

# THE SOUL AND ITS POWERS ACCORDING TO TOMMASO DEL GARBO (D. 1370), A PHYSICIAN IN TRECENTO ITALY

Joël Chandelier, Aurélien Robert

## *Abstract*

Tommaso del Garbo, son of the famous Dino del Garbo and a pupil of Gentile da Foligno, taught medicine in several Italian universities in the 14th century. Although he left no philosophical treatises, his taste for intellectual speculation is well known and some passages in his medical works bear witness to this. In this paper, we examine *quaestiones* and *dubia* on the relationship between the soul and its powers, which are quite similar to what can be read at the same time in commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. Thanks to these texts, which we are editing as an appendix to this paper, we will show that Tommaso del Garbo had a very precise knowledge of the debates of his time (he quotes Radulphus Brito, John of Jandun, Francis of Marchia and William of Alnwick) and that he defends an original position inspired by William of Ockham's nominalism. According to this theory, the soul is nothing other than its powers, which are only ways of designating the same reality on the ontological level.

*Keywords:* Tommaso del Garbo, William of Ockham, medicine, noetics, nominalism.

In his *Book on the origins of the city of Florence and her famous citizens*, Filippo Villani, who writes in the last decades of the fourteenth century, devotes a small note to Tommaso del Garbo (d. 1370). Described as an “imitator of his father's finesse”, Tommaso was indeed the son of Dino del Garbo, a famous physician who died in 1327. Villani insists on his professional achievements: “When they fell ill, the powerful tyrants of which Italy is full were convinced that they would necessarily die if they did not have Tommaso as their physician”<sup>1</sup>. But the chronicler also insists, on two occasions, on a lesser known aspect of his character: Tommaso is described as a “very great philosopher in medicine” (*phylosophus maximus*

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1 Filippo Villani, *Liber de origine civitatis Florentie et de eiusdem famosis civibus*, ed. G. Tanturli, Antenore, Padua 1997, pp. 135-136 for the first version of the text. Filippo Villani later modified the text, accentuating this aspect: Tommaso is said *phylosophus permaximus in medicina* (ivi, pp. 395-396).

in medicine) and it is emphasized that he “took extraordinary pleasure in philosophical matters” (*in phylosophicis [...] mire delectatus*). In the same vein, Villani attributes to him a “very insightful”, yet unfinished (like his *Summa medicinalis*), commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*<sup>2</sup>.

Tommaso del Garbo should not be regarded as an exceptional and isolated case. As soon as medicine was integrated into the Italian universities in the second half of the thirteenth century, the relationship between philosophy and medicine was not only intellectual but also institutional. The two disciplines were united in a single faculty (of arts and medicine) and professors as well as students easily passed from one to the other without disruption<sup>3</sup>. Such a situation favored thematic overlaps, particularly on topics concerning biology, the functioning of the human body or the relationship between the body and the soul. Doctors regularly mentioned this last point in their lessons but also in their written productions: in addition to a theoretical interest in physiology, there were also motivated by medical issues concerning mental illnesses, doctor-patient relationships and the role of physicians in the government of the self.

If Tommaso del Garbo is therefore part of a long lineage, we would like to show that he did not only take an interest in philosophy for practical or didactic reasons, but defended strong theses and positioned himself, well beyond what his peers could do, in contemporary debates on the nature of

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2 Ivi, p. 136: “Postremo magnum opus aggressus est, quod *Summam totius medicine* voluit appellari, sed morte preventus incompletum reliquit; parum tamen illi deficere periti medicine testantur. In phylosophicis insuper mire delectatus, Aristotelis librum subtilissimum *De anima* perspicacissime commentavit; sed praeperipientibus dies fatis etiam imperfectum reliquit”.

3 On this topic, some classic works are still very useful: N.G. Siraisi, *Taddeo Alderotti and his Pupils. Two Generations of Italian Medical Learning*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1981; P.-G. Ottosson, *Scholastic Medicine and Philosophy. A study of commentaries on Galen’s Tegni (ca. 1300-1450)*, Bibliopolis, Napoli 1984; J. Agrimi, C. Crisciani, *Edocere medicos. Medicina scolastica nei secoli XIII-XV*, Guerini e Associati, Naples 1998. Recently, the volume *La filosofia in Italia al tempo di Dante*, ed. C. Casagrande, G. Fioravanti, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2016, offers very important contributions on the teaching of philosophy and medicine in Bologna at the end of the 13<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century (especially the chapters by Andrea Tabarroni, Chiara Crisciani and Gianfranco Fioravanti). For more precise discussions, see also C. Crisciani, *Medicina e filosofia nel Medioevo: aspetti e fasi di un rapporto discusso*, in “I Castelli di Yale. Quaderni di filosofia”, 9, 2007-2008, pp. 9-35, and L. Bianchi, *Ubi desinit physicus, ibi medicus incipit*, in G. Zuccolin (a cura di), *Summa doctrina et certa experientia. Studi su medicina e filosofia per Chiara Crisciani*, SISMELE – Edizioni del Galluzzo, Florence 2017, pp. 5-28.

the soul. From this point of view, Tommaso del Garbo is an original figure, part of his time as well as exceptional. For this reason, exploring his theoretical concerns with the soul-body relationship can help us understand not only how Italian physicians of the *Trecento* became interested in philosophy, but rather how they *were* philosophers, in the same way as theologians were philosophers – that is, with an approach that was certainly peculiar and sometimes constrained by the epistemological and sociological frameworks of the discipline, but always informed and deliberate.

### 1. *Tommaso del Garbo, the physician and the soul*

Tommaso del Garbo is, in every respect, a perfect representative of the trends and developments of the medical discipline during the *Trecento*<sup>4</sup>. Born probably between 1310 and 1320, he studied in Perugia under Gentile da Foligno (d. 1348), himself a former colleague of his father in Siena. He began his medical teaching in Bologna (1341-1343) and then gave lessons in the capital of Umbria (1343-1345) before going back to Bologna and then, from 1348 onwards, moving to the newly re-founded University of Florence, where he became the first professor of medicine. While continuing to teach at the university in the 1350s and 1360s, Tommaso del Garbo turned toward practice and attended to great figures such as Galeazzo II Visconti. At the same time, he held several important offices within the Florentine Republic: he was consul of the guild of doctors and apothecaries on six occasions, prior of the commune in 1358 and 1363 and even *Gonfaloniere di Giustizia* – the most important position in the city – in 1368.

This evolution, characterized by a less strictly academic career, even though he never left university, is quite typical of many physicians in the second half of the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries. This explains why the majority of Tommaso del Garbo's works preserved until today date from the 1340s and 1350s, i.e. from the beginnings of his academic career. For example, in 1341 he wrote a commentary on the chapter of Avicenna's *Canon* on the generation of the embryo<sup>5</sup>, in 1343 a treatise on the restoration of radical moisture<sup>6</sup>, a commentary on Galen's *De differentiis februm*

4 On Tommaso del Garbo, see A. De Ferrari, *Tommaso del Garbo*, in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, vol. XXXVI, 1988, *sub voce*, et J. Chandelier, *Avicenne et la médecine en Italie. Le Canon dans les universités (1200-1350)*, Honoré Champion, Paris 2017, pp. 248-255.

5 Ed. Venice 1502, Inc. "Sit Deus exaltatus qui est rex verax laudabilis".

6 Ed. Venice 1506, Inc. "Tractatum intendimus edere utilem".

in 1345<sup>7</sup> and a text on “the reduction of medicine to act” completed in 1351<sup>8</sup>. All these works are perfectly in line with the debates and topics discussed in the medical faculties at the time. The same is true of a partial commentary on the beginning of Avicenna’s *Canon*, which can be dated to the same years. Preserved in two manuscripts, this text contains an exposition of the last doctrine of the first fen of Book I, dealing with the virtues and operations of the soul, followed by separate questions on the whole of the first fen and an incomplete commentary on the second fen that focuses on diseases<sup>9</sup>.

The choice of these passages is quite interesting. The last doctrine of fen 1 deals precisely with questions related to the soul and its powers; it had already been commented on, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, by the physician and philosopher Antonio da Parma (d. 1327), but the commentary devoted to it by Gentile da Foligno, Tommaso’s teacher, stopped after only one chapter because of the teacher’s sudden death<sup>10</sup>. It is tempting to consider that Tommaso’s aim was to complete the unfinished exposition of the Folignate, which would place the writing around 1350 – this is also what some readers and copyists may have thought, as evidenced by one of the two manuscripts of the text in which the commentary is placed after that of the master of Perugia, but without the first chapter already commented on by the latter<sup>11</sup>.

The composition of the *Summa medicinalis*, in the last years of his life, is all the more significant. It corresponds to a time when Tommaso del Garbo’s career was well established and his experience, both theoretical and practical, important: it is likely that he wanted to compose a vast synthesis, product of his maturity, even if the unfinished nature of the work makes it difficult to understand its overall purpose. As it has come down to us, it consists of two books, of which only the first is complete, but the short prologue announces three books: one on the natural things and physiology, another on the six non-natural things and the preservation of health, and a third on the non-natural things that corrupt the body<sup>12</sup>. The plan was there-

7 Ed. Lyons 1514, Inc. “Intendimus commentare librum utilem Galeni in materia februm tam theorica quam practica”.

8 Ed. Venice 1506, Inc. “Quoniam nil carius ac utilius existit quam”.

9 Mss. Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. lat. 2000 (ff. 151r-167r for fen 1, ff. 167v-174r for the questions, ff. 180r-189r for fen 2), and Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, CLM 254 (80va-94va for fen 1, 94va-105vb for fen 2 – the manuscript does not contain the questions on fen 1).

10 Cfr. J. Chandelier, *Avicenne et la médecine en Italie*, cit.

11 It is the Munich manuscript mentioned above.

12 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, prologus (Venice 1506, f. 1ra): “Continebit autem hec summa libros tres. Primus liber investigabit de rebus natu-

fore to deal with the entirety of what physicians of the time considered to be theoretical medicine. In line with what is found in the first fen of the first book of Avicenna's *Canon*, the first book of the *Summa medicinalis* thus addresses, successively and in the same order as in the Arabic encyclopedia, the elements, the complexions, the humors, the members and finally the virtues and the spirits.

The *quaestiones* and *dubia* addressed in the *Summa* show a clear philosophical orientation. Of the 102 questions in the text, 42 (including some of the longest) deal with issues related to the soul and its virtues (treatise 5), whereas only 7 are dedicated to humours in treatise 3. Despite his involvement in practice, Tommaso seems to have never stopped answering the theoretical questions he had raised twenty years earlier in his commentaries on the *Canon* – many of the *quaestiones* are indeed common to both texts. The first two *dubia* of treatise 5 of the *Summa medicinalis*, which interest us here, are a perfect illustration of this permanence. Here he asks the following questions: “Is the soul of our body and of other animals extended according to the extension of the body?” and “Are the virtues of the soul distinct things from the essence of the soul?”. In the first chapter of the commentary on the *Canon*, we find almost identical questions: “Is the soul of our body essentially and equally in all parts of the body?” and “Do the virtues differ from the soul?”<sup>13</sup>. In all these texts, Tommaso del Garbo is perfectly consistent and supports the same thesis, namely that the soul is everywhere in the body and that the sensitive soul is extended like any other natural form: unlike the intellective soul, which is one and indivisible, the sensitive soul is extended in the body and therefore divisible. Depending on its location, this sensitive soul can thus perform different functions that the tradition, both medical and philosophical, has called “powers or virtues of the soul”. But, on this point, Tommaso del Garbo is very clear: the soul and its powers are not distinct things. It is the same soul that is in the heart, liver or brain, although it performs different acts in each of these parts of the body.

These debates were common at the time, both in medical texts and in commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*, but the position championed by Tommaso del Garbo is not. Here, he defends a theory very close to that of William of Ockham (d. 1347) and criticizes several other philosophical and theological opinions of his contemporaries. Indeed, one of the charac-

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ralibus et de eis annexis humano corpori pertinentibus. Secundus liber erit de rebus non naturalibus appellatis, ab extra inevitabiliter humano corpori occurrentibus. Tertius liber erit de rebus preter naturam humanum corpus accidentaliter corruptentibus”.

13 For the text of those questions, see the appendix *infra*.

teristics of Tommaso del Garbo's commentary on Avicenna's *Canon* is that he discusses many opinions: not only those of contemporary physicians such as William of Brescia (d. 1326), Peter of Abano (d. 1316) or Pietro Torrigiano (d. c. 1325), but also that of philosophers and physicians such as the Bolognese Averroist Antonio da Parma or Franciscan friars such as Peter Auriol (d. 1322), William of Alnwick (d. 1333) or Francis of Marchia (d. after 1343). This is also the case in his *Summa medicinalis*, where he quotes several great Parisian masters, such as Radulphus Brito (d. 1320-1321) and John of Jandun (d. 1328), as well as theologians, in particular William of Ockham. His questions on the relationship between the soul and the body therefore illustrate an important debate between physicians, philosophers and Franciscan theologians: studying these references, their conceptual rationale and their context will help us to better understand the position defended by Tommaso del Garbo, as well as its originality.

## *2. Is the soul equally present in the body? Tommaso del Garbo and the physicians*

The issue of the relationship between the soul and the body, and more precisely the one between the soul and its powers (*virtutes* or *potentiae*), caught the attention of Italian physicians very early on. In the last decades of the thirteenth century, Taddeo Alderotti already devoted two short questions to this topic in his commentary on Johanniatus' *Isagoge*<sup>14</sup>. Defending the unity of the soul in the body, he argued that the soul is one from the point of view of its substance, i.e. as the subject of powers, but that its *virtutes* or powers also have a nature or essence distinct from the soul as such. The brevity of his answer, however, makes it difficult to understand fully how this substantial form which is the soul can be one essence and contain several essences at the same time. This is perhaps what prompted his successors to clarify this point. As for the second question, if Taddeo Alderotti repeats that the soul is one in the body and in each of its parts, he again admits that its powers have different natures and that they are distinguished according to their operations, in particular thanks to the instruments they use. Such a thesis partially takes up the one found canonically in Thomas Aquinas and which became the official position of the Church after the

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14 Taddeo Alderotti, *In Isagogen Iohanitii*, Venice 1527, f. 355ra-vb: "An iste tres virtutes sint una substantia vel non et an virtutes differant a se invicem solum penes diversitates membrorum, aut penes suarum differentiarum propriarum et non a subiecto".

Council of Vienna (1311-1312). It is also influenced by Avicenna, who maintained that the soul is one although it is received variously in the body, according to the complexion of the members that receive it – which allows it to operate various actions in the different parts of the body.

These *quaestiones* were classic and could be found, at that time, in most commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima*. However, they took a slightly different turn in the medical context, since the physicians had to know where the soul was located in the body and whether the alteration or loss of certain faculties were linked to the organ concerned or to the soul itself. Without giving precise answers to these questions, Taddeo Alderotti provided a philosophical questionnaire to which later generations of physicians would have to respond. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, in Bologna, Antonio da Parma indeed raised the question of the relationship between the soul and its powers in his commentary on Avicenna's *Canon*<sup>15</sup>. The discussion is more extensive than that of Taddeo Alderotti and reviews the theories of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Gilles of Rome. According to him, these latter would have all defended the same idea, namely that the *virtutes* are distinct from the soul and are in a way instruments of the soul. However, Antonio da Parma did not agree with this view and defended the total identity between the soul and its powers – at least as far as the sensitive soul is concerned, since, as a disciple of Averroes, he considered the intellect to be absolutely separated from the body<sup>16</sup>. To the question of the distinction between the soul and its powers was thus added that of the distinction between the sensible and the intellectual soul.

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- 15 Antonio da Parma, *In primum librum Canonis Avicennae*, I, 1, 6, ms. Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4452, ff. 30vb-31va: “Circa hanc lectionem cadit una questio: utrum virtus sive potentia animae sit idem cum anima vel aliquid ei superaditum differens ab ipsa. [...] Dico tamen ad questionem quod virtutes anime idem sunt cum anime essentia et non dicunt aliquid essentialiter distinctum ab ipsa anima”. The text is edited in G. Fioravanti, *La quaestio utrum virtus sive potentia anime sit idem cum anima di Antonio da Parma*, in C. Panti, N. Polloni (a cura di), *Studi su natura, spiritualità e scienze operative offerti a Michela Pereira*, SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, Florence 2018, pp. 299-314. On Antonio da Parma, see D. Calma, *Pelacani, Antonio*, in *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, vol. LXXXII, 2015, pp. 92-95; see also D. Calma, *Etudes sur le premier siècle de l'averroïsme latin: approches et textes inédits*, Brepols, Turnhout 2011, pp. 313-332.
- 16 Antonio da Parma, *In primum librum Canonis Avicennae*, I, 1, ms. Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4452, f. 46va: “Unde dicebat Averrois in 3<sup>o</sup> *De anima* quod ymaginatio, extimatio et memoria simul invicem coadiuvant, ut representent ydolum intellectui possibili et agenti; virtus enim ista, scilicet intellectiva, secundum Aristotelem nec nobis cuniuncta est ex parte corporis, nec ex parte anime, sed ex parte cognitionis specierum”.

Tommaso del Garbo was not unaware of the position supported by Taddeo Alderotti, known either directly or through intermediaries, nor of that of Antonio da Parma, who is quoted several times in his commentary on the *Canon* and in his *Summa medicinalis*. If he agrees with Antonio da Parma on the fact that the soul is identical to its powers from the point of view of its essence, he tries to preserve Taddeo Alderotti's intuition that there are differences coming from the organs related to the operations of the powers of the soul. To do this, he asks about the presence of this single soul – in fact the sensitive soul only, since the intellect has no organs – in the whole body and about the modalities of its diversification in the various organs.

In order to connect the question of the presence of the soul in the body to that of the relationship between the soul and its powers, Tommaso del Garbo draws on Pietro Torrigiano's commentary on the *Tegni*: entitled *Plusquam commentum* and written in the 1320s, this profound text enjoyed great success throughout the fourteenth century<sup>17</sup>. While defending the idea of an equal presence of the soul in the whole body (since the soul gives it its being, its essence and its life), Pietro Torrigiano supports a thesis close to Aristotle's cardiocentrism and affirms that the sensitive soul is mainly found in the heart<sup>18</sup>. For him the heart then transmits the various powers to the other parts of the body, notably through the *spiritus* and bodily heat.

In his commentary on Avicenna's *Canon*, Tommaso del Garbo takes up most of the arguments quoted by Pietro Torrigiano; however, he does not support the same thesis. Instead, he opts for an anonymous position cited by Pietro Torrigiano, according to which the soul informs the whole of our body in essence. He thus opposes not only Pietro Torrigiano but also Antonio da Parma, to whom he attributes the thesis that the soul informs one part of the body by essence and the others by means of the powers that emanate from this first part of the body. However, there were several ways of interpreting the thesis he intends to defend: either by following the path of Thomas Aquinas, as did Taddeo Alderotti, that is by considering that there is only one soul in the body, namely the intellect, which includes the lower powers (vegetative and sensitive); or by following the theses of some Aristotelians who, like John of Jandun, distinguish between the sensitive soul and the intellectual soul; or, finally, by siding with some

17 Pietro Torrigiano, *Plusquam commentum in parvam Galeni artem*, Venice 1557, vol. II, ff. 34r-37r.

18 See D. Jacquart, *Cœur ou cerveau? Les hésitations médiévales sur l'origine de la sensation et le choix de Turisanus*, in "Micrologus", XI, 2003, pp. 73-95.



Franciscan theologians who admitted a plurality of substantial forms in the human body and therefore a plurality of souls. In his commentary on the *Canon*, Tommaso del Garbo does not really decide, and only asks – in the hypothesis of a plurality of substantial forms – whether the sensitive soul is extended into matter, in which case it would be divisible, or whether it is indivisible and therefore wholly within the totality of the body and each of its parts, like the intellect.

Tommaso del Garbo's solution is then clearly stated: "It is held that the soul is extended according to the extension of matter, like any other natural form in natural substances". Without this presence of the soul in the whole body, the latter would only be an aggregate without unity; the sensitive soul is everywhere and is not found first in the heart and then elsewhere in the body, as Pietro Torrigiano maintained. The soul does not move, only the *spiritus* does; it is everywhere in its essence, but it is also extended in matter and therefore divisible. Thus, if you cut off a piece of the body, you also cut off a piece of the sensitive soul<sup>19</sup>.

When he returns to this question in his *Summa medicinalis* twenty years later, Tommaso del Garbo focuses on what was only a *dubium* in the commentary to the *Canon*: "Is the soul of our body and that of other animals extended according to the extension of the body?". Moreover, instead of mentioning the competing theories, he simply says that he defends the one that seems to him "the most probable" and does not dwell on the debate on the primacy of the heart, considering that he has already answered it earlier<sup>20</sup>. The thesis presented is the same as that of

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19 A passage from the *Summa medicinalis* is particularly clear on this point. Cfr. Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus IV, q. 1, f. 29ra-b: "Ad illud autem quod ulterius dicitur, quod tunc corrupta una parte corporis corrumpetur una pars anime, dicendum secundum diversos modos inferius cum de virtutibus disputabimus ponendos. Nam si quis teneat animam brutorum esse extensam ad extensionem sue materie, necessario habet tenere quod corrupta una parte corporis corrumpatur pars anime, que illam partem informabat; nec est hoc inconveniens plusquam de aliis formis naturalibus materialibus. De intellectiva autem non est sic, quia ipsa non est tota in toto et pars in parte, sed tota in toto et in qualibet parte".

20 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus IV, q. 2 *Utrum membra principalia sint plura vel unum tantum*, f. 29vb: "Supposito enim sicut inferius apparebit quod virtutes anime non distinguantur ab anima vel saltim quod non sit dispositio corporalis, et supposito quod spiritus qui a corde progreditur non sit animatus, ut communiter tenetur, non est verum dicere quod cor sit plus principium virtutis anime quam alia membra. Similiter non est verum quod cor transmittat virtutem sensitivam cerebro, immo nec alicui membro illam transmittit, quod clare patet ex antecedente quesito. Similiter

his commentary on the *Canon*, but with several new elements. First (first conclusion), in line with the position of the Church, Tommaso asserts that the intellectual soul is indivisible, that it is one in the whole body and in each of its parts. But then (second conclusion) he acknowledges that this Thomistic thesis cannot be demonstrated, either rationally or empirically (*per experientiam*): it is therefore a matter of faith, not of reason. Once this is accepted (third conclusion), is it necessary to admit that there is another soul in our body than the intellectual soul, namely a sensitive soul extended in the body? Again, for Tommaso, this cannot be demonstrated, but it is more likely (*verisimilius est*) that there are distinct forms, and therefore distinct souls, in the body. Finally (fourth conclusion), if the sensitive soul is distinct from the intellectual soul, then it is truly extended throughout the body. For if it is distinct, it is because it is derived from matter and corruptible, like the souls of animals and brutes. These four conclusions are very close to those defended by William of Ockham in several of his works; but before we get to this silent source, let us take a closer look at the theories against which he argues.

### 3. The Bolognese Averroists and the Franciscan theories of the soul

In his commentary on the *Canon*, Tommaso del Garbo quotes both the Averroist Antonio da Parma and the Franciscans Francis of Marchia and William of Alnwick. The same cross-interest in Averroists and Franciscans can be found in the *Summa medicinalis*. Among the many *quaestiones* on the soul and its cognition of the external world, when Tommaso del Garbo asks whether it is necessary to accept the existence of a *species in medio*, i.e. a form that would come from things to our senses and other cognitive functions of our soul<sup>21</sup>, he explicitly attacks the Averroist

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etiam si quid teneret quod sensitiva anima et anima intellectiva non distinguantur vel saltem quod sensitiva etiam in brutis est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte, ut multi tenent, et licet sit forma corruptibilis ad corruptionem sui subiecti haberet dicere quod primum sensitivum pro primo subiecto in quo fiunt sensationes non est plus cor quam aliquod aliud membrum, quia tunc predictae sensationes non sunt nec fiunt plus in corde quam in pede vel quam in alio membro, sed hec est materia inferius reservanda et de predictis sensationibus tractatum faciemus”.

21 On this classical debate, see K.H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345*, Brill, Leiden-New York-Copenhagen 1988.

John of Jandun and clearly defends the position of William of Ockham<sup>22</sup>. Moreover, he points out that he disputed this *quaestio* in the Franciscan convent of Bologna<sup>23</sup>:

Although all this seems to be said in a probable way and seems to agree sufficiently with the spirit of the authorities, yet the contrary opinion seems to us to be truer and can be supported by better arguments; this is the opinion of some moderns and we have supported and defended it formerly in Bologna under a certain master in *sacra pagina* of the order of the Minors, in the presence of a great gathering of doctors and a multitude of students assembled.<sup>24</sup>

The event reported by Tommaso was not uncommon in Bologna in the 1340s. A number of Vatican manuscripts illustrate this close relationship between members of the Faculty of Arts and Mendicants, such as Vat. Ottob 318, Vat. Lat. 3066 or Vat. Lat. 6768<sup>25</sup>. Thanks to these

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- 22 This *quaestio* has been studied in detail by E. Griffin Smith, *A Disagreement on the Need of a Sensible Species in the Writings of some Medical Doctors in the Late Middle Ages*, PhD thesis, supervised by C. Ermatinger, Saint Louis University 1974. Griffin Smith shows that Marsilio Santasofia answers to Tommaso del Garbo in a treatise dedicated to the notion of *species*, even if he is not absolutely consistent on this point in the whole *Summa medicinalis* and sometimes uses the notion of *species* in other contexts. On this, see K.M. Boughan, *Beyond Diet, Drugs, and Surgery: Italian Scholastic Medical Theorists on the Animal Soul, 1270-1400*, PhD thesis, supervised by K.H. Tachau, University of Iowa 2006, notably pp. 137-148.
- 23 Let us note that a Bolognese jurist, contemporary of Tommaso del Garbo, also discusses this question in his *De arbore consanguinitatis*, ms. Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. ms. 2639, ff. 219v-226v. Cfr. K.H. Tachau, *The Response to Ockham's and Auriol's Epistemology (1320-1340)*, in A. Maierù (ed.), *English Logic in Italy in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries*, Bibliopolis, Naples 1982, pp. 185-217 (see p. 216, note 80).
- 24 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus V, q. 15, f. 63ra: "Licet autem illa sint probabiliter dicta et mentibus auctorum videantur satis consonare, nobis tamen opinio contraria videtur verior et melioribus posse rationibus roborari, que est opinio quorundam modernorum, et nos iam Bononie sub quodam magistro in sacra pagina de ordine minorum hanc sustinimus et defendimus, ubi fuit magna doctorum congeries et multitudo maxima scholarium congregata".
- 25 Those manuscripts are well known; cfr. A. Maier, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des italienischen Averroismus im 14. Jahrhundert*, in "Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken", XXXIII, 1944, pp. 136-157; C. Ermatinger, *Averroism in Early Fourteenth-Century Bologna*, in "Mediaeval Studies", XVI, 1954, pp. 35-56; A. Maier, *Die italienischen averroisten des codex Vat. Lat. 6768*, in Eadem, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Rome 1967, pp. 351-366; Z. Kuksewicz, *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La*

testimonies, we know that some philosophers and doctors of the *studium* disputed *quaestiones* in the Mendicant convents of the city, but also that they could be invited in these places to comment and discuss the theories of other philosophers and also of some theologians, especially Franciscans. Thus, in 1344, Anselm of Como discussed the positions of John of Jandun in the Franciscan convent of Bologna<sup>26</sup>. In the same year, he also presented a gloss on two *quaestiones* by the Franciscan William of Alnwick, one of which dealt precisely with the identity between the soul and its powers<sup>27</sup>. Thus, in Bologna there existed a debate between the Averroists of the Faculty of Arts and Medicine on the one hand, and the theologians of the Mendicant *studia* on the other. Of course, an important part of these debates concerned the separation and uniqueness of the intellect, but once this thesis, inherited from Averroes, had been rejected, the question remained as to whether the intellect was separate from the other functions of the soul and whether several souls should be admitted in man. The position of the philosopher John of Jandun was at the heart of the debate, since he admitted that there were two forms in man: one corresponding to the sensitive soul and which was in the body, and another corresponding to the intellect and which was attached to the body from outside, without being the form of the body<sup>28</sup>. Without the uniqueness of the intellect, such a “dimorphism” could be acceptable to some Franciscans.

As William Duba has shown, the debate on the relationship between the soul and the body was extremely important among the Friars Minor, even after the Council of Vienna which had indirectly imposed the defense of the Thomistic thesis of the substantial form as the only form of the human

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*théorie de l'intellect chez les averroïstes latins des XIII<sup>e</sup> et XIV<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1968, pp. 148-176. For an overview, see J. Chandelier, A. Tabarroni, *Philosophie, médecine et frères mendiants à Bologne dans la première moitié du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, in J. Chandelier, A. Robert (ed.), *Savoirs profanes et ordres mendiants en Italie (XIII<sup>e</sup>-XV<sup>e</sup> siècles)*, Ecole française de Rome, Rome 2022 (forthcoming).

- 26 Anselmus de Cumis, *Glossa in Johannis de Janduno utrum eternis repugnet habere causam efficientem*, ed. in Z. Kuksewicz, *Averroïsme bolonais au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Ossolineum, Wrocław 1965, pp. 113-124 (p. 118: “Hanc solutionem sive responsionem dedit magister Anselmus 1344 in domo Minorum”). He also disputed a *quaestio* with the Dominicans and another with the hermits of Saint Augustine *sub frate Gregorio* of Rimini.
- 27 Anselmus de Cumis, *Glossa in Guilhelmi Anglici utrum potentie anime sint eedem cum essentiali anime realiter*, ed. in Z. Kuksewicz, *Averroïsme bolonais*, cit., pp. 109-113.
- 28 Cfr. J.-B. Brenet, *Âme intellectuelle, âme cogitative: Jean de Jandun et la duplex forma propria de l'homme*, in “Vivarium”, XLIII, 3, 2008, pp. 318-341.

body<sup>29</sup>. It was all the more important in Bologna where physicians, philosophers close to Averroes and Mendicant theologians were in close contact<sup>30</sup>. As early as 1312, Peter Auriol, then a lecturer at the Franciscan *studium* in Bologna, wrote a treatise entitled *Tractatus de principiis physicis*, which dealt mainly with the relationship between matter and form, but which unfortunately lacks the end on the human soul<sup>31</sup>. In the existing parts, it is clear that he is in direct discussion with the Bolognese philosophers and physicians<sup>32</sup>. He defends a “dimorphist” thesis, according to which the sensitive soul is the form of the body, essentially and truly distinct from the intellectualive soul – a position reminiscent of the one presented by Tommaso del Garbo. Such a philosophical anthropology was indeed acceptable to the thinkers of the Faculty of Arts, although Peter Auriol did not go so far as to adhere to the Averroist opinions<sup>33</sup>.

When William of Alnwick presented his *determinationes* at the convent of San Francesco in Bologna in 1322-23, such an accommodation was no longer possible. He attacked the Averroists, and in particular John of Jandun, in a much more virulent manner<sup>34</sup>. In his commentary on Avi-

29 W. Duba, *The Souls after Vienne: Franciscan Theologians' Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315-1330*, in P.J.J.M. Bakker, S. De Boer, C. Leijenhof (ed.), *Psychology and other disciplines. A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250-1750)*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2012, pp. 171-272.

30 On the debates between Franciscans and Averroists, see S. Piron, *Olivi et les averroïstes*, in “Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie”, LIII, 2006, pp. 251-309.

31 Tommaso del Garbo knows some texts by Peter Auriol since he quotes him at least once in this commentary on Avicenna's *Canon*. Cfr. Ms. BAV Reg. lat. 2000, f. 168r (q. *Quid est subiectum in libro Avicenne et tota medicina*): “Sciendum quod illa opinio quod obiectum scientie sit totale significatum complexionis demonstrate potuit extrahy ex opinione Petri de Oriolo qui posuit quod universale non est aliud nisi obiective et hoc declarat, quia dicit quod illud significatum hominem esse animal nulla res est nec aliud nec aliqua, summendo ly aliud 3<sup>o</sup> modo, sed bene summendo ly aliud 2<sup>o</sup> vel primo modo et est unum significabile per illam propositionem homo est animal”.

32 W. Duba, *The Legacy of the Bologna Studium in Peter Auriol's Hylomorphism*, in K. Emery Jr., W.J. Courtenay, S.M. Metzger (ed.), *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts*, Brepols, Turnhout 2012, pp. 277-302.

33 J.-B. Brenet, *Moi qui pense, moi qui souffre : la question de l'identité du composé humain dans la riposte anti-averroïste de Pierre d'Auriol et Grégoire de Rimini*, in O. Boulnois (ed.), *Généalogies du sujet. De saint Anselme à Malebranche*, Vrin, Paris 2007, pp. 151-169.

34 A. Maier, *Wilhelm von Alnwick's Bologneser Quaestionen gegen den Averroismus*, in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter*, vol. I, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Rome 1964,

cenna's *Canon*, Tommaso del Garbo refers to one of these Bolognese *determinations* in which the Franciscan wondered: "Are the powers of the soul really identical with the essence of the soul?"<sup>35</sup> In this text, Alnwick mainly attacked Thomas Aquinas but also discussed the opinions of other Franciscans such as Bonaventure (d. 1274), Richard of Mediavilla (1308) or John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). Like Peter Auriol, he defended the existence of several forms in the human body but maintained that there was no distinction between the soul and its powers: in other words, each soul was its own power. Such a theory may seem close to that of the Averroists, since the intellect is clearly distinguished from the sensitive soul, but it differs in that it does not subscribe to the thesis of a total separation of the intellect and even less to that of its uniqueness for the whole human race<sup>36</sup>.

While traces of the influence of Peter Auriol and William of Alnwick can be found in other scholars at the University of Bologna, the presence of references to Francis of Marchia in the texts of Tommaso del Garbo is more original. Born in the village of Appignano, in the Marche region, he went, after taking the Franciscan habit, to study at the University of Paris where he read the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard in 1319-20, while Peter Auriol was still Master Regent. In 1328 he was in Avignon and fled the city with William of Ockham and Michael of Cesena to the court of Ludwig of Bavaria in Italy, and then to Munich. It is not known whether he passed through Bologna, but some of his works can still be found there in old manuscript collections<sup>37</sup>.

In his commentary on the *Canon*, Tommaso del Garbo refers to *questio* 37 on the second book of the *Sentences* of Francis of Marchia, which has come down to us in the form of a *reportatio* completed in 1319-20<sup>38</sup>. As part of a series of several *quaestiones* concerning natural philosophy and

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pp. 1-40. On the soul in particular, see Z. Kuksewicz, *Guillaume d'Alnwick. Trois questions anti-averroïstes sur l'âme intellectuelle*, in "Studia mediewistyczne", VII, 1966, pp. 3-76.

35 This *determinatio* was edited by C. Piana, *Una Determinatio inedita di Guglielmo Alnwick O.F.M (1333), come saggio di alcune fonti tacitamente usate dall'autore*, in *Studi Francescani*, vol. 79, 1982, pp. 191-231.

36 On this point, see F.A. Prezioso, *Il problema dell'unione tra anima e corpo in Guglielmo Alnwick*, Libreria scientifica editrice, Naples 1966.

37 In the 14th-century manuscripts Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria 2257 (lat. 1123); Bologna, Reale Collegio di Spagna, Biblioteca antica 45 (E.V.8); Bologna, Reale Collegio di Spagna, Biblioteca antica 104.

38 Franciscus de Marchia, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum qq. 18-49. Reportatio IIA*, ed. T. Suarez-Nani, W. Duba, D. Carron, G.J. Etzkorn, Leuven University Press, Leuven 2012, pp. 92-114.

the nature of the soul, it asks whether the intellectual soul is extended. As in Peter Auriol's *Tractatus de principiis physicis*, it is striking to note the proximity of these questions to those that Italian philosophers and physicians were tackling at the same time. Questions 33 to 36 deal with elements and their mixture and q. 38 with the plurality of substantial forms: Francis of Marchia defends an idea of Avicennian origin according to which there is another form than the soul in the human body, namely a form of corporeity (*forma corporeitatis*)<sup>39</sup>. In the rest of the text (qq. 39-40), Francis of Marchia criticizes the Averroist position of the uniqueness of the intellect to defend the existence of a plurality of intellects, i.e. singular intellects in every human individual.

Tommaso del Garbo only mentions the discussion on the extension of the soul in this question 37 because Francis of Marchia defends a rather original thesis. For him, the soul is not extended into matter, in the sense of bodily extension, since this would mean that it would be divisible into parts, but he goes further and affirms that it is also the case for the human intellectual soul as well as for other animal souls, and even for plants. In other words, even the vegetative or sensitive soul is not extended in the sense of a corporeal form – which is a problem for some animals like earthworms, which continue to live when cut into pieces<sup>40</sup>.

As we have seen, Tommaso del Garbo adheres to the pluralistic thesis of the Franciscans and shows no particular sympathy for the Averroist thesis. However, he opposes Francis of Marchia and William of Alnwick because they both believe that the sensitive soul is, like the intellect, indivisible. On the other hand, the Florentine physician states very clearly that the sensitive soul comes from matter and is extended in it, like any other form. It remained to be seen, therefore, how the soul of a human individual performs its various functions, i.e. how it is divided into several powers.

39 On this thesis, see T. Suarez-Nani, *Una anthropologie dans l'horizon scotiste : François de la Marche*, in A. Speer, D. Wirmer (hrsg), *1308: eine Topographie historischer Gleichzeitigkeit*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2010, pp. 388-401.

40 Q. 37, pp. 105-106: "Dico ergo quantum ad istas tres animas, puta intellectivam, sensitivam et vegetativam, quod anima intellectiva non est extensa; de anima sensitiva animalium perfectorum, quae decisa non vivunt, probabile est quod non sit extensa, nec etiam anima sensitiva animalium imperfectorum, quae decisa vivunt, nec etiam per consequens anima vegetativa plantarum. Multae enim rationes factae superius ad probandum animam sensitivam esse indivisibilem probant idem de anima vegetativa: operatio enim eius in una parte sui corporis impedit aliam operationem in alia parte eius; ipsa etiam determinat sibi determinatum corpus, sicut superius dictum est de anima sensitiva".

#### 4. *Is the soul identical with its powers? Tommaso del Garbo and the Ockhamist solution*

In his study of the commentaries on the second book of Aristotle's *De anima* between 1260 and 1360, Sander de Boer has identified an important shift in the treatment of the question of the relationship of the soul to its powers<sup>41</sup>. He proposes to distinguish three phases in this debate: a first one in the years 1260-80, linked to the powerful influence of Thomas Aquinas; a second phase (1290-1320) from Radulphus Brito to John of Jandun, two authors that Tommaso del Garbo knows and mentions; finally, a third phase, with the commentaries of John Buridan and Nicole Oresme. The contribution of the second phase would have been to bring to the fore the question of animals that can be cut into pieces without dying (an example already found in Aristotle but which becomes central) and the one of the extension of the soul to all parts of the body. As for the third phase, its origin lies in the introduction of William of Ockham's ideas and in particular his semantical analysis of this issue. Without judging the overall relevance of this historical scheme, it must be said that Tommaso del Garbo summarizes these three phases and finally opts for the last one.

The influence of William of Ockham on Tommaso del Garbo's thought has long been noted<sup>42</sup>. In the *Summa medicinalis* there is an explicit reference to the commentary on the *Physics* of William of Ockham, who is described as a "man of great worth"<sup>43</sup>. Of course, Tommaso del Garbo is by no means the only one to mention the *Venerabilis inceptor* in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century. He was present in Italy in 1328, after his escape from Avignon, and several Italian students at Oxford, mostly Mendicants, had brought back from their journey texts on logic that included some by Ockham<sup>44</sup>. As William J. Courtenay has shown, the places

41 S.W. De Boer, *Soul and Body in the Middle Ages. A Study of the Transformations of the scientia de anima, c. 1260 – c. 1360*, PhD thesis, supervised by P.J.J.M. Bakker, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 2011.

42 K. Park, *Doctors and Medicine in Early Renaissance Florence*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1985, pp. 198-209; J. Agrimi, C. Crisciani, *Medicina e logica in maestri bolognesi tra Due e Trecento: problemi e temi di ricerca*, in D. Buzzetti, M. Ferriani, A. Tabarroni (a cura di), *L'insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo*, Istituto per la storia dell'Università, Bologna 1992, pp. 187-239.

43 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus V, q. 20 *An sonus sit aliqua res preter corpora percussa et aerem*, f. 69vb: "Illa via tenetur ab illo valente viro Guillelmo Okam, ut patet in suis questionibus super 5<sup>o</sup> *Physicorum* et in quampluribus aliis locis, ubi de illa materia loquitur".

44 Cfr. A. Maierù (ed.), *English Logic in Italy*, cit.



most representative of English influence were Bologna, Florence, Assisi and Perugia, and only later Padua<sup>45</sup>. It is therefore not surprising that a manuscript containing parts of Ockham's commentary on the *Sentences* was copied in Bologna around 1340, nor that his *Summa logicae* was still copied in Faenza in 1373 and in Bologna before 1380<sup>46</sup>. In Perugia, in the 1340s, Stephano de Rieti and Francesco da Prato discussed William of Ockham's theses very precisely, albeit critically<sup>47</sup>. More importantly, in Florence, the greatest poet and composer of *Trecento* Italy, Francesco Landini (1325-1397), wrote a poem in Latin hexameters to defend Ockhamist logic<sup>48</sup>. A contemporary of Tommaso del Garbo, like him close to Petrarch, this author is the symbol of a certain popularity of the Ockhamist theories in the Florentine culture of the time, even beyond academic and Mendicant circles.

It is thus easier to understand why Tommaso del Garbo makes such an extensive use of Ockhamist thought. Even when the name of the English theologian does not appear, he heavily borrows from his philosophy. For example, in addition to the famous "Ockham's razor", which is found several times in Tommaso's writings, he writes about common sensibles that "the terms 'figure', 'number', etc. signify nothing outside the soul and that there is nothing outside the soul but substances and qualities" – which seems to him to be self-evident *sicut in hoc concordant omnes moderni*<sup>49</sup>. Here we can recognize Ockham's parsimonious ontology, which does not accept any other *res* in the world besides singular substances and qualities. Tommaso even adds that in the oral, vocal or mental propositions in which

45 W.J. Courtenay, *The early stages in the introduction of Oxford logic into Italy*, in A. Maierù (ed.), *English Logic in Italy*, cit., pp. 13-32 (in particular p. 18).

46 Quoted by W.J. Courtenay, *op. cit.*

47 See C. Rode, *Francis of Prato*, and F. Amerini, *Stephan of Rieti's Criticism of Ockham's Interpretation of Aristotle and Porphyry*, in C. Rode (a cura di), *A Companion to Responses to Ockham*, Brill, Leiden-Boston 2015, resp. pp. 273-302 and 303-333.

48 A. Lanza, *Polemiche e berte letterarie nella Firenze del primo Rinascimento. 1375-1449*, Bulzoni, Roma 1971, pp. 233-238. For the social and intellectual context, see M.P. Long, *Francesco Landini and the Florentine Cultural Elite*, in "Early Music History", III, 1983, pp. 83-99.

49 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus V, q. 25 *Utrum prae-ter sensibilia propria sensuum sint aliqua sensibilia <communia> per se ab illis sensibilibus distincta*, f. 82va: "Prima [conclusio] est quod figura, numerus etc. nullam rem extra animam significant, nec alique res sunt extra animam preter substantiam et qualitatem. Illa superponuntur pro vera, sicut in hoc concordant omnes moderni philosophi". See A. Goddu, *Connotative Concepts and Mathematics in Ockham's Natural Philosophy*, in "Vivarium", XXXI, 1, 1993, pp. 106-139.

these expressions appear, the terms often do not designate things but have a material supposition, i.e. they refer to themselves, such as the term “Tommaso” in the sentence “Tommaso is a name”<sup>50</sup>. This is a typical Ockhamist strategy to show that the words we use do not always stand for things that actually exist outside the soul.

The Florentine physician also uses Ockham’s theory of connotation to distinguish between the *complexio naturalis* and the *complexio etativa*, terms that signify the same thing in the first place but connote different aspects of that same thing<sup>51</sup>. Elsewhere, it is said that the same is true of the terms *cognitio* and *scientia*. Sometimes, it is a matter of simple terminological borrowing, as Tommaso himself explains.

Let us leave this to the logicians, to whom this doctrine of terms belongs. And let no one be surprised if in medicine we have affirmed these conclusions and in this way, because in any science there are subjects whose truth cannot be established without being expressed in this way; otherwise, it would be necessary to lay down very different and futile divisions, which obscure the intellect.<sup>52</sup>

Sometimes the author does indeed take up the arguments of the English Franciscan, as when he rejects the existence of the *species in medio* in q. 63. This is also the case when he questions the links between the soul and its powers, although he does not mention the name of William of Ockham. In his commentary on the *Canon*, Tommaso concedes that the powers of the soul differ from the latter in their nominal definition (*quid nominis*), but not in their real definition. Indeed, if we take the Aristotelian definition of the soul, the soul is the act of an organized body: it cannot therefore be applied to any of its powers, such as the power to see, defined as the ability to see colors.

50 Ivi, f. 82va-b: “Quarta conclusio est quod in omnibus istis propositionibus ‘figura est sensibile commune’ et sic de aliis, et ‘sensibile commune a pluribus sensibus sentitur’, solum supponit pro ipso termino sive sit propositio mentalis sive vocalis sive scripta, sicut in istis ‘homo est species’, ‘animal est genus’, ‘homo est nomen’, et in similibus [...]. Sed pro nulla re extra animam supponit, quia nulla talis res, ut dictum est, est sensibile commune. Ex istis statim sequitur conclusio quinta quod de virtute sermonis illa est falsa ‘sensibile commune per se sentitur’ [...]”.

51 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus II, q. 13, f. 18va.

52 Tommaso del Garbo, *Summa medicinalis*, Liber I, Tractatus V, q. 25, f. 82vb: “Sed illa logicis dimittimus, quorum est hec doctrina terminorum. Et nulli mirum si in medicina illas posuimus conclusiones et per istum modum, quia in quibuscumque scientiis sunt aliquando materie quarum veritas dilucidari non potest nisi talia exprimendo; et aliter oportet divisiones multimodas et frivolas formare, intellectum obfuscentes”.

However, as Tommaso points out, it is not the same thing to apprehend a power of the soul from the point of view of its instrument in the body, the organs, or from the point of view of the soul itself, which is one in the body and extended in each of its parts. In the first case, we shall insist on what distinguishes the soul from its powers, by showing that without the organ it cannot perform certain acts proper to a human soul: without eyes, the sensitive soul will no longer be able to see even if it is still present elsewhere in the body, since the eyes are absolutely necessary for vision. In the second case, if we place ourselves from the point of view of the soul itself, there is no need to distinguish the soul from its powers since in the organ it is always the soul that feels, sees, touches, etc. This is where the Ockhamist solution comes in: the terms “soul” and “powers” signify the same thing primarily (*in recto*), but connote different aspects related to the acts of the soul<sup>53</sup>.

Tommaso is even clearer in his *Summa medicinalis* when he answers the same question. He begins (first conclusion) by repeating what he wrote in his commentary on the *Canon* while making it clear, with the help of Ockham’s razor, that it is not necessary to stipulate that these terms – soul and power – connote anything other than the qualities and dispositions of the body that the soul needs in order to perform its functions. Thus (second conclusion), the names of powers signify the soul but connote their operations. It follows (third conclusion) that according to the primary significata of these terms, the soul is everywhere the same and cannot be said to be first in one member and then in the others. On the other hand, if we stick to the secondary significata or connotations of the terms designating the different powers, then it is possible to distinguish and hierarchize them, and even to think that some powers are prior to others in the development of the human being, since we focus our attention on the organs and other tools necessary for the operations of these powers.

Tommaso del Garbo thus uses the tools provided by the Ockhamist theory to solve the debates between Franciscans and Averroists in Bologna and to propose to his medical readers a definitive solution. By taking the point of view of a metalinguistic analysis, he places himself in the position of a judge and shows that disagreements are sometimes only questions of words. However, as in the case of the *species*, he does not only borrow

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53 William of Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, III, q. 4, ed. F.E. Kelley, G.J. Etzkorn, in *Opera theologica*, VI, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure (New York) 1982, pp. 130-148.

logical tools from Ockham: he even defends the same positions<sup>54</sup>. Like Ockham, he distinguishes between the sensitive and the intellective soul, but does not accept the existence of a third vegetative soul<sup>55</sup>. Like him, he thinks that the sensitive soul is extended and material while the intellective soul is not<sup>56</sup>. Like him, he believes that each of these souls is identical to its powers even if, when we speak of these powers and in any case for the sensitive soul, we insist on the instruments and organs that are necessary for their actualization<sup>57</sup>.

### Conclusion

Tommaso del Garbo could thus rightly be called an “Ockhamist doctor” to emphasize the fact that he is clearly a philosopher in his approach to the questions raised. As far as we know, he is the only physician of this type. Some might be tempted to conclude that his thought is not very original, since it is based on that of an author who was extremely well-known at the time. But the texts we are publishing and commenting on here show, on the contrary, the value of his approach, which calls on numerous medical, philosophical and theological authorities. Moreover, if he uses the philosophy of William of Ockham, he makes a singular use of it and intends to defend a position that is his own and remains compatible with medical authorities, in particular Avicenna’s *Canon*. In his view, there is no need to subscribe to Avicenna’s metaphysics in order to accept the descriptions contained in the *Canon*: a much more parsimonious ontology can accommodate them very well. Similarly, when Tommaso del Garbo discusses the positions of the so-called “Averroists”, he can show, along with Ockham, that it is possible to separate the sensitive and intellective souls without postulating the existence of a single, separate intellect. Thus, although largely inspired by Ockham and his principle of economy, the philosophy and psychology of Tommaso del Garbo are no less original and interesting from the point of view of the history of philosophy and medicine.

54 For a synthetic presentation of Ockham’s position, see M. McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana 1987, vol. II, pp. 647-669.

55 William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta*, II, q. 11, ed. J.C. Wey, in *Opera theologica*, IX, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure (New York) 1980, pp. 162-164.

56 William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta*, II, q. 10, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-161 (in particular p. 159).

57 William of Ockham, *Quaestiones in librum tertium Sententiarum (Reportatio)*, II, q. 20, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-447, et III, q. 4, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-148. See S.W. De Boer, *Soul and Body in the Middle Ages*, cit., pp. 240-244.

A question remains, that our study does not solve: what about Tommaso del Garbo's lost commentary on the *De anima*? Without categorically questioning Filippo Villani's assertion, there are several indications that the *Trecento* historian might have taken a part of the *Summa medicinalis* for such an exposition: for example, the unfinished character that he attributes to it, which is also the case of the *Summa*, or the very important number of questions related to this theme in the text. If such a commentary was indeed written, however, our study and our editions will undoubtedly help to identify it, by comparing the positions defended. For it must be stressed that Tommaso is remarkably consistent in his opinions. In our view, this should not simply be seen as a reworking of early texts within the *Summa*. Rather, we think we can see the mark of a coherent mind, trying to build a medical theory in line with the most recent and advanced philosophy – a proof, if any were needed, that late medieval physicians did not consider philosophy as a mere propaedeutic, but as an essential part of their own discipline.



APPENDICE I  
*SCRIPTUM SUPER PRIMUM LIBRUM  
CANONIS AVICENNE  
IN PRIMAM FEN, DOCTRINA 6*

Thomas de Garbo

The edition of the following two *quaestiones* from Tommaso del Garbo's commentary on the first fen of book I of Avicenna's *Canon* is based on the only extant manuscript:

*R: Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. Lat. 2000, ff. 152v-153v*

The second manuscript in which this commentary is conserved (Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, CLM 254, ff. 80va-94va) is incomplete and lacks the beginning where these *quaestiones* took place.

All the corrections we made in the Latin appear in the critical apparatus as well as the errors and corrections of the scribe himself.

*/152v/Cadunt tres questiones. Una reservabitur infra, scilicet a quo semen decidatur. 2<sup>a</sup> questio est qualiter anima que habet istas virtutes habeat esse in nostro corpore. 3<sup>a</sup> questio est an virtutes differant ab anima.*

Proponatur ergo questio utrum<sup>1</sup> anima nostri corporis essentialiter et equaliter sit in omnibus partibus corporis.

Quod non, quia sequeretur quod unum membrum non esset magis principale quam aliud, et unum non dependeret ab<sup>2</sup> alio. Consequens est falsum. Consequentia patet ex quo <que> equaliter participant sua forma sunt equalis perfectionis.

In oppositum: si forma non esset equaliter in omnibus membris, sequitur<sup>3</sup> quod homo non esset unus numero, quod est falsum. Consequentia tenet,

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1 an *add. ms.*

2 ab] *supra linea ex ante corr. ms.*

3 sequitur] *sic pro sequeretur ms.*

quia tunc non haberent unam substantialem formam a qua fit unitas in materia, ut Averoy primo *De anima*.

Est una opinio que dicit quod anima per essentiam est tantum in corde, sed omnia alia membra sunt coordinata seu cordi annecta, et est in eis anima per annas<c>entiam et virtutem que est in continuo influxu a corde ad alia membra per spiritum.

Hoc probat<ur>, quia quanto forme sunt innobiliiores, tanto sunt a sua materia magis participabiles; ita in animalibus annulosis et emptomis, si incidatur, in qualibet parte est anima, ut in eis anima sit equaliter in partibus. Similiter in plantis propter imperfectionem anime in eis, ut ille forme in <im>perfectis assimillentur formis accidentalibus. Ergo quanto forme sunt perfectiores et sunt magis perfecte, <tanto> sunt minus a materia participate; sed cum in nobis sit anima perfecta, non est participata equaliter ab omnibus, sed est susceptive<sup>4</sup> in nobiliori per essentiam, velut in fonte, ut in corde, et ideo anima intellectiva nullo modo est participata a sua materia.

Secundo: si anima esset essentialiter in omnibus membris, sequitur<sup>5</sup> quod virtus auditiva esset in oculo, et visiva in aure, quod est falsum. Consequentia tenet, quia si anima sensitiva est in osse, igitur sentit; et si dicas “non, quia ibi non est organum”, contra: quia tunc anima sensitiva esset frustra toto tempore in osse.

Item, erupto oculo erueretur anima. Consequenter sequitur quod plures anime numero differentes essent in nobis. Proba[tur], quia cor primo generatur, et sic habet animam; postea generat alia membra, modo generans et generatum differunt numero.

Et summit illam opinionem ab Aristotele in libro *De motibus animalium*, qui hoc videre dicere et multis sonat illa opinio, quia si rex est in civitate, non oportet in omnibus locis esse regem, similiter in animalibus non oportet esse animam in omnibus partibus animalis. Exemplum: ut anima assimiletur arti existenti in anima artificis, et non est in toto corpore artificis per essentiam et per potentiam; nam si artifex perdit manum etc., non perdit artem et tamen manus exercebat artem, ita anima est in corde per essentiam et alia membra possunt opera anime exercere.

Ista opinio, licet videatur satis pulcra, dicit quod primum sensitivum et apprehensivum habet esse solum in corde subiective, et ideo audacia est in corde, et ita de aliis, ut in libro *De sompno et vigilia* potest haberi ab Aristotele. Ista opinio est falsa, quia anima non dat esse corpori nisi

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4 susceptive] *sic ms.*

5 sequitur] *sic pro sequeretur ms.*



secundum quod illi unitur, sicut forma dat esse materie; sed anima dat esse toti corpori; ergo ei unitur.

Similiter, Aristoteles 2<sup>o</sup> *De anima* dicit quod vegetativum est in sensitivo sicut trigonum in tetragono<sup>6</sup>. Si igitur sic est, ergo sensitivum non potest separari a vegetativo; sed si anima deferretur, et eius potentie, a corde ad alia membra, iam iste potentie multis haberent differentiam; et ideo ubicumque est sensitiva est vegetativa, et econtra, licet non ubicumque vegetet ibi sentiat propter ineptionem instrumenti.

Similiter, ubi est anima ibi operatur; sed opera anime sunt in qualibet parte; igitur et anima.

Iste rationes possunt solvi, tamen alique persuadent, sicut illa ultima. Posset ad illam dici: cum dicitur anima non operatur nisi ubi ipsa est, verum est vel per essentiam vel per organa, modo in aliis membris a corde est anima per virtutem et anas<c>entiam. Et ad minorem – operationes sunt in qualibet parte – verum est per organa, sed non per essentiam; non valet, ymo maior est vera omnino, quia <si> summatur membrum ubi non est anima per essentiam, operatio que ab ipso provenit fit a causa effectiva immediata existente in eo.

Dicis tu quod anima operatur per organa. Dico quod tunc non est operatio anime, igitur si fit operatio anime, oportet quod anima sit ubi est operatio. Et si dicas contrarium de habitu artis, nego. Tu dicis: manus operatur. Conceditur, et cum dicitur manus non habet artem, nego quod anima est in manu, et ideo ars est in manu. Et tu dicis: si manus abscindatur remanet ars. Conceditur, et ideo in notitia artis, remanet <artifex> ita bonus sicut umquam. Vel aliter ponendo quod ars non esset in tota anima, tamen operatio manus que fit ab anima dependet ab anima que est deserviens anime que est in corde, ubi est<sup>7</sup> ars.

Alia est opinio in hoc quesito quod membra nostri corporis habent diversas formas substantiales et in hoc ponunt aliquas conclusiones.

Prima: entia diversa habentia formas substantiales diversas possunt esse naturaliter continua, ut evitent hoc argumentum quod posset fieri, quia tunc aliquis componeretur ex pluribus numero differentibus. Patet, nam cor ultimo moritur et postea manent alia membra sub alia<sup>8</sup> forma substantiali, et remanent continua. Et ideo non sequitur aliqua entia sunt naturaliter continua, ergo habent unam formam, et aliqua habent plures formas, ergo non sunt continua.

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6 tetragono] tertagranno *ms.*

7 est] anima *add. sed del. ms.*

8 sub alia] substantiaalia *ante corr. ms.*

Secunda conclusio: entia que habent operationes specie distinctas habent formas substantiales specie distinctas. Patet: omnis operatio proveniens a diversis agentibus particularibus arguit aliquam diversitatem in agentibus, et non sufficit distinctio accidentium, quia tunc homo et asinus<sup>9</sup> non different specie, quia diceremus quod habent accidentia. Arguitur ergo diversitas formarum substantialium ex diversitate specifica operationum, nam operatio facit scire formam, sicut transmutatio materiam; sed operatio visiva specie differt ab auditiva et sensitiva a nutritive; ergo illa membra differunt specie a quibus iste operationes proveniunt.

Tertia conclusio: quecumque habent operationes eiusdem speciei sunt eiusdem speciei. Et in hoc ymaginatur quod ad diversitatem specificam necessario sequitur diversitas specifica in operationibus, sed ad ydemptitatem non. Et ideo aliqua membra nostra plus conveniunt cum quibusdam membris equi vel asini quam cum quibusdam nostris membris, sicut patet de oculo asini et hominis, quia sunt eiusdem speciei; sed oculus hominis et auris hominis non sic conveniunt, nam oculos asini et hominis habent eandem operationem, ut visionem, que non differt specie ab alia visione; et ideo oculus hominis non differt nisi numero ab oculo asini, sed homo et asini differunt /153r/ specie, quia in aliqua operatione<sup>10</sup> ultimata differunt. Similiter est de oculo asini et aure sua vel etiam hominis. Ex quo sequitur quod corpus hominis componitur ex pluribus specie differentibus et tamen illa constituunt unum numero et corpus est unum numero, quod corpus cum aliquo alio differunt specie, et tamen plures partes eorum sunt eiusdem speciei et habent eandem formam substantialem. Sed illa opinio dimictatur quia multum est extranea.

Alia est opinio quam tangit Plusquamcommentator in *Tegni* et credimus esse veram, quod anima nostri corporis est tota informans materiam<sup>11</sup> nostri corporis et unicuique parti immediate unitur per essentiam, et non unitur uni per essentiam et alii per virtutem et potentiam sicut dixit Anthonius.

Sed in hoc esset multiplex modus ymaginandi.

Unus est ponendo quod in corpore sit solum una anima que facit omnes operationes corporis, et tunc quia in nobis est anima intellectiva que non est in aliis et est indivisibilis, ipsa est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. Sed questio esset extra propositionem utrum anima nostra sit solum una.

Alter modus esset quod in nobis esset anima intellectiva ultimata forma et sensitiva esset distincta ab intellectiva, et tunc esset duplex modus: vel

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9 asinus] sanus *ms.*

10 operatione] operationem *ms.*

11 materiam *bis sed del.*

quod sensitiva faceret vegetationem etc. vel quod vegetativa esset per se, ita quod essent tres anime. Et in hoc inveniuntur opiniones.

Sed movet dubium an anima sensitiva sit extensa in materia, vel indivisibilis et tota in toto etc.

Quidam dicunt quod anima sensitiva est extensa in materia, sicut in bruto, et illam opinionem credimus verioriem.

Alii dicunt quod licet anima sensitiva et vegetativa educantur de potentia materie, tamen est indivisibilis existens tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte. Et ita tenuit Franciscus de Marchia etiam de animabus brutis. Sed que sit veritas in hoc esset hic extraneum.

Sed ille qui dicit sic, aut diceret quod eadem forma numero potest informare diversa substantia numero, aut quod in animali diverso inducitur duplex anima in illa materia et istam opinionem videtur insequi Guiglielmus Alwochi.

Sed ad presens tenendum quod anima est extensa ad extensionem materie, sicut alie forme naturales in substantiis naturalibus. Sed quod anima sit in omnibus membris per essentiam probatur, quia aliter animal esset compositum per agregationem.

Secundo: anima est actus corporis organici et plurimum organorum, sed si esset solum in corde esset tunc actus solius unius organi, quomodo ergo dicimus quod unum membrum est principalius. Dicimus hoc quia membrum principale dicitur illud ex quo anima <h>aurit sibi spiritum ad operationem exercendam sicut proprium instrumentum. Licet ergo anima sit in pede et in aliis, tamen quia ex eis anima non <h>aurit spiritum sicut facit ex corde, ideo ex hoc dicitur principale non quia habeat plus animam nec aliter quam alia membra. Et illa est mens Aristotelis 3<sup>o</sup> *De partibus animalium*. Et a corde non defertur anima nec potentia eius defertur ad alia membra, sed sola organa, scilicet spiritus, per que anima cum complexione membri simul potest operationes exercere. Ex hoc patet intentio Phylosophi in libro *De motibus animalium*: vult enim quod sicut si princeps sit in civitate, non oportet quamlibet esse principem ad hoc ut civitas bene gubernetur, dummodo quilibet obediat principi, ita de anima non oportet quod sit in quolibet, scilicet velut in principio, quia aliqua sunt principalia et aliqua sibi deservientia etc.

Ad rationem: quanto forme sunt magis imperfecte <tanto> plus participantur a materia sua, negetur illa propositio de virtute sermonis; sed potest concedi quod propter imperfectionem forme minus possunt removeri, ut in animalibus anulosis etc. Dico quod in illa parte vel membro quod a nobis abscinditur erat anima, sicut in illa que remanet, sed corumpitur in nobis anima que erat in membris, que est abscisa, et ratio est propter colligantiam

quam habent membra ex perfectione forme; sed in animalibus annulosis non est necessario ex innobilitate forme esse tantam colligantiam.

Ad secundam: sequitur quod auditiva esset in oculo, concedo quod anima que audit est in oculo, sed non est illa pars que est subiective in aure, sed sit eadem numero sicut de albedine in papiro que est una numero et tamen diverse partes albedinis informant diversas partes subiecti; vel aliter: licet anima faciat omnes operationes et cognitiones et apprehensiones, tamen propter diversa organa, auditiva non est visiva.

Ad aliam: tunc erupto oculo etc., dico quod eruitur pars anime.

Ad aliam: cor primo generatur, conceditur; et postea generantur alia, conceditur. Et tu dicis: “illud quod generat distinguitur numero a genito”, nego, ut patet de nutrito quod generat et facit nutrimentum seu nutritum membrum et generat simile in numero.

Ad aliam dico quod anima que est in osse non est sensitiva<sup>12</sup>, sed anima que in aliquo potest sentire et in aliquo non, quia alicubi non sunt omnia requisita ad sensationem, non differunt specie. Et tu dicis: “ergo in osse erit frustra”. Negatur quia in osse non debet sentire, quia in osse non sunt necessaria ad sensum.

Ad rationem primam aliorum: substantia que habet operationes distinctas specie etc., nego si illa substantia faciant unum numero, quia ab agente perfecto possunt provenire operationes diverse et specie differentes.

Remansit questio an virtutes anime distinguantur ab anima.

Quod sic, quia anima et virtutes verificantur et predicantur de diversis, igitur distinguuntur.

In oppositum: si virtus anime distinguitur ab anima, aut hoc est substantia, et hoc non, quia substantia non est in substantia, sed virtus anime est in anima; vel accidens, et tunc vel est corporeum, et sic non, vel incorporeum, et sic non, quia potest facere omnia opera per se et non per alia accidentia.

Dicendum quod anima et virtus anime differunt diffinitione exprimente quid nominis, quia habent diversas diffinitiones, nam anima est actus corporis organici etc., sed virtus visiva est que potest videre colores, modo ille diffinitiones differunt.

Sed notandum quod potentie anime summuntur dupliciter, vel pro omni necessario requisito ad omnem actum anime causandum, alio modo potest summi prout se solum tenet ex parte anime elicentis aliquem actum.

Primo modo potentia anime distinguitur ab anima, quia multa requiruntur ad posse videre tanquam causa partialis que non requiruntur ad

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12 sensitiva] sentita *ms.*

actum videndi; ergo si virtus summatur primo modo, distinguuntur. Etiam distinguuntur potentie anime ab anima, quia anima non potest opera facere nisi cum organis, ergo sic summendo, anima non est virtus anime; est igitur virtus ipsa anima cum omnibus requisitis ad opus, sicut virtus artificis pro omni eo quod necessario requiritur ad faciendum capsam est artifex cum omnibus instrumentis.

Si summatur secundo modo, prout tenet se ex parte solius anime facientis opera, sic virtus anime et anima sunt idem, quia nihil est aliud ibi preter organa et dispositiones ad opera, et ideo antiqui dicunt quod anima et virtus anime sunt idem realiter et differunt ratione, quia idem significant in recto, sed aliquid connotatur /153v/ per virtutem, quod non per animam; et ideo anima et virtus differunt, quia anima dicitur absolute, non relata ad opus, sed ut refertur ad opus, tunc sortitur hoc nomen virtus et tamen nihil aliud est; et ratio est, nam ex quo ponuntur dispositiones sufficientes in organo et anima, igitur frustra aliud poneretur, quia frustra fit per plura etc. Ex hoc patet quod virtus aliquid connotat, quod non anima; et ideo diversa de eis possunt predicari. Patet etiam quomodo potest dici quod anima habet diversas virtutes. Et sic patet ad illud quod fuit in dictis in principio questionis: si quis advertat etc.



APPENDICE II  
*SUMMA MEDICINALIS*, I, 5  
Q. 1 AND Q. 2

Thomas de Garbo

The edition of the text is based on the two extant manuscripts and the first printed edition (Venice 1506), since the following ones (Lyons 1529 and Venice 1531) are merely copies of it. Since ms. V presents the best version, we will follow this witness (including its spelling), except when it is clearly wrong. Variants are indicated in the footnotes, except for simple word inversions.

*V*: Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 2490, f. 1ra-126ra (Padova 1386)

The two *quaestiones* are copied on f. 55va-56ra and 56ra-rb.

*W*: Wiesbaden, Hessische Landesbibliothek 58, f. 8ra-273vb (early 15th century)

The two *quaestiones* are copied on f. 116rb-117ra and 117ra-117vb.

*Ed*: “*Venetiis mandato et expensis heredum nobilis viri domini Octaviani Scoti ... per Bonetum Locatellum presbyter Bergomensem*” (Venice, 1506)

The two *quaestiones* are copied on f. 53ra-b et 53rb-vb

<*Utrum anima nostri corporis et aliorum animalium sit extensa ad extensionem corporis*>

/55va/ In hoc quinto tractatu intendimus ea que circa animam et eius<sup>1</sup> virtutes<sup>2</sup> et spiritus sunt dubia investigare. Et primo queratur an anima nostri corporis et aliorum animalium sit<sup>3</sup> extensa ad extensionem corporis.

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1 In hoc quinto ... eius] I[n ...] *W*

2 virtutes] operationes vel virtutes *Ed*

3 sit] sint *W*

Quod sic ostenditur. Quia si non, tunc aliquando animal<sup>4</sup> simul secundum se totum<sup>5</sup> posset moveri et quiescere, ut cum unum membrum movetur alio quiescente, ymo<sup>6</sup> secundum se totum<sup>7</sup> posset<sup>8</sup> moveri motibus contrariis, ut cum<sup>9</sup> due partes corporis ad contraria loca moventur, sed hec videntur absurda<sup>10</sup>. Amplius incisa<sup>11</sup> una parte corporis anima videretur transmigrare<sup>12</sup> de predicta parte ad residuum corporis<sup>13</sup>, cum non remaneat<sup>14</sup> in parte predicta.

Ad oppositum arguitur<sup>15</sup>, quia illa forma non videtur esse<sup>16</sup> extensa extensione sui subiecti, que secundum se totam transmutationem recipit quacumque parte subiecti transmutata indifferenter, quia contrarium huius apparet<sup>17</sup> de formis extensis; sed sic est in anima ut patet experientia.

Hoc quesitum hic dubitamus pro<sup>18</sup> fundamento aliquorum dicendorum<sup>19</sup> in quesitis sequentibus, et<sup>20</sup> quia hoc a quampluribus determinatum est secundum diversas opiniones ponamus<sup>21</sup> dicta que nobis in hoc<sup>22</sup> apparent magis<sup>23</sup> probabilia, et<sup>24</sup> ab aliis similiter<sup>25</sup> etiam<sup>26</sup> affirmata. Ponemus<sup>27</sup> diversas conclusiones sicut<sup>28</sup> et diversimode anima reperitur.

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- 4 aliquando animal] aliquando anima sed aliquando animal *ante corr.* V alii W  
 5 totum] totam V W  
 6 ymo] ymmo simul W  
 7 totum] totam V W  
 8 posset] potest W  
 9 ut cum] nisi W  
 10 hec videntur absurda] hoc videtur falsum W  
 11 incisa] transcisa W  
 12 transmigrare] transmigrari V transire W  
 13 corporis] corpus Ed  
 14 remaneat] remanet W  
 15 arguitur] autem Ed  
 16 esse] om. W  
 17 contrarium huius apparet] quam aliam W  
 18 pro] quesito *add.* W  
 19 dicendorum] dictorum vel dicendorum W  
 20 et] om. W  
 21 ponamus] ponemus W  
 22 hoc] hac W  
 23 magis] om. W  
 24 et] licet W  
 25 similiter] sint W Ed  
 26 etiam] om. W  
 27 Ponemus] Actem dentes igitur primo ponemus W  
 28 sicut] sic W



Prima conclusio est<sup>29</sup> de anima intellectiva, /V 55vb/ quod veritas est quam<sup>30</sup> affirmare debemus quod ipsa est indivisibilis et est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte corporis, et quod ipsa vere<sup>31</sup> est forma corporis dans esse substantiale. Ex quo<sup>32</sup> statim patet<sup>33</sup> intelligenti qualiter ipsa sit extensa vel non ad extensionem corporis.

Secunda conclusio est animam intellectivam<sup>34</sup> esse indivisibilem et totam in toto et totam in qualibet parte corporis non potest aliqua evidenti ratione naturali<sup>35</sup> ostendi seu<sup>36</sup> investigari, nec<sup>37</sup> etiam per experientiam aliquam, quia hec<sup>38</sup> non deduceretur nisi ex aliqua operatione in nobis existente, que tali forme attribueretur<sup>39</sup>, et nulli alteri; sed nulla est talis operatio in nobis que non bene possit<sup>40</sup> reduci in animam nostram sensitivam absque hoc quod in nobis ponatur aliqua<sup>41</sup> anima intellectiva; igitur ipsa non est evidenti ratione vel experientia investigabilis<sup>42</sup>, sed ipsam<sup>43</sup> esse talem et incorruptibilem per fidem credere debemus<sup>44</sup>.

Tertia conclusio est de anima sensitiva de qua dubium est an in nobis<sup>45</sup> sit forma distincta ab anima intellectiva, vel<sup>46</sup> eadem. Et deinde videndum est si ipsa<sup>47</sup> in nobis et similiter in<sup>48</sup> animalibus aliis est extensa ad extensionem corporis. De primo dicimus quod neutra pars est bene demonstrabilis, tamen verisimilius est quod sint distincte forme substantiales quam quod sit una, quod maxime apparet esse verum propter diversas operationes in nobis simul repertas, que adinvicem videntur

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29 est] om. *W*

30 quam] om. *W*

31 vere] vera *W om. Ed*

32 quo] qua *W*

33 patet] apparet *W*

34 intellectivam] nam add. *W*

35 naturali] om. *W*

36 seu] sive *Ed*

37 nec] per consequens add. *Ed*

38 hec] hoc *W Ed*

39 attribueretur] actinentur *W*

40 possit] posset *W*

41 aliqua] predicta *W*

42 evidenti ratione vel experientia investigabilis] investigabili ratione vel experientia reperibilis *Ed sed in marg. add. in alio: igitur ipsa non est evidenti ratione vel experientia investigabilis.*

43 ipsam] om. *V*

44 credere debemus] tenemus *W*

45 an in nobis *V*] in nobis an *Ed* in nobis an ipsa *W*

46 vel] an *Ed*

47 est si ipsa] si ipsa est distincta an ipsa *W*

48 in] om. *W*

impossibiles<sup>49</sup> in eadem forma recipi, et ab eadem forma<sup>50</sup> procedere, quod sic non evenit si ponantur esse distincte forme<sup>51</sup>.

Quarta conclusio est<sup>52</sup> quod anima sensitiva in nobis, si est forma distincta ab intellectiva, est<sup>53</sup> extensa ad extensionem corporis in quo est. Hec conclusio statim<sup>54</sup> patet, quia si anima sensitiva est ab intellectiva distincta, ipsa est educta de potentia materie generabilis et<sup>55</sup> corruptibilis, sicut et aliorum brutorum animalium; igitur<sup>56</sup> ipsa similiter erit<sup>57</sup> extensa extensione corporis sic<sup>58</sup> et illorum; sed clarum est quod illorum anima est extensa, quod patet per incisionem multorum animalium imperfectorum in quibus post incisionem apparet quamlibet partem sentire, si quis illam<sup>59</sup> pungendo contristet.

Nec valet si diceretur, sicut dicunt multi, quod cum dividuntur<sup>60</sup> animalia predicta, per divisionem corrumpitur anima preexistens et generantur ibi due anime<sup>61</sup>; et hoc virtute corporis celestis in illis duabus partibus<sup>62</sup>, quia similiter potero dicere de omni alia forma, et quod cuiuscumque rei forma est indivisibilis, nec poterit contrarium ostendi. Similiter nulla corruptio alicuius forme in aliqua materia videtur posse producere ad generationem forme<sup>63</sup> speciei eiusdem in eadem materia, nam ut patet<sup>64</sup> ex 7<sup>o</sup><sup>65</sup> *Methaphysice*: Corruptum<sup>66</sup> non redit idem specie nisi fiat<sup>67</sup> reductio usque ad<sup>68</sup> materiam primam, et ponit exemplum de vino et aceto, quod in hac corruptione non evenit.

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49 impossibiles] impossibiles *W*

50 forma] om. *W Ed*

51 esse distincte forme] quod sint forme distincte *Ed* esse diverse forme *W*

52 est] om. *W*

53 est] erit *W*

54 statim] om. *W*

55 et] om. *W*

56 igitur] ergo *Ed*

57 similiter erit] est *W*

58 sic] sicut *W Ed*

59 illam] illa *W*

60 dividuntur *W Ed*] dividunt *V*

61 anime] in duabus partibus add. *W*

62 in illis duabus partibus] om. *W*

63 forme] om. *W*

64 patet] om. *W*

65 7<sup>o</sup>] 2<sup>o</sup> *W*

66 corruptum] corruptio *W*

67 fiat] fuerit *W*

68 usque ad] ad suam *W*

Quod<sup>69</sup> autem anima sit extensa et quod<sup>70</sup> ipsa sit formaliter<sup>71</sup> in toto supra apparuit<sup>72</sup> in antecedendi tractatu circa principium. Si autem anima sensitiva<sup>73</sup> in nobis ponatur idem<sup>74</sup> cum intellectiva<sup>75</sup>, clarum est quod ipsa<sup>76</sup> inextensa existit; aliorum autem animalium anime<sup>77</sup> extense erunt<sup>78</sup>, aliter idem<sup>79</sup> oporteret<sup>80</sup>, ut dicunt<sup>81</sup>, hoc similiter de omnibus naturalibus formis asserere, cum habeant condiciones cuiuscumque forme materialis<sup>82</sup>.

Ex his<sup>83</sup> apparet quid dicendum ad ea que in principio adducuntur<sup>84</sup> et probat argumentum primum propositum, quia tamen probaret oppositum eius<sup>85</sup> est de anima intellectiva. Dicendum quod verum concludit de eo quod per se movetur, non autem de eo quod movetur per accidens ad motum alterius, quia ex quo anima intellectiva ponitur tota in qualibet parte, id<sup>86</sup> de ea arguere non est inconueniens, sicut non est inconueniens ponere idem, ut eam<sup>87</sup> esse in diversis locis distantibus.

Similiter quod secundo arguitur non concludit, nam incisa una parte non est verum<sup>88</sup> /*V 56ra*/ quod anima transmigraret quousque<sup>89</sup> post incisionem non informat tantam quantitatem corporis quantam prius informabat. Quod autem in contrarium arguitur, apparebit in quodam alio quesito inferius de loco cognitionum<sup>90</sup> et sensationum, quia primum

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69 Quod] Si *W Ed*  
 70 et quod] quod *Ed* ita quod *W*  
 71 formaliter] formalem *W*  
 72 apparuit] supra *add. V*  
 73 sensitiva] intellectiva *Ed*  
 74 idem] esse *add. W*  
 75 intellectiva] sensitiva *Ed*  
 76 ipsa] est *add. W*  
 77 anime] *om. W*  
 78 erunt] est autem *W* existunt *Ed*  
 79 idem] ideo *Ed*  
 80 oporteret] oportent *W*  
 81 ut dicunt] simul pati contraria *W*  
 82 materialis] naturalis *W*  
 83 his] autem *add. W*  
 84 adducuntur] sunt adducta *W*  
 85 eius] eius quod *W* quod *Ed*  
 86 id] ideo *Ed*  
 87 eam] causa *W*  
 88 nam incisa una parte non est verum] quod est *Ed* non enim est hic *W*  
 89 quousque] sed *Ed* quod *W*  
 90 cognitionum] cogitationum *W*

quod assumitur potest<sup>91</sup> negari, et forte apud aliquos negaretur secundum dictum concessum<sup>92</sup> primo, sed quid de hoc apparebit.

<Utrum virtutes anime sint res distincte ab essentia anime>

Secundo queritur, an<sup>93</sup> virtutes anime sint res distincte ab essentia anime<sup>94</sup>. Et<sup>95</sup> primo ostenditur<sup>96</sup> quod sic, quia quando aliqua sic se habent quod aliqua<sup>97</sup> verificantur<sup>98</sup> de uno illorum et non de alio, illa videntur distincta adinvicem<sup>99</sup>, sed multa verificantur de anima que non verificantur de eius virtutibus, nam<sup>100</sup> anima est in quolibet membro secundum antedicta, et tamen visio non est in quolibet membro vel<sup>101</sup> virtus visiva nec<sup>102</sup> sensitiva<sup>103</sup>; et sic de multis aliis predicatis<sup>104</sup> inductive<sup>105</sup> ut patet<sup>106</sup> cuilibet intelligenti et in qualibet virtute probat<sup>107</sup> hoc argumentum similiter<sup>108</sup> quod virtutes anime sint adinvicem<sup>109</sup> inter se distincte.

Oppositum ostenditur<sup>110</sup> quia<sup>111</sup> sicut se habet in aliis rebus naturalibus sic et in corpore vivente<sup>112</sup> debet contingere, sed in aliis ad operationes exercendas non concurrat nisi forma substantialis rei<sup>113</sup> et qualitas que

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- 91 potest] posset *Ed*  
 92 concessum] concesso *W*  
 93 Secundo queritur, an] *om. W*  
 94 essentia anime] ipsa anima anime essentia *W*  
 95 Et] *om. W*  
 96 ostenditur] ostendit *V*  
 97 aliqua] ad *W*  
 98 verificantur] verificatur *W*  
 99 adinvicem] abinvicem *W*  
 100 nam] igitur hoc est verum secundum antedicta quod *W*  
 101 secundum antedicta ... membro vel] *om. W*  
 102 nec] vel *Ed*  
 103 sensitiva] non *add. W*  
 104 predicatis] predictis *Ed*  
 105 inductive] potest induci *W*  
 106 ut patet] patet *Ed*  
 107 probat] Et probat *W*  
 108 similiter] *om. Ed*  
 109 adinvicem] invicem *W*  
 110 ostenditur] arguitur *W*  
 111 ostenditur quia] ostenditur quia *add. V*  
 112 vivente] viventi *W*  
 113 rei] rerum *W*

est eius<sup>114</sup> proprium instrumentum, igitur similiter<sup>115</sup> in corpore vivente non erit nisi anima et eius complexio<sup>116</sup> tanquam proprium instrumentum deserviens anime<sup>117</sup>.

In hoc quesito breviter ponemus quod credimus esse verum, licet iam antiquitus<sup>118</sup> multi inutiliter et supervacue<sup>119</sup> multa dixerunt, et ponimus<sup>120</sup> in hoc aliquas conclusiones.

Prima conclusio<sup>121</sup> est quod nulla virtus anime, quantum ad id quod in recto et principaliter per virtutem<sup>122</sup> significatur<sup>123</sup>, est distincta ab ipsa anime essentia que equivalet<sup>124</sup> huic: quod preter<sup>125</sup> qualitates et dispositiones corporis nulla est res a parte anime que sit aliqua res distincta ab anima, que virtus anime nuncupetur<sup>126</sup>. Causa huius conclusionis est in pronto<sup>127</sup>, quia frustra fit per plura quod eque bene potest fieri per pauciora, sed omnes operationes corporis, quecumque sint<sup>128</sup>, possunt exerceri ab ipsa anima cum diversis dispositionibus membrorum, nullam aliam<sup>129</sup> rem ex parte ipsius anime ponendo; igitur etc.

Secunda conclusio est<sup>130</sup>, quod sumendo virtutem quantum ad id quod secundo<sup>131</sup> significatur et connotatur<sup>132</sup> virtus est res distincta ab essentia anime, cuius ratio est, quia virtus connotat actum et operationem<sup>133</sup>, unde virtutes per operationes cognoscuntur; per virtutem enim visivam statim<sup>134</sup> connotatur actus videndi. Nunc autem<sup>135</sup> ad diversas operationes

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114 eius] *om. W*

115 similiter] *om. W*

116 complexio] *sibi add. W*

117 anime] *om. Ed W*

118 antiquitus] *om. W*

119 supervacue] *similiter vacue V*

120 ponimus] *ponemus W*

121 conclusio] *om. W Ed*

122 virtutem] *virtutes W*

123 significatur] *significavimus W Ed*

124 equivalet] *equivalent W*

125 preter] *om. W*

126 nuncupetur] *nuncupatur W*

127 pronto] *promptu Ed W*

128 sint] *sunt W*

129 aliam] *nullam sic W*

130 est] *om. W*

131 secundo] *per virtutem add. W Ed*

132 significatur et connotatur] *significamus et connotamus W Ed*

133 operationem] *operationes W*

134 statim] *om. Ed*

135 autem] *om. W*

exercendas licet sit una anima, indiget tamen diversis operationibus<sup>136</sup> corporalibus et diversis instrumentis, ut clarum est, que quidem<sup>137</sup> omnia requiruntur<sup>138</sup> ad actum et operationem exercendam, respectu cuius talis virtus vel talis anime nuncupatur<sup>139</sup> per virtutem anime connotant<sup>140</sup>; unde virtus visiva significat<sup>141</sup> animam connotans esse illud<sup>142</sup> quod requiritur ad hoc ut possit exerceri actus<sup>143</sup> videndi; et ideo cum ista sint multum<sup>144</sup> diversa in<sup>145</sup> diversis actibus et operationibus diversarum virtutum, idcirco sumendo virtutem hoc modo ipsa est distincta ab anima et diverse virtutes etiam adinvicem sunt distincte.

Ex his autem statim<sup>146</sup> sequitur conclusio tertia, quod nulla virtus sumendo primo modo virtutem transmittitur ab aliquo membro ad aliqua alia; et patet hec conclusio de se et patuit in antecedenti<sup>147</sup> tractatu circa principium. Sumendo autem virtutem secundo modo, virtutes */V 56rb/* possunt dici transmitti a principalibus ad alia, sub quo intellectu auctores sepe locuntur. Similiter ex dictis sequitur quod sumendo virtutem primo modo, quodlibet membrum habet quamlibet virtutem, non autem sumendo eam<sup>148</sup> secundo modo.

Erit<sup>149</sup> autem dubium magis infra, cum iam dictum sit quod anima sensitiva est extensa et pars anime que est in una parte corporis, ut verbi gratia in oculo, non sit pars anime que est<sup>150</sup> in aure, et ita<sup>151</sup> virtutes anime que sunt in diversis membris, sumendo virtutem primo modo, sint adinvicem<sup>152</sup> distincte; erit dubium<sup>153</sup> si sint<sup>154</sup> etiam distincte<sup>155</sup> quoad

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136 operationibus] organis *W Ed*

137 quidem] *om. Ed* quedam *W*

138 requiruntur] requisita *W*

139 nuncupatur] nuncupantur *W*

140 connotant] significant alias connotant *Ed* connotantur *W*

141 virtus visiva significat] virtutes visive significant *Ed*

142 illud] id *W*

143 exerceri actus] exercere actum *Ed*

144 et ideo cum ista sint multum] Non tamen ita sicut videntur *W*

145 in] et *W*

146 statim] *om. Ed*

147 antecedenti] quesito *add. W*

148 sumendo eam] *om. Ed*

149 Erit] Sicut *W*

150 est] sit *W*

151 ita] igitur *W*

152 adinvicem] abinvicem *W*

153 erit dubium] et dubium erit *W*

154 sint] sunt *W*

155 erit dubium si sint etiam distincte] *in marg. ead. manu V*

operationes diversarum virtutum. Et<sup>156</sup> quod operatio unius virtutis fiat sic determinate in una parte anime<sup>157</sup>, verbi gratia visio, quod non fiat in aliis partibus<sup>158</sup> anime existentibus in aliis partibus corporis; sed quid<sup>159</sup> de hoc apparebit, quidquid autem sit de hoc<sup>160</sup>, virtutes tamen anime primo modo sumendo virtutem non aliter adinvicem possunt esse distincte nisi<sup>161</sup> diverse partes<sup>162</sup> anime sint<sup>163</sup> distincte.

Ex hiis<sup>164</sup> patet ad inducta<sup>165</sup>. Ad primum<sup>166</sup>, concessa maiori nego minorem<sup>167</sup> primo modo sumendo virtutem, ymo virtus visiva est in unoquoque<sup>168</sup> membro in quo est anima cum qua<sup>169</sup> est idem. Si enim teneatur quod tota anima videt, patet quod<sup>170</sup> virtus visiva est in toto corpore; si autem teneatur quod determinata pars anime videt, tunc clarum est quod predicta pars est in determinata parte corporis, et non in toto corpore. Argumentum autem in oppositum verum<sup>171</sup> probat, primo modo sumendo virtutem, non autem secundo modo.

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156 Et] ut *W*

157 anime] ut *add. W*

158 anime existentibus in aliis partibus] *om. Ed*

159 quid] quicquid *Ed*

160 quidquid autem sit de hoc] *om. Ed*

161 nisi] sicut *add. Ed*

162 partes] partis *W*

163 sint] sunt *W Ed*

164 hiis] dictis *W*

165 patet ad inducta] autem appareret ad ea que inducuntur in principio *W*

166 primum] primam *W*

167 maiori nego minorem] argumenti ad veritatem negatur *W*

168 unoquoque] quecumque *W*

169 qua] quo *V*

170 patet quod] *om. W*

171 verum] *om. W*