations or unpredictable business sector where the good standing stocks of today can become worthless tomorrow due to the appearance of a small start-up with an innovative approach. All of this is enhanced by being immersed in the ubiquitous paradigm of our age marked by digitalization and the blurred border between human and machine. The critical point is the advancement of Ulrich Beck’s risk society (1986) embodied in invisible and invincible threat into what I call governance of unpredictability. It is not to claim that in such an era every revolution is down-scaled to the mere product of uncertainty, rather we can establish disruptiveness as a more endurable practice. Taking into account the above mentioned, I claim that

disruptive technology is antecedent to the change of systemic paradigms. Finally, the crucial question is whether technology causes the shift or the shift is pertinent to the technology itself. The answer is to be found in the correlation of manifest appearances of technology and its latent oneiric intrusions into the rationale of systemic hierarchies.

The starting point of the answer is precisely the new proposed model of disruptive technology. The mutual constitution of disruptive technology and another platform being it state or state-like, enables technology to impose its disruptive character while at the same time being adjusted to the needs of the other. By doing so, the trap of essential continuity has been avoided and disruption is treated as it should actually be, as nascent and predictable just when in hindsight (Kostoff et.al, 2004, p. 142). Although it may sound similar to the usual model of disruption, the key difference lies in the fact that disruption will be a long-lasting process and not a transitional phase until systemic structures find the way to appropriate it. On the other side, the technology itself will not be prone to radical adjustments, but solely to a sufficient extent to preclude the emergence of an adversarial relationship as is obviously the case with the war machine. Moreover, technology should transcend the state as the traditional platform upon which to be disruptive and travel through the center towards the margin since there lies the real ontological potential. We can compare this movement with a theory of RMA where the move from economic determinist to contingent innovation model dictates the very principle of disruptive (Biddle 1998, p. 6-9). Indeed, the iteration of contingency is completely compatible with the rhizomatic nature of disruptive technology. With that in mind, the war machine and disruptive technologies can be meaningfully put to work together.

#### 4. War Machine and Disruptive Technology: A Dangerous Romance

Without a doubt, both war machine and disruptive technology have been located at the margins. Provided that the title is suitable, the method for researching those margins should be called the investigation of the fringe. Three are the main characteristics of the fringe domain: deterritorialized space, instability and legitimation of the obsolete.

Departing from the notion of territory in the traditional sense, Deleuze and Guattari saw its transformation when confronted with the appearance of nomads: “[I]t is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself. It is the earth that deterritorializes itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory” (1986, p. 45). Therefore, the fringe embodied in nomadic principle sees territory as a secondary feature whose presence is not a necessary condition for the positive constitution of the commons, as well as for identification of nomads with being precisely that without the need for an external actor to grant the recognition. It is through the absence of proper territory that the war machine has been born and technology became disruptive. Following the passage from Deleuze and Guattari, it can

be seen that the attempts to (re)build on the lack of presence indicate continuous non-existence of the state-like elements and inherent structural impossibility for engineering science to impose its own haunting premises.

Except for the fringe being marked by the lack of territory, but also because of that fact, it is a domain of instability. A wide array of characteristics pertinent to the war machine can be translated onto the environment of the fringe: “[V]iolence, instability... vortical, vectoral, projective or swarming and eruptive movement” (Cohen 2011, p. 276). Consequences of the rhizomatic nature are evident, apparently loosely connected, chaotic, but paradoxically very durable and with the solid underlying logic. Instability here is interpreted as a critical impediment towards the appearance of the state either as an internal obstacle for the organization and systematization or an external refusal of acceptance of the more or less coherent rules of engagement. That is why the fringe is marked by “a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor” (Deleuze, Guattari, 1986, p. 13). Often expressed the vision of nomads as agents whose mobility is motivated solely because of an adventurous spirit and the lack of relation of belonging to a certain state is shattered here by the very fact of impossibility of being in that relation.

Through the process that I call legitimization of the obsolete, the fringe, together with featuring actors, is adopting the means of the fight and the lines of flight. This can be best explained on the example of science. As Crogan writes, states capture the knowledge in form of science, but also technical artifacts to be labeled as applied science (1999, p. 139-140). If we take military history as an example, the majority of the groundbreaking weapon systems have not been discovered under the auspices of the state, but always in the tribes, mercenaries, scientists, private companies (for example Dupuy 1980, p. 1-10, 91-105; Brodie 1962, p. 7-14). The logical move of the state was to acquire those technologies, deprive them of disruptive character and use it as applied science, in this particular case military science. That is why Deleuze and Guattari hit the point by claiming an utterly pragmatic move of the states to retain the (nomadic) science they can appropriate and to ban all of the remaining (1986, p. 21). The list of persons, theories and discoveries that were pushed to the margins is infinite. That list is the naming of the obsolete to be used in the domain of the fringe. There lie the power and instability, but also the most dangerous of them all: power of the instability.

Locating both phenomena in the fringe domain means that their encounter is an unavoidable event. Some authors would call it an event of organicity (Cohen 2011), while others would rather talk about Event where capital letter signals a concrete, particular form of universality (Badiou 2005, p. 42-45). Regardless of the character of the event, the encounter occurs under certain conditions and produces striking consequences. The rest of this chapter is dedicated precisely to those two manifestly causal but latently ontological categories.

The conditions under which war machine and disruptive technology meet at the metaphysical periphery are mutual vulnerability and symbiosis (the fusion of such opposed conceptual frameworks of strategic studies and biology is deliberately used here). Although the two are to an extent sequential, for the sake of



intelligibility, we should separate them. Mutual vulnerability is a concept drawn from the period of the nuclear stalemate in international relations when great powers are needed to overcome adversarial Cold war relations (Nef 1999, p. 2-4). The proposition has been to arrive at the point at which two sides would recognize the flaws in each other to the extent of creating a common negative foundation for the preclusion of prospective conflicts. Translated to the fringe domain, both war machine and disruptive technology have critical shortcomings that need to be recognized in order to avoid any kind of subordination or domination. Concretely, the war machine lacks the means to challenge cocooned sovereignty. This is not to claim that the war machine is incapable of confronting state sovereignty which “reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally” (Deleuze, Guattari 2008, p. 68). Quite on the contrary, it needs surplus-value to create new forms of sovereignty that would co-exist and release it from the cocoon of systemic hierarchies. In addition to that, except for missing tools, the war machine is deprived of sources of legitimacy for its own modality of existence.

As has already been mentioned, the vulnerability of disruptive technology is a non-existent platform upon which to be disruptive. State apparatuses have been continuously adopting the disruptive as servile or simply refusing to engage with it. One more time resorting to military science, Pierce claims: “[T]o bring the technology to full maturity where it can disrupt the old way of doing things, you generally have to disguise it” (2005, p. 2). The very disguise here is a euphemism for the absolute state apparatus control of the disruptiveness. Moreover, adjusting the old way of doing things after the appropriation of technology means nothing more than recalibrating the means for the achievement of strategic goals. Because of that, disruptive technology requires an application within the fringe domain where it can explicitly be disruptive and where the absence of a hierarchy would cut with the tradition of avoiding systemic changes. In the end, if there is no system, disruption should not represent a dangerous, but potentially pragmatic practice.

It is not difficult now to imagine the transformation from mutual vulnerability to the prospective symbiosis of the war machine and disruptive technology. Benefits for the war machine stem from the fact that disruptive technology will add to its development, constitutive capacity, and ontological strength. As described in Crogan, the unfolding of the technological lineages which always remain exterior guarantee that any technological innovation will “have the potential to induce the intensive, transformative speed proper to the War Machine” (1999, p. 139-140). Transformative speed equals widen the horizon of possibilities for the actualization of the fringe and establishment of new centers. The more disruptive technology contributes towards the sustainability of war machine as such, the closer it will get to the bedrock of sovereignty as will be described in the provisional conclusion. However, it is important to note before any technological unfolding stands a nomad (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 78). Similarly to the placing of the war machine in the domain of nomadic becoming, disruptive technology can follow the trend. Technological empowering of the war machine to the level where it can exist without war as the center of gravity is a structural necessity of the fringe domain,

a centrifugal attempt to make state apparatus impotent and turn it into a silent observer. To use Lévi-Strauss and his notions, instead of engineering, a reformed war machine will be built by a *bricoleur*. As can be inferred, symbiosis means that the other part of the dichotomy has certain developmental potential as well.

War machine represent a platform upon which disruptive technology can remain equally disruptive before and after the encounter. To prove the unchanged nature of the disruption we will draw from the legal theory of Carl Schmitt where a state of exception represents a self-identifying act of a sovereign by which he puts law outside of the law. In other words, it is a legal action that cannot be legal (Agamben 2005, p. 1-11). Building upon this theory, Agamben notices the paradoxical nature of the state of exception: "Being-outside, and yet belonging; this is the topological structure of the state of exception" (2005, p. 35). When the state of exception becomes a mode of governance (possible to find even in the most democratic societies of today), we can speak about a permanent state of exception. Using those insights, the conclusion is that technological disruption has the same substance as a sovereign exception. Namely, its monolithic permanence in transcending the external-internal division ensures that exception never becomes a new normal and disruption never becomes a new servant. The war machine and its transformative potential perfectly match the similar tendencies of disruptive technology. One more time, stability is here embodied in instability and on that foundation, the whole dynamics of credible chaos are to be built.

Finally, the war machine and disruptive technology need to be put in relation to revolution. Lambert claims that all the great revolts, especially of revolutionary kind tend to become another form of violence (2010, p. 4-6). Deleuze and Guattari compare war machine to the history of revolutionary insurgencies giving birth to continuous struggles and even harsher oppositions (Switzer 2010, p. 157). The question asked here is whether the concoction of the two revolutionary concepts can result in the first radical change which will not lean towards the total destruction? The fringe domain indicates a degree of possibility for that to occur since an inherent destructive potential can be turned into the brand new constitutive perspective.

## 5. Towards the Conclusion

When Jacques Derrida wrote that there is something rogue in every state, he added: "[T]he recourse to terror and fear has always been [...] the ultimate recourse for the sovereign power of the state, in an implicit or explicit, blatant or subtle, form, and even when it is contractual and protective" (2007, p. 47-48). Contrary to the often explicated dogma about the sovereignty as the primary institution and highest ethical contribution of the statehood, Derrida noticed its wicked role. Consequently, without any axiological or etiological assumptions, we are free to claim that the most central statist element is actually located in the fringe domain similarly to its traditional "non-state" counterparts.

Finally, without any additional scruples, we can formulate the underlying principle of the paper: interaction of war machine and disruptive technology is intended to produce a new form of sovereignty. An indeterminate article is intentionally used because it would be just one of the limitless number of hybrid forms. Sovereignty is being pulled away from the states and not tamed, but liberated to be re-constituted. In other words, sovereignty becomes fringe and the fringe becomes sovereign. In that dangerous romance lies the great potential, but the great hazard as well. If state apparatuses free themselves from the constraints of system hierarchies and decide to roam free across the whole spectrum of becomings than the new resilient structure will appear as a viable alternative. In that conjuncture, hierarchy evolves to omniarchy, leaving the system obsolete as the very last remnant of the times when totalizing tendencies were substitution for the freedom of ontological association. For the very end let us recall the distinction of George Dumezil who described two faces of sovereignty as magician-king and jurist-priest, despot and the legislator (Deleuze, Guattari 1986, p. 3). In the world full of nomads dare to be an ambitious magician-king...

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