flessibile, anticipatorio, diretto a uno scopo» (p. 111). Numerosi e interessanti sono gli esempi riportati da Calvo di efficace comunicazione, di capacità di apprendimento e di giudiziose analisi di costi e benefici condotte da parte delle piante. Talmente giudiziose da poter arrivare a parlare, con non poche reazioni contrarie, di macchine predittive. Per l'autore, infatti, il mondo vegetale è in grado di interagire con l'ambiente circostante seguendo le regole dell'inferenza percettiva e dell'inferenza attiva teorizzate da Friston. Non solo le piante avrebbero la capacità di autocorreggersi, ma anche di modificare l'ambiente affinché questo coincida con le loro aspettative. E lo farebbero secondo la loro "personalità": l'esperienza di una pianta, nel percepire *affordances* in ciò che la circonda, non è uguale a quella di un'altra. La frontiera della fitopersonalità è esplorata dal filosofo della scienza nell'ultima sezione del testo. «Una volta che abbiamo visto i meccanismi complessi usati dalle piante per raccogliere e impiegare l'informazione dedotta dai loro ambienti, i comportamenti intelligenti di cui sono capaci i vegetali e le relazioni intricate che hanno con gli altri organismi intorno a loro. Abbiamo preso in considerazione cosa si prova a essere una pianta […]» (p. 233), un ripensamento filosofico di ciò che abbiamo tradizionalmente inteso per mente, intelligenza, comportamento cognitivo, coscienza e consapevolezza diviene necessario. D'altronde, ed è questo l'invito che il testo rivolge efficacemente ai lettori, se formazioni diverse di tessuto nervoso possano arrivare alle stesse funzioni, la possibilità che le capacità cognitive, compresa la senzienza, possano essere raggiunte da altri tessuti (che nervosi non sono) dovrebbe essere quanto meno presa in seria considerazione.

Mauro Carbone, Graziano Lingua, *Toward an Anthropology of Screens: Showing and Hiding, Exposing and Protecting*, Palgrave Macmillan, Cham 2023 [Chiara Scarlato]

A philosophical examination of the role that screens play in our lives is essential for a multitude of reasons that directly relate to the human condition in the present era. This is because our bodies are constantly engaged with screens, thereby establishing various forms of proximity and mutual interaction with them. These forms of proximity (or mutual interactions) were particularly evident during the global pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which spread from China to other countries from the end of 2019 onwards, reaching its peak during 2020. Subsequently, we have been gradually led to a situation of coexistence with the virus, which, by an

extraordinary semantic conjunction, went 'viral' not only in the physical world but also in the virtual one. Among the plethora of artistic creations that emerged during the pandemic, one particularly noteworthy example was the series of images depicting rats drawn on the walls of street artist Banksy's bathroom at his residence. The images were initially disseminated on Banksy's social media channels in April 2020, accompanied by the caption "My wife hates it when I work from home". The aesthetic merits of the work aside, the artist with the mysterious identity has highlighted the broader human reaction to the pandemic: when individuals have been forced to withdraw from the outside world, they have reproduced that world within the private spaces of their homes.

This mode of responding to the pandemic can be viewed as an allegorical representation of a novel mode of existence in the world that has gradually emerged over the past few years in conjunction with the growing utilisation of digital screens. While it is evident that the "romantización de la cuarentena [ha sido] un privilegio de clase" (as evidenced by a banner posted on a private residence), this experience can be considered a case study through which to reflect on the occurrence of the following fact in the human condition: the prohibition of establishing any relationship with the outside world has resulted in the transformation of domestic spaces from private to institutional settings. In this situation, our own bodies were institutionalised within the virtual community, and this form of integration was achieved thanks to the mediation of screens. It is, therefore, of particular importance to philosophically examine the interactions between human beings (or bodies) and (digital) screens, as Mauro Carbone and Graziano Lingua do in their book entitled *Toward an Anthropology of Screens: Showing and Hiding, Exposing and Protecting* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).

In his analysis of the pandemic, Carbone was among the first to emphasise the dual nature of screens as both tools to facilitate communication and also to protect themselves. Indeed, during the pandemic, screens acted as intermediaries between the external and internal realms, facilitating communication while simultaneously constraining physical interaction in order to protect human lives. In this sense, screens have served not only the function of disseminating information about external events, but also that of disseminating information about internal events, including those normally occurring in private and individual spaces. But this is not simply a matter of considering the reversal of the dynamic between the external and internal realms, but also the possibility to maintain affective relationships with others. In sum, the pandemic experience made evident that human beings require a range of screens – including smartphones, tablets, and laptops –

in order to extend their physical presence in the world and also to entertain interactions with the external environment and other individuals. Although it is important to recognise that the pandemic has set in motion a series of processes whose ramifications will continue to unfold in the coming years, Carbone and Lingua's volume offers as of now valuable insights for contemplating the coming of these processes, by particularly focusing on screens from a multifaceted perspective that encompasses philosophical and political dimensions. By doing so, the volume also provides thought-provoking reflections on a range of topics, including, i.e.: ethical and moral issues pertaining to contemporary human social life; the impact of wea-rable technology on human sensory perception; and the advent of novel forms of affective relationships.

In order to better elucidate the timing and pivotal philosophical value of this volume, it is more than useful to briefly linger on the four verbs which compose the subtitle of the book, namely: 1) to show; 2) to hide; 3) to pro-tect; 4) to expose. The authors' decision to conjugate the verbs at the gerund appears to recall not only their respective denotations but also the "gesture" indicated by each of them, in accordance with the specific semantic conno-tations that this can assume in relation to screens. In this context, the actions of showing, hiding, and protecting and exposing can be conceptualized as follows: 1) showing can be defined as an action performed with the inten-tion of attracting attention to a specific object or subject; 2) the act of hiding can be seen as the result of an unconscious or conscious selection process, whereby individuals decide what to show or, precisely, hide in screens; 3) protecting can be viewed as a form of hiding, albeit with an affirmative in-tention. This intention concerns a form of safeguarding that extends beyond mere concealment and encompasses the preservation of something from the attention of others. It can be viewed as an act of selective exposure, where the intention is not just to display information but to maintain control over how and what it is presented; 4) the verb "exposing" is the most radical of these, as it calls to mind the necessity not only of displaying specific items, but of conveying a vast array of information within the confines of a screen by triggering a mechanism that leads to the total overlapping between real and virtual life. Bearing in mind these four meanings, let us attempt to situate each one of these verbs at the vertices of a figurative square that coincides with a "screen". We may then consider this screen as a space within which we have moved, are moving and will move. This space is none other than the screen that, in a certain sense, we have always inhabited, regardless of the concrete interaction between our bodies and the screens that has been emphasized during the pandemic.

Given that the connection between screens and bodies is rooted in the human evolutionary history, it is not the contemporary screens themselves that is of primary consequence, but rather the manner in which it has been used throughout time. This is also the primary reason why Carbone and Lingua speak of an "anthropology" of screens, alluding to the conjunction between human beings and their utilisation of surfaces that – on occasion, from time to time – have been employed to show, hide, protect, or expose a body situated in that equilibrium of the visible and the invisible, as defined by specific spatio-temporal coordinates. In other words, from the prehistoric era to the most contemporary times, humans have always made use of 'screens' in order to interact with the environment they inhabited. In this regard, Carbone makes a particularly pertinent observation, recalling the notion of "arche-screen" (crucial also in his *Philosophy-screens*, SUNY Press 2019), which is intended to denote a trans-historical principle "in which the power to distribute the visible and the invisible interweaves with other powers that not only involve the presentation of figures, images, or other signs but also imply one's exposure to the environment and one's ability to mediate the relationships that this exposure involves, protecting oneself from the excesses it may bring" (p. 20). Carbone and Lingua's book, thus, attempts to provide a genealogical archive of the human experience with screens, spanning i.e. from the walls of prehistoric caves to the cinema screens, from the mythological Perseus' shield to Google Glass, from the Biblical veil to our own human bodies.

The ten programmatic premises presented in the introduction serve to further contextualise the authors' methodological approach, which also entails a critique of the opposition between words and images, as well as the assumption of an impossible distinction between images and screens. As we have extensively seen above, Carbone and Lingua's volume arises from a specific consideration around the use of technology during the pandemic, a use that has led towards the need of rethinking the border between virtual and real, but also on the influence that screens have got in our lives as human beings living in a world which is, somehow, both virtual and real. Thus, "'to relearn to see screens' is to make the effort of allowing the precious teachings of a somewhat collective 'phenomenological epoché' to sediment before they gradually begin to fade away" (p. 13). Moreover, this form of re-education to see screens might help in considering the functional interactions between bodies and screens. Over time, it may also help to anticipate and prepare for the gradual evolution of their interaction in a form of a total integration. The five chapters of the volume provide, thus,

useful tools not only for understanding this form of interaction, but also for "having a guide" within the universe of screens which seamless affect our virtual and real lives.

The latter intention is particularly apparent in the conclusions, which are structured in a manner analogous to the premises, and encompass ten potential outcomes for the future research on screens in a theoretical passage from anthropology to ethics. In the second point of this 'manifesto', it is emphasized that "screens show us daily what they are capable of doing and enable us to do, while also revealing their growing independence in relation to our interactions with images" and it is exactly for this reason that "the need for a pragmatics of screen experiences [is] increasingly urgent and complex" (p. 166). In a Foucauldian sense, it can be argued that the only way to protect ourselves from the dynamics of power and control is by describing and individuating them. In the case of screens, as Carbone and Lingua frequently illustrate in their publication, it is also important to avoid stigmatising screens as such. Instead, it is necessary to consider the ways in which we ourselves use screens in order to re-learn not only how to see (through) screens, but also to re-learn how to consciously protect and hide what we unconsciously show and expose.

Rosa Maria Marafioti, *Heidegger und die Gottesfrage*, Bautz, Nordhausen 2024 [Francesco Terenzio]

La monografia di Rosa Maria Marafioti, *Heidegger und die Gottesfrage*, affronta in maniera sistematica il rapporto del pensiero di Martin Heidegger con la questione di Dio e, più in generale, con la teologia. Si tratta di un aspetto della filosofia di Heidegger che, già dalla pubblicazione di *Sein und Zeit* nel 1927, ha suscitato un ampio dibattito: Erich Przywara, teologo gesuita tra le figure più rilevanti del cattolicesimo del XX secolo, interlocutore di Karl Barth e mentore di Edith Stein, sottolineò sin da subito le radici cristiane dell'analitica esistenziale heideggeriana. Analogamente, anche Rudolf Bultmann e Karl Löwith lessero l'opera come una secolarizzazione della concezione cristiana dell'esistenza (p. 11). Numerosi altri studiosi hanno successivamente insistito sull'ambiguità della posizione di Heidegger, apparentemente in bilico tra il distacco critico da ogni riferimento religioso e un importante debito nei confronti dell'eredità teologica (p. 11n). Nonostante le molteplici ricerche dedicate all'influenza di Heidegger sulla teologia del '900 e, viceversa, agli influssi che gli studi teologici e il clima religioso dell'epoca ebbero sul suo