

Daniele Nuccilli

To Participate in History(ies). Lifeworld, Embodiment and Entanglement

Introduction¹

This paper examines a particular interpretation of human historicity, focusing on Wilhelm Schapp's so-called "philosophy of hi/stories". I will highlight the complex interplay between a historical-hermeneutic dimension and a narrative dimension in his theory of human's entanglement in hi/stories.

The theory of human entanglement in hi/stories is based on a lexical-conceptual ambiguity that conceals a theoretical stance. With *Geschichten* (hi/stories), Schapp refers both to the historical and objective concatenation of past events and to the way in which these events are passed down and understood by humans through storytelling or other forms of the emergence of the past. Behind this indistinction lies an ontological interpretation of hi/stories² that aims to trace every narrative process back to the historical and hermeneutic rooting of the subject. Schapp's *Geschichten* have a dual structure: on the one hand, they represent the background of human life-experience that makes any understanding possible, and on the other hand, they form the internal struc-

¹ This work was supported by the European Regional Development Fund project "MSCA Fellowships CZ – UK2" (reg. no.: CZ.02.01.01/00/22_010/0008115).

² Eichler refers to "narrative ontology" (see K.-D. Eichler, *Wilhelm Schapps Narrative Ontologie. Eine Problematisierung seiner Geschichtenphilosophie* in K. Joisten (a cura di), *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps*, Karl Alber, Freiburg/München 2010, pp. 102-125) while Pohlmeier speaks of "ontosemantics" (see M. Pohlmeier, *Geschichten-Hermeneutik. Philosophische, literarische und theologische Provokationen im Denken von Wilhelm Schapp*, Lit, Berlin, 2014, 199. For a more in-depth discussion of the ontological nature of hi/stories and entanglement see D. Nuccilli, *History and Stories: Schapp's Ontological Conception of the Entanglement*, in "Kritika & Kontext", 53-54, 2018, pp. 27-43 e Id., *Wilhelm Schapp. Von der Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung zur Philosophie der Geschichten*, in F. Bruckmann, M. Pohlmeier (a cura di), *Geschichtenphilosophie von Wilhelm Schapp und ihre Rezeption*. Aisthesis, Bielefeld 2025, pp. 49-80

ture of meaning and the rationality of any verbal narration³. The history itself, understood as the reworking of past events involving peoples and nations, emerges, according to Schapp, only through the hi/stories, whether written, narrated, or emerging through commemorative monuments and other forms of recalling the past. Secondary literature has already addressed this complex connection between life experience, narrative, and the understanding of historical and individual pasts. Carr, for instance, highlighted the origin of this ambiguity in the concept of the transcendental ego in Husserl, according to which it “constitutes itself for itself, so to speak, in the unity of a *Geschichte*,” where *Geschichte* can be translated as either history or story⁴. Marquard, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of the pluralistic conception of hi/stories as a form of liberation for the subject from a progressive and monopolistic view of history that engulfs the individual and their actions.⁵ Ricoeur, for his part, underscored the foundational importance of Schapp’s concept of entanglement in relation to narrative. According to him, hi/stories represent the hermeneutic background upon which every form of narration is built. Entanglement, in fact, is, in his view, a “prehistory of the told hi/story,” and hi/story is something that “happens to” someone before anyone tells it⁶. Fellmann has also highlighted this rooting of narrative in the individual’s past experience, interpreting Schapp’s hi/stories as “prejudices from which human beings cannot escape”⁷. In a more technical manner, Scholz expressed a negative opinion regarding the possible contribution of Schapp’s philosophy of hi/stories to historical science, while nonetheless acknowledging that both historical science and Schapp’s philosophy of hi/stories are phi-

³ See for this D. Nuccilli, *Wilhelm Schapp on the narrative structure of intersubjectivity*, in A. Božič (a cura di), *Thinking Togetherness. Phenomenology and Sociality*, Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities, Ljubljana 2023, pp. 143-155, ivi, pp. 144-146.

⁴ D. Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1986, p. 73

⁵ Cfr. O. Marquard, *In Praise of Polytheism (On Monomythical and Polymythical Thinking)* in *Farewell to Matters of Principle*, tr. R. M. Wallace, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 87-105, ivi. 102. See Nuccilli, D., *Stories as a Critical Means of Access to the Life-world. Language, Reality, History* in “New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy”, 22, 2024, pp. 35-55, ivi. 49-51.

⁶ P. Ricoeur, *Temps et Récit. L’Intrigue et le Récit historique*, Seuil, Paris 1983, cit., pp. 114-115

⁷ This binding element of hi/stories has also been recognized by Habermas, who states that “being entangled in their (hi)stories,” the members of a society “control neither the possibilities for mutual understanding and conflict, nor the consequences and side effects of their actions.” (J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*, Bd. II, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 224).

losophies of experience⁸. In fact, the discussion on the contribution of Schapp's philosophy of hi/stories in relation to history and the historicity of human beings becomes more fruitful when considering the way in which the life-world and historicity intertwine within individual experience. As Jean Greisch rightly pointed out, the tripartition of the concept of entanglement provided in *In Geschichten verstrickt*, namely self-entanglement, other-entanglement and common-entanglement offers a way out of Heideggers fundamental existential concept of "care", allowing to understand the historicity of human beings a new through the *pluralia-tantum* of hi/stories⁹.

The analyses of the aforementioned authors have successfully highlighted fundamental aspects of Schapp's philosophy of hi/stories. This is particularly evident in the way his thought conceptualizes the connection between individual experience and the unfolding of the past in its various forms. However, one crucial aspect has been entirely overlooked by the secondary literature: Schapp's philosophy of hi/stories stems from his project to philosophically ground historical science a priori. We find a sketch of this project in his phenomenology of law and the historicist approach present in his theory of values¹⁰. It is only by considering this aspect that one can understand the historicist impulse of his philosophy of hi/stories, even in its more hermeneutic and narratological consequences¹¹. What is outlined within the theory of values, in fact, as I will attempt to show in this article, represents the fundamental structure of his philosophy of hi/stories. The historicity implicit in the theory of human entanglement in hi/stories can be articulated through three steps or moments: (a) the description of the relationship between I and the work in his historicist conception of values; (b) the concept of entanglement based on the relationship between body and narration as he outlines it in *In Geschichten verstrickt*; (c) the concept of the positive world and universal history in his philosophy of hi/stories. I will address point (a) in the

⁸ See G. Scholtz, *Das Verhältnis der Geschichten zur Geschichte. Kritische Fragen an Wilhelm Schapp* in K.-H. Lembeck (a cura di), *Geschichte und Geschichten. Studien zur Geschichtenphänomenologie Wilhelm Schapps*, Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 57-71.

⁹ See J. Greisch, *Phänomenologie als Philosophie der Geschichten: eine vierte, stille Revolution der philosophischen Denkungsart?* in K. Joisten (a cura di), *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps*. Karl Alber Freiburg/München 2010, pp. 190-214, ivi. 194.

¹⁰ See D. Nuccilli, *Wilhelm Schapp*, pp. 73 ff.

¹¹ For a reference to the influence of Dilthey and Rickert, his mentors in his youth, on his hermeneutic approach, see D. De Santis, D. Nuccilli, *On the Many Philosophies of Wilhelm Schapp. Editors' Introduction*, in D. De Santis, D. Nuccilli (a cura di), *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Schapp: From Phenomenology to Jurisprudence and the Hermeneutics of Stories*. Bloomsbury Academic, London 2025, pp. 1-19, ivi. 1 ff.

first section, “Historical A Priori and Theory of Values: I–Work Relationship” (1), and point (b) in the second section, “Entanglement and Narrative: Things-for, Embodiment, and History” (2). Before moving to the conclusions, I will finally discuss point (c) in the third section, “History and the Entanglement of Humans in Hi/stories: Positive World, We-Hi/stories, and Universal Histories” (3).

1. Historical A Priori and Theory of Values: I-Work Relationship

In the first section of the second volume of *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht*, Schapp develops a theory of values based on two principles: (1) every world of values is constructed upon a subjectivity that, from its historical-cultural position, draws upon that world of values¹²; (2) The very construction of this world of values is based on the production of works and the I-work relationship. Let us try to investigate these two points.

According to Schapp, the dimension of value is primarily linked to an “attitude of the soul” [*Haltung der Seele*] that unfolds in contact with the thing and allows it to be encountered. The thing’s value reveals itself in “enjoying, tasting, sipping, feeling” [*Geniessen, Kosten, Schlurfen, Fühlen*]¹³. Through this contact between the thing and the soul, a dynamic circle is inaugurated that elevates the thing above its mere materiality¹⁴ and includes it within what he defines as a “world of values” [*Wertwelt*]. This world of values is, according to Schapp, different depending on cultural heritage and individual experience¹⁵. Although some things may be objective and universally recognized as valuable, each person engages with them and perceives their value differently. As Schapp points out, for example, if you are attending a parade where beautiful and powerful horses are marching by, you might take pleasure in watching them – but only someone who is truly passionate about horses will be able to fully enjoy the experience. Moreover, only those who also have the skill and opportunity to ride such a horse will be able to fully appreciate it and place it at the center of their value system.

¹² Cfr. W. Schapp, *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht II*, p. 70

¹³ Ivi, p. 4

¹⁴ See Ivi, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵ See Ivi, pp. 70 ff. In the first volume of *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht*, Schapp describes the ordering of individual universes of value in reference to the empirical world as a “*Verschmelzung von Wertwelten*” [fusion of worlds of value]. Cfr. W. Schapp, W., *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht. Eine phänomenologische Untersuchung. 1. Bd. Der Vertrag als Vorgegebenheit*, Rotschild, Berlin-Grunewald 1930, pp. 22 f.

For someone like him, who is not a true horse enthusiast, the value of a powerful horse remains excluded from, or at the margins of, their value system¹⁶. As this example shows, things do not present themselves to us with labels indicating their value. Even if certain things are conventionally considered valuable, this value is not necessarily recognized by everyone. In some cases, what holds great value for one person may not hold the same value for another – or at least, it may be expressed differently. While an objective dimension of value is conceivable, access to it depends on the subject's historical position and on the situational context of both the valuing subject and the valued objects. Schapp emphasizes this point with the example of the apple:

In terms of value, there is a difference if I pick the last apple from a tree or if I choose an apple from a tree laden with apples, even if the two apples I eventually eat are equally good. There is again a difference if the tree is part of a large garden or if it is a solitary tree, and there is yet another difference if this garden is part of my homeland or a country indifferent to me, and if this homeland is part of a strong and flourishing nation or if it is like suspended in the air and in the hands of enemies.¹⁷

Thanks to this quoted passage, we can see how the issue of values has implications that are not only horizontal – meaning how values are positioned in the world – but also historical and temporal. This historical-temporal dimension emerges from the interaction between the valued object and the soul, encompassing both the subject's historical position and the temporal reality of the object within the series of concatenations that characterize the “world of value,” at the heart of which resides the subject.

By integrating the aforementioned aspects, we can highlight three points regarding Schapp's formulation of the concept of value:

1) The value is beyond the perceptual reality of the thing: even if the taste of the apples is the same, the value and the way how it is savored vary depending on the circumstances and thus on the world of value in which the apple is embedded.

2) With respect to this world of values, the self has a peculiar position, constituting its unequivocal center. Although there are subjects who share the same world of values, within this world, there are things that have different values depending on the individual's position and experience of the lifeworld.

¹⁶ Cfr. Schapp, *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht II*, pp. 8-9.

¹⁷ Ivi, p. 19.

3) From the contact between the valued object and the soul, a historical-temporal dimension radiates, involving both the subject's position in history and the historical-temporal reality of the object within the series of concatenations that characterize the so-called world of value.

These three points regarding value theory constitute the central elements upon which Schapp builds his theory of the I-work relationship. However, with the introduction of the concept of work and its relation to production and the I, the discussion deepens and incorporates additional elements that lead to a historicist foundation of the concept of value.

Schapp introduces the notion of work within his investigation of the constitution of property, understood as a pre-givenness of positive law. He aims to highlight how property is rooted in a pre-legal dimension that precedes the formal institution of law and finds its origin in the act of production itself.¹⁸ Using a rudimentary example, Schapp argues that the core of this pre-legal dimension of property lies in the production of an object. He states, "In the situation in which someone produces a stone axe or carves a bow and arrows, the property already finds its place."¹⁹ From the perspective of the foundation of property, it makes no difference whether it is a simple axe being refined or a more complex object, like a car. What truly matters is the moment of production itself, which cannot be investigated in a static manner, as one might do with objects when they are considered in terms of their perceptual qualities. In fact, he highlights just how difficult it is to apply the phenomenological method to such an investigation, stating:

If the reader now sets the book aside and tries to ascertain for himself something essential about this simple process, he will understand the difficulty of the investigation that follows and the ambiguities necessarily connected with it [...]. If we now approach this process from the outside and try to imagine Stone Age man removing sliver by sliver and shaping the rough stone, this image still tells us nothing about the inner connections of the creation of the stone axe.²⁰

According to the author, focusing solely on external actions or perceptual qualities does not capture the more profound, dynamic connections in the production process, whether for simple or complex objects. To understand this phenomenon, one must transpose oneself into the meaning-context in which the object is produced. The individuals involved in

¹⁸ Cfr. W. Schapp, *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht II*, pp. 79-95

¹⁹ *Ivi*, p. 34

²⁰ *Ibidem*

the production may be enslaved or free may create the object for a religious rite or for more profane purposes and may do so for themselves or others. These conditions are not secondary to understanding the object. On the contrary, Schapp argues that it is these very conditions that define the value of the object. The situated relationship with the producer and their position in the lifeworld makes the work different from other non-human-produced objects. One object is only conceivable as a work when there is a creator [*Schöpfer*], someone in “flesh and blood”²¹ who releases it from the stone and, in so doing, excludes it from the world of natural objects, inserting it instead into the world of human-made objects and then of objects with a specific value. Therefore, any cognitive evaluation of the thing and its composition must be immediately referred to the productive context and the human being who produced it²². This approach shifts the focus of the investigation from the work itself to the physical relationship the work establishes with its producer. This is what Schapp calls the *Ich-Werk-Beziehung* [I-work relationship]. Drawing on a theme already present in Lipps’ aesthetic theory, Schapp asserts that in every work, one can perceive its “creator’s will” [*Willen zum Werke*], especially the means and techniques used to shape that specific material.²³ This is where the phenomenology of creation must begin: from the ordering of the material work within a bodily activity and the cycle that is established in it. It must shift his analysis from the tool to the hand and to the traces that this hand and tool have left on the work. However, according to Schapp, this is only the first step. To truly understand the “work character” [*Werkcharakter*], one must immerse oneself in the creator’s intentions in bringing it into being. One must place the action, the plan of the producer, and the work itself in a context of reasonable meaning. To explain this, he takes the example of a pincer-shaped object on a smoking table. If we observe the pincer-shaped object on a smoking table, we immediately recognize that it is in some way a work and probably a tool. However, we only understand the work in its fullest sense when the smoker uses it to bring the cigarette to his mouth, thus avoiding soiling his fingers with nicotine”²⁴. To understand each work, we must place it in a similar context, and this often goes beyond the simple context of use, as is the case with the clips and the cigarette, but also opens

²¹ See Ivi, p. 37.

²² Cfr. Ivi, p. 36.

²³ In his *Ästhetik*, Lipps defines the individual’s projecting of the will into the working of a thing and the subsequent recognition of aspects of the subject in the thing as the “character of the thing” itself (cfr. Th. Lipps, *Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst. Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, Verlag von Leopold Voss, Leipzig 1903, p. 201).

²⁴ Schapp, *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht II*, p. 38.

up a whole series of references that situate the work within a broader circle of ends and values. For example, coming back to the example of the stone axe, Schapp states: "If we want to understand the stone axe as a work we have to think about the fact that it serves to cut wood and that a house can be built with wood and that the house serves to shelter from the wind and rain and the heat of the sun during the day"²⁵. Beginning with the axe, then, a series of references radiate out, opening for us a window to the world that also involves a semiotic of some of its aspects, from stone to the sun. On this last horizontal dimension of the unfolding of meanings and the utility value of the work, Schapp incorporates a vertical dimension that leads not only to the individual who produced that object in the past but also to its development and the historical conditions surrounding that development. This historical dimension is described in a paragraph where Schapp attempts to define the essence of the work. Once again, he employs a practical example and analyzes in detail the work of a shoe:

If we consider the shoe from the outside, we immediately recognize the single parts: the sole, the toe box, the upper, and the heel. In this subdivision, each part takes on its own meaning. The division between the sole and heel allows for greater support of the metatarsal; the division between the sole and upper facilitates repair. Each part of the shoe refers us back to someone who first discovered its meaning. It dissolves before our eyes into multiple paths, each of which can be traced back to a discovery. These discoveries have their temporal locus, that is, a place in historical time.²⁶

Each component of the shoe, according to Schapp points back to the individual human who conceived it. Embedded in any assessment of the essence of the work is a projection back into the past, even hundreds of years, in search of the value – and meaning-context in which the idea or plan led that individual to perfect an object already in use or to create a new one. In relation to this search, what is important is to immerse oneself in the "idea" – in the spiritual attitude in which the different humans who contributed to the improvements of the thing "shoe" were situated. In this way, the person who observes the shoe and its components is somehow immersed in the same value context as those different humans and can thereby get in touch with a fragment of their spiritual history. In assessing the essential predicates of the shoe as a work, one can thus no longer be satisfied with isolating the characteristic aspects

²⁵ Ivi, p. 40.

²⁶ Ivi, p. 47.

that make it the thing we know as a shoe; instead, one must place it in an evolutionary dynamic of productions and discoveries that characterizes the micro-history of shoe production within the macro-history of humankind's evolution. For this reason, in some very dense lines, Schapp writes:

The history of humankind is the history of its works. The relations we have identified between self, work, value, and production are fundamental relations for history; they represent the a priori of historical science. In this sense, a bottle of Moselle wine, a shoe, a car, a horse, the color and smell of a rose all have their histories.²⁷

Asserting that every work has its history, Schapp primarily means, that each work is connected to a multitude of humans, both past and present, who contributed to its production and evolution. For Schapp, the value of works lies precisely in this connection: they engage in a creative – and therefore spiritual – relationship with humans. However, it is not always feasible to trace the history of each work's genesis and development in detail. Take, for example, a bottle of Moselle wine; it is not straightforward to reconstruct the history of its origins or how it differentiated itself from other wines over time, ultimately achieving its unique character. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible to outline the broader history of viticulture, with its key milestones, and place Moselle wine within a more extensive historical framework. Such broader histories create stable meanings within the larger history of humankind, and these meanings correspond to values. Indeed, Schapp suggests that values are what allow works to be ordered within human history, and through this ordering, history is permeated with reason [*Vernunft*]²⁸.

This reason that permeates history through works does not, however, constitute the foundation of the human universe of values. There are older values like generosity, kindness, courage, loyalty, and love that do not have a historical evolution but appear to be essential to humanity and its ethos and are “as ancient as humanity itself”²⁹. For this reason, they constitute the foundation and generative space of a world of values, regardless of their kind. Anticipating what will become one of the fundamental themes of his philosophy of hi/stories, Schapp refers to the tale of Ulysses encountering the dog Argos after many years upon his return to Ithaca, moved to compassion, as well as the tale of Blundketil from Norse tradition, a peasant who, despite his humble circumstances, is known even

²⁷ Ivi, p. 67.

²⁸ See *Ibidem*

²⁹ Ivi, p. 71.

among the noblest for his generosity and kindness of heart. According to Schapp, these tales reflect values that we can attribute to people we know or that we still find in contemporary narratives. Thus, these stories embody an ideal of humanity and value that remains constant throughout the ages, suggesting that despite historical and cultural changes, certain human qualities remain ever-present. The Protagorean motto that “man is the measure of all things” should be reinterpreted, according to Schapp, through a new value-oriented perspective, which would state that “the inner qualities of humans are the measure of all things”³⁰. The value of works and inventions, viewed from this perspective, thus roots and grounds itself in an internal world of values. In Schapp’s view, the invention of the radio or cinema does not inaugurate a new world of values; rather, it merely facilitates access to existing values. Each new material or spiritual invention brings value, but only if there is a point of connection and linkage with the ancient values inherent in the human soul, allowing it to be ordered into a history with them³¹.

2. Entanglement and Narrative: Things-for, Embodiment, and History

The conception of human works as a historical *a priori* already encompasses a peculiar vision of the relationship between the hi/stories of individuals and collectives, past and present, and the objects we encounter in everyday life, as well as, more generally, with reality as understood through the production of these objects. Through works, one can come into contact with a fragment of the world of an individual subjectivity, its historical context, and the society in which it lived. The history of a thing becomes interwoven with the individual history of its maker and, tracing back into the past, with that of its creator and the various individuals who have developed it, transmitted its uses and purposes, and adapted them to their own goals and present circumstances. In the final phase of Schapp’s thought, the intertwining between the histories of objects and the world context they carry with them, and the histories of human beings, constitutes one of the fundamental themes underlying the concept of the entanglement of humans in hi/stories. The first section of *In Geschichten verstrickt*, begins precisely with the question of how the hi/stories of objects and the hi/stories of humans relate to each other. It is within this reflection that Schapp transposes the historical dimension onto the hermeneutic-narratological framework. According to Schapp,

³⁰ Ivi, p. 72.

³¹ See *Ibidem*

everyday things, which he, starting from *In Geschichten verstrickt*, defines as *Wozudinge* [things-for], represent a sort of subtle pathway between the external world and the entangled subject³². This can be said for two main reasons: (a) through the experience of the production of things-for and the body in action, the world can emerge with all its material characteristics; (b) the development and production of things-for refer us back in time to the conception and development of that thing-for and thus to the realm of the creator and the historical and contextual framework in which it was developed and continues to evolve. These two coordinates enable, on the one hand, the entangled subject to have a pre-understanding of the world that is receptive to the historical-hermeneutic context, and, on the other hand, for history itself to emerge from this pre-reflective experience of the world through the rooting of the thing-for in history. How this plays out on a narrative level is something I will address shortly. For now, however, it is worth exploring points (a) and (b) in greater depth, particularly in relation to the problem of understanding history and, more broadly, the past.

Regarding point (a), the concept of the original body [*ursprünglicher Leib*] becomes particularly relevant. In the first section of *In Geschichten verstrickt*, Schapp seeks to circumscribe the hermeneutic horizon of the entangled subject's understanding of the world, and this horizon is identified in the bodily experience of production. According to Schapp, we have an understanding of the material characteristics of things and their meaning within the context of the lifeworld, starting from the experience of being in action when the subject uses or works on the things-for. In this regard, he writes:

We must focus on this intimate aspect of the industrious becoming [*tätig Werden*] of work, directing our gaze to the internal unfolding of hammering, sawing, and splitting. Through the tool, we first become aware of our hand and fist, then of our arm, and ultimately of our entire lived body [*Leib*]. Yet, we would be moving on the wrong plane if, in speaking of the hand, arm, or lived body [*Leib*], we were to conceive of them or attribute to them a visible body [*sichtbarer Leib*]. This visible body [*sichtbarer Leib*] is only distantly related to the lived body [*Leib*], which reveals itself through activity. We gain access to it only by fully immersing ourselves in the very acts of sawing, drilling, hammering, and splitting. We thus sense how the lived body [*Leib*] extends and tenses, how it bends and rises again, how it is, so to speak, drawn into a relational field of effects [*Wirkungszusammenhang*]. Every movement is expressed by the entire lived body [*Leib*]. This lived body [*Leib*], perceived, as

³² See W. Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding* [1953], Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2012, p. 3.

it were, from within, forms in work a dynamic unity with the tools – hammer, axe – and, further, with the ground on which it stands and the material upon which it works. This lived body [*Leib*], of which we speak, is the primordial body [*ursprünglicher Leib*], the foundational mode of bodily being upon which any other conception of the body is built.³³

This embodied dimension of production allows the world to emerge with all its characteristics. It is only by beginning with the circle of relations that is generated around the one working on the thing-for that qualities such as rigidity, heaviness, and other properties of matter come to primary manifestation³⁴. Not only does the primordial body form the horizon for a participatory dimension of the hi/story of things and the world, but things are also rooted in the world through their material, or what Schapp defines as “from-what,” [*auswas*] which gives the matter its specific place in the “overall image of the world” [*ganze Weltbild*]³⁵. These things carry the traces of events that tell their destiny, offering a glimpse into the hi/story of the people who used them and the hi/story of things within the lives of those people. Through the things-for and the signs of wear they carry with them, we gain a glimpse into the hi/story of the people who used them and the hi/story of things embedded in the lives of those people. According to Schapp, the things-for are characterized as a “formation of hi/stories”³⁶ that refer to one or more entangled beings. This is not only because they are embedded in a context of use, but also because, as in *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht II*, the things-for direct us toward the creator’s design and plan, along with its evolutions, thereby offering us a piece of the history of human culture and the peoples who conceived and developed that thing. How is the connection established between the experience of the primordial body and the hi/story that an object encountered in the lifeworld tells us? If the production or experience of everyday objects reveals their hi/stories and embeds them in the hi/stories of other individuals, both present and past, with whom we identify, then the primordial body, as the radiating center of this hi/story that allows different aspects of reality to emerge along with its action, becomes the occasion for those hi/stories to emerge and, in turn, perpetuates them into the future. In this way, the entangled being also becomes the subject of a new hi/story that can, in turn, be told.

The dimension of historical becoming through productive experience, as just outlined, is closely intertwined in Schapp with the way the past

³³ W. Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt*, pp. 21-22.

³⁴ Cfr. Ivi, pp. 22f

³⁵ Ivi, p. 11.

³⁶ Ivi, p. 13.

emerges through historical narratives or the testimonies left by great civilizations. The things-for and the works produced by human beings indeed constitute the precondition for understanding every hi/story told about the historical past. This occurs according to a hermeneutic principle that Schapp defines as “co-entanglement”. By co-entanglement, he means the participation in the hi/story of a past individual that emerges through an oral account, a commemorative monument, a narrative in a book, or any trace left by that person in this world.³⁷ There are great works produced by humans in the past that evoke entire historical periods, such as the Colosseum, the Pyramids, and the Parthenon³⁸. They reveal aspects of the human condition that we can connect to our own life experiences and to feelings we are familiar with. In the Colosseum, we see Vespasian’s dreams of grandeur, and further back, Nero’s sense of omnipotence reflected in the colossal statue that once stood where the Flavian amphitheater was later built – the very statue from which the Colosseum takes its name. We identify with the courage of the gladiators through the various filmic and literary narratives, and we sense the cruelty toward animals shown by a people who had not yet developed the sensitivity to this issue that we possess today. We are able to be co-entangled in these hi/stories because they merge with our personal understanding of that era and its values in relation to the values of our present.

There are at least two evaluations to be made regarding co-entanglement, which constitutes the fundamental way in which humans participate in the hi/stories of the past. The first reflection concerns the underlying structure of the hermeneutic condition of being entangled. The second evaluation concerns the relationship between the theory of entanglement and the theory of values proposed by Schapp in his phenomenology of law. These two elements could help clarify how the entangled individual participates not only in hi/stories but in history through them. Let’s start with what constitutes the essential condition of entanglement. As we have seen, the things-for and the external world always and only appear within hi/stories centered around someone entangled in hi/stories. They can be understood only because every human being is originally at the center of a “network of hi/stories”³⁹. But how is this being entangled in hi/stories constituted? Already in the opening lines of the introduction to *In Geschichten verstrickt*, Schapp presents the foundational premise of the concept of entanglement: “We humans are always entangled [*verstrickt*] in hi/stories [*Geschichten*]. To every hi/story there

³⁷ See W. Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt*, pp. 126-138

³⁸ See Ivi, pp. 3-4.

³⁹ See D. Nuccilli, *History and stories*, pp. 35-36.

belongs someone who is entangled [*Verstrickter*]. Hi/story and being-entangled-in-hi/stories [*In-Geschichten-verstrickt-sein*] belong together so closely that they cannot be separated from each other, probably even in thought⁴⁰. In these lines, we find the hermeneutical and epistemological cornerstone of the philosophy of hi/stories: it is impossible to distinguish between the hi/story and the humans participating in the hi/story.⁴¹ Although this assumption is given as a premise from the outset, it becomes clearer throughout *In Geschichten verstrickt* in contrast to the phenomenological theory of the intuition of essences. According to Schapp, the phenomenological method of intuition of essences presupposes two elements: (1) the identification of an identity-component of the object investigated; and (2) the perspective of a neutral observer⁴². Thanks to the theoretical attitude, which involves a form of abstraction from daily habits, perception allows the thing to manifest itself in its characteristics and essence through the presentation of the idea⁴³. Yet, since it is impossible to distinguish between the hi/story and the humans participating in the hi/story, it also becomes impossible, according to Schapp, to have a neutral perspective on the hi/story. Even when the hi/story is theoretically investigated as an object or nexus of meaning, it already presupposes the hermeneutical background of the entangled. The hi/story can never formally constitute itself as an object, because with it we are already in an original relationship, a relationship that is given to us by being-entangled-in-hi/stories [*In-Geschichten-verstrickt-sein*]⁴⁴. This entanglement already involves a background of hi/stories that prevent us from isolating a hi/story that presents itself to us as something objective and detached from our lived experience⁴⁵. Knowledge of the

⁴⁰ Ivi, p. 1.

⁴¹ Cfr. Ivi, p. 85.

⁴² See D. Nuccilli, *The Character of Things: Ding, Werk and Wozuding. A Path in Wilhelm Schapp's Thought*, in D. De Santis, D. Nuccilli (a cura di), *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Schapp: From Phenomenology to Jurisprudence and the Hermeneutics of Stories*, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2025, pp. 105-129, ivi, p. 106.

⁴³ See W. Schapp, *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung* [1910], Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2013, pp. 130ff. and D. Nuccilli, *Species, Ideas and Stories. Schapp between Phenomenological Platonism and Anti-Platonism* in "Azimuth", nr. 15, VIII, 2020, pp. 61-76, ivi, pp. 70ff.

⁴⁴ This formulation with hyphens evokes Heidegger's concept of being-in-the-world, and thus reveals a certain influence of Heidegger. For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between humans' being-entangled-in-hi/stories and Heidegger's being-in-the-world, see Nuccilli, *History and Stories*, pp. 36-37; J. Greisch, *Empêchement et intrigue. Une phénoménologie pure de la narrativité est-elle concevable?* in "Études Phénoménologiques" 11, 1990, pp. 41-83, ivi, 48.

⁴⁵ Fellmann refers to the impossibility, according to the model proposed by Schapp, of reaching the phenomenological position of the *uninteressierter Zuschauer* [disinterested spectator]. See

hi/story itself thus coincides with entanglement in the hi/story, that is, our being prepared [*Vorbereitetsein*] for the hi/story⁴⁶. Consequently, the historicist-hermeneutic one, any understanding of history is conditioned by the cultural context and the world in which every human is embedded. The latter being builded upon the foundational hi/stories of our cultural identity and our personal life experience.

What has just been said brings us to another point to consider, which can help us reconstruct how Schapp's historicist approach to the theory of values connects with the historical-hermeneutic approach of his philosophy of hi/stories. When outlining the concept of a work, Schapp explains that abstract works or the entire activity of a significant political and historical figure can also be considered works. Often, these works are not simply created but maintain a close connection with the person who created them and with their life. In a certain sense, they constitute legacies that each individual carries with them in their life before leaving them to humanity. According to Schapp, if the work holds significant importance for the creator and is incomplete yet still capable of being finished, it exerts a force that compels the creator toward its completion. Otherwise, all their efforts would be in vain. As Schapp writes, "The work is not merely a mirror of the I in the sense that the I reflects within it; rather, it is also a piece of the I"⁴⁷. The soul itself suffers a kind of wound when the work is left unfinished: "The fracture running through the work reflects itself, in some sense, within the soul. It is not so much where our treasure lies that our heart is found, but rather where our work lies"⁴⁸. Thus, if a work is damaged or destroyed, the creator's soul suffers as well. It is precisely in that moment that the creator becomes fully aware of the bond they may have previously taken for granted. Only in the destruction of the work does it become evident how the fate and history of the work are entwined with the history of the human who created it. In this way, Schapp introduces what will become a defining feature of his "philosophy of hi/stories", using a historical example to emphasize the inseparable bond between work and I. To express how a human's work can identify with their hi/story, he refers to the example of the Napoleonic trajectory, considering his entire political and military campaign as his work. According to Schapp Napoleon on Elba is simply the other side of Napoleon at Austerlitz, except that in exile, all of Napoleon's spiritual energies, which were once directed toward his great imperialistic work and personal affirmation, now go

F. Fellmann, *Das Ende des laplaceschen Dämons*, in R. Koselleck, W.-D. Stempel (a cura di), *Geschichte. Ereignis und Erzählung*, Wilhelm Fink, München 1983, pp. 115-138, ivi, 137-138.

⁴⁶ See W. Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt*, p. 92.

⁴⁷ W. Schapp, *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht II*, p. 75.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*

to waste and no longer have any grounding in a world of values⁴⁹. However, work does not “entangle” humans only when they are broken or incomplete, but also when they are finished. It needs to be maintained and occupies the soul of the human in the same way throughout his life. In fact, in this sense, it also assumes a collective resonance, both social and historical. Even when the creator is long dead, a work – whether material, like a great cathedral, or intellectual, like a philosophy – is continued and preserved by successors. In this regard, using the example of Napoleon, it could be said that he somehow collected and perpetuated the work of Alexander the Great, along with all the people he surrounded himself with, and for a period, the entire French people. In this way, the history of the human being and the history of the work insert themselves into a new collective history of a people or an era and anchor themselves in a value order that constitutes an aspect of reason that penetrates history.

History thus emerges through the deeds and works of people from the past, in which we become entangled as they manifest themselves in the narratives that hand them down to us. According to Schapp, these hi/stories represent the human being more accurately in their essence. For this reason, in the most famous passage of *In Geschichten verstrickt*, he declares that “history stands for the human being”⁵⁰. With this statement, the philosopher claims that there can be no understanding of humans without trying to understand their hi/stories. The same applies to historical figures. For instance, according to Schapp, the episode of the Alexander’s helmet, narrated by Plutarch in *Life of Alexander*, reveals more about the figure of the king, in command of an army struggling with thirst in the middle of the Balochistan desert, than any military victory or conquest mentioned in history books. As a matter of fact, Plutarch relates how Alexander refused to take advantage of his status to the detriment of his soldiers by emptying a helmet filled with water previously brought by a slave. This episode, according to Schapp, reveals an aspect of Alexander’s personality that explains his political and military success in a far more effective way than in-depth analyses of his political choices and military decisions.

3. History and the Entanglement of Human in Hi/stories: Positive World, We-Hi/stories and Universal History

What has been said in relation to the possibility of acquainting themselves with history through relevant historical figures’ individual hi/

⁴⁹ Cfr. *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ W. Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt*, cit., p. 103.

stories, or the monumental works that constantly provide us with entire historical periods, is set, according to Schapp, within a continuist conception of human history. However, such a continuity is not justified by an intimate harmony that characterises the events along the timeline of the historical progress, but rather is based on the entanglement-in-hi/stories' hermeneutical-ontological structure and the co-entanglement's gnosiological mechanism⁵¹. Schapp's intention is to phenomenologically explore the horizon of the understanding of the past from the single individual perspective. He writes in his *Philosophie der Geschichten*: "The single entangled is always at the center of our investigation. Starting from him or his hi/stories, we advance in all directions as far as we can. That being so, no obstacles stand in the way. We are not only entangled in our hi/stories, but also in all the hi/stories up to the world's creation and, consequently, up to the furthest human back in time."⁵² From a gnosiological point of view, the entanglement of which Schapp speaks – and thanks to which we can come to the dawn of world history – finds nourishment in what the author calls "positive world"⁵³. By the expression "positive world", he refers to the world to which the entangled-in-hi/stories belongs, built on a universal hi/story that involves an indefinite number of human beings, along a timeline that projects itself up to the ancient times⁵⁴. The western positive world is based, for instance, on the universal history of the world's creation, from Hesiod to Dante⁵⁵. The only access to this world is our hi/stories that lead us, then, into the horizon of the positive world to which we belong, to other entangled-in-hi/stories individuals' hi/stories, with which we come into contact and within which we can, in turn, be co-entangled. The entangled one finds himself/herself co-entangled within a universal history, which serves as a horizon for the single individual hi/stories⁵⁶. It is precisely that horizon, then, that is located at the center of an endless number of horizons, likewise determined by other universal histories that build the horizon of further positive worlds, within which other individual hi/stories take place. We can access those individual hi/stories through the identification of an anchor, set between the horizon of hi/stories that constitutes their world and the horizon that configures ours. Being human involves being entangled-in-hi/stories, but it also means being or living in a posi-

⁵¹ See G. Scholtz, op. cit., p. 59.

⁵² W. Schapp, *Philosophie der Geschichten*, a cura di K. Joisten-J. Schapp, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2015, p. 46.

⁵³ See *ivi*, pp. 54-103.

⁵⁴ See J. Greisch, *Phänomenologie als Philosophie der Geschichten*, pp. 195-197.

⁵⁵ W. Schapp, *Philosophie der Geschichten*, p. 51.

⁵⁶ See J. Greisch, *Empêtrement et intrigue*, p. 266.

tive world, in a certain period of time. Living in a positive world means living in a world of values that lies at the center of a myriad of other value-worlds – worlds that orbit this positive world, which is grounded in foundational values transmitted through universal hi/stories. This positive world, in turn, stands at the center of other positive worlds, which one can access through the foundational hi/stories of those worlds – hi/stories that, in one way or another, intersect with our own. According to Schapp then every human being finds themselves within a single positive horizon, and from there, they can perceive other worlds – whether indefinite or specific⁵⁷. The most obvious example of such a plurality of worlds is the history of the great monotheistic religions, which share a common horizon with regard to the Old Testament God⁵⁸. The different individual hi/stories, spread throughout the positive world upon a common diachronic horizon, occur to determine what Schapp calls the “We-entangled”. The extension of this ‘We’ depends on the extension of the co-entangled individuals within the single hi/story or in the single hi/stories taken into consideration by turns. The concept of We-hi/story has a crucial relevance in Schapp, as it represents the linking element between single hi/stories and universal history:

The transition from the individual hi/story to the universal hi/story takes place either through the co-entanglement or the We, where even the tiniest individual hi/story already contains a We. We must admit that this We shows up in hi/stories in an infinite number of nuances, such as the We uttered among two given siblings or the We that identifies families, the clans, a village, states, a barracks, or a workplace. Each individual hi/story suddenly becomes a We-hi/story.⁵⁹

By identifying the intrinsic and plural collective structure of the entanglement-in-hi/stories, Schapp aims to build the hermeneutical horizon within which it is possible to quickly understand the hi/stories concerning the vicissitudes and the vision of world of humans very far from us in space and time. Such an understanding takes place by following the threads that stitch together each single hi/story and the hi/stories involving the We, from time to time offered to us by the horizon of history⁶⁰. Such We lies at the foundation of collectivities that fit into each other,

⁵⁷ Schapp, *Philosophie der Geschichten*, p. 44.

⁵⁸ Cfr. W. Schapp, *Philosophie der Geschichten*, pp. 42-44; see M. Pohlmeier, *Die Allgeschichte des Christentum* in K. Joisten (a cura di), *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps*, Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg 2010, pp. 126-141, ivi, pp. 131-133.

⁵⁹ W. Schapp, *Philosophie der Geschichten*, p. 201.

⁶⁰ See G. Scholtz, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

ranging from the family unit to all of humankind, which entangle the single individual in hi/stories with an ever-widening horizon. It is by acting in this way, and by letting our gaze go up from the single hi/story to the collective horizon in which it is situated, that we can bring out entire cross-sections of societies and civilizations belonging to other historical periods. To use the same Schapp example, starting with the hi/story of Alexander we can pass, by following the horizon of hi/stories in which he is entangled, to the events of the epigones that experienced that event and, from their hi/story, to the hi/story of the division of the huge territories Alexander conquered and to the consequences arising from this action that brought about the rise of the kingdoms, cultures, and religions that later developed. It is evident how, for each change in gaze along the horizon of this positive world, a new collectivity presents itself to us, a collectivity that is involved with one or more hi/stories come down to us and behind which Hellenic culture stands out, that is, the philosophy of Aristotle, the tutor of Alexander, and the Greek mythology rooted in Homer's and Hesiod's epics. Even more clear is the fact that each form of our understanding of this hi/story will be affected by the way we access it, and will take place in the hi/stories that have characterised our knowledge of Aristotle, Homer, Alexander and his epigones. In some way, we are within the same universe of hi/stories, as we are immersed in the positive world of Western culture – entangled in a web of hi/stories and potential narratives shaped by our own individual hi/story, itself interwoven with the grand hi/stories of our literary, cultural, and political past. Thus, history never appears as singular, inevitable, or linear, as it was conceived by German Idealism; rather, it fragments into the branching paths of hi/stories that unfold from our embodied self in this time and historical place, reaching all the way to the narratives that come to us from the very beginnings of writing and history. According to Schapp every universal hi/story, able to bring together the whole history of humankind, will remain nothing but a *desideratum*, even to the most ambitious historiography. It is not by choice that in the opening lines of the inaugural work of the philosophy of hi/stories, he writes:

We might perhaps seek to start out from the stories of peoples, nations or states, as well as we receive them: Hesiod, Thucydides, Livy, Ranke or Mommsen; the so-called scientific hi/stories written with the greatest claim to objectivity. However, within these hi/stories we do not meet the 'We' we have been seeking; the enveloping 'We'.⁶¹

⁶¹ W. Schapp, *In Geschichten verstrickt*, p. 1

According to Schapp, systematic conceptions of history like Hegel's are nothing other than attempts at creating some snapshots of the universal history, both as it structures itself at a time when the historian gets entangled and from the restricted perspective of the horizon to which the individual might access. Every methodological attempt at realising an objective history, passing through the search for a meaning intrinsic to it, or aiming to the mere reporting of facts, cannot go beyond such a structural perspectivism, being bound to the different position each individual holds in history. This awareness, though, has no relativistic implications. Each historical explanation, even the most mystifying, as well as any ambiguous narration or conflicting testimony, marks a decisive new stage,

a new trail within the intricate cartography of hi/stories, leading us in fact, thanks to the co-entanglement's gnosiological device, both to the single individuals and to the repercussion history has in the horizon of hi/stories that entangles them and, by radiating out, provides us with the starting point for any historiographic investigation on the whole historical and cultural world in which he/she lived.

Conclusions

This article aimed to highlight how the relationship between human beings and history unfolds – history here understood as both the systematic and personal elaboration of past events concerning humankind. The central point of reference was Schapp's philosophy of hi/stories. As we have seen, Schapp's philosophy of hi/stories is grounded in the semantic stratification of the term *Geschichte*, which ranges from the micro-history of human-made works – understood as an a priori of historical science – to hi/story as individual lived experience, which connects humans to the lifeworld. This complexity runs throughout Schapp's work and forms the backbone of a historicist approach to human existence and its world of values, as well as of a hermeneutic-historicist grounding of narrativity as its mode of expression. The ambiguity in the title of this contribution is meant to reflect precisely this complexity. It lies not only in the plural form set in parentheses, but also in the way “participating” in hi/story or hi/stories is understood. On one hand, it refers to actively participating in the making of hi/story – through the human works that shape the universe of values we grow within and that provide the a priori for all historical understanding. On the other hand, it points to our being already embedded in history: being situated within a context of meaning that conditions how we understand ourselves, our past, and the world. This embeddedness is experienced both in the lifeworld and the lived body, and through our be-

longing to a historical horizon shaped by works and foundational hi/stories. From this horizon, we engage with other historical and hermeneutic perspectives – those of other individuals and civilizations – which we encounter through what Schapp calls the “positive world”. To participate in hi/story thus means, first, to be co-constructors of a world of values shaped by our experience of the lifeworld; second, to be embodied in everyday life within the hi/stories that surround us; and third, to become entangled through these experiences in a positive world. This positive world is a hermeneutic-historical horizon where we engage with the foundational hi/stories of our cultural and religious past, allowing us to understand and interact with the narrative horizons of other positive worlds we encounter and which emerge from the past. The hi/stories of the past return to us the values in which we recognize ourselves and through which we bring to life the hi/stories of other human beings and, with them, their positive world and the historical context in which they lived.

References

- Carr, D., *Time, Narrative, and History*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1986.
- De Santis D., Nuccilli, D., *On the Many Philosophies of Wilhelm Schapp. Editors' Introduction*, in *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Schapp: From Phenomenology to Jurisprudence and the Hermeneutics of Stories*, ed. by D. De Santis and D. Nuccilli. Bloomsbury Academic, London 2025, pp. 1-19.
- Eichler, K.-D., *Wilhelm Schapps Narrative Ontologie. Eine Problematisierung seiner Geschichtenphilosophie* in K. Joisten (a cura di), *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps*, Karl Alber, Freiburg/München 2010, pp. 102-125.
- Fellmann, F., *Das Ende des laplaceschen Dämons*, in R. Koselleck, W.-D. Stempel (a cura di), *Geschichte. Ereignis und Erzählung*, Wilhelm Fink, München, pp. 115-138.
- Greisch, J., *Empêchement et intrigue. Une phénoménologie pure de la narrativité est-elle concevable?* in “Études Phénoménologiques” 11, 1990, pp. 41-83.
- Id., *Phänomenologie als Philosophie der Geschichten: eine vierte, stille Revolution der philosophischen Denkungsart?* in K. Joisten (a cura di), *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps*, Karl Alber Freiburg/München 2010, pp. 190-214.
- Habermas, J., *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft*, Bd. II, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1981.
- Lipps, Th., *Ästhetik: Psychologie des Schönen und der Kunst. Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, Verlag von Leopold Voss, Leipzig 1903.
- Marquard, O., *In Praise of Polytheism (On Monomythical and Polymythical Thinking)* in *Farewell to Matters of Principle*, tr. R. M. Wallace, Oxford University Press Oxford, 1989, pp. 87-105.
- Nuccilli, D., *History and Stories: Schapp's Ontological Conception of the Entanglement*, in “Kritika & Kontext”, 53-54, 2018, pp. 27-43.

- Id., *Species, Ideas and Stories. Schapp between Phenomenological Platonism and Anti-Platonism* in "Azimuth", nr. 15, VIII, 2020, pp. 61-76
- Id., *Stories as a Critical Means of Access to the Life-world. Language, Reality, History* in "New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy", 22, 2024, pp. 35-55.
- Id., *Wilhelm Schapp. Von der Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung zur Philosophie der Geschichten*, in F. Bruckmann, M. Pohlmeier (a cura di), *Geschichtenphilosophie von Wilhelm Schapp und ihre Rezeption*. Aisthesis, Bielefeld 2025, pp. 49-80.
- Id., *The Character of Things: Ding, Werk and Wozuding. A Path in Wilhelm Schapp's Thought*, in D. De Santis, D. Nuccilli (a cura di), *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Schapp: From Phenomenology to Jurisprudence and the Hermeneutics of Stories*, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2025, pp. 105-129.
- Pohlmeier, M., *Die Allgeschichte des Christentum* in K. Joisten (a cura di), *Das Denken Wilhelm Schapps*, Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg, 2010, pp. 126-141.
- Ricoeur, P., *Temps et Récit. L'Intrigue et le Récit historique*, Seuil, Paris 1983.
- Schapp, W., *Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung* [1910], Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2013.
- Id., *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht. Eine phänomenologische Untersuchung*. 1. Bd. *Der Vertrag als Vorgegebenheit*, Rotschild, Berlin-Grunewald, 1930.
- Id., *Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht. Eine phänomenologische Untersuchung*. 2. Bd. *Wert, Werk und Eigentum*, Rotschild, Berlin-Grunewald 1932.
- Id., *In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding* [1953], Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2012.
- Id., *Philosophie der Geschichten*, a cura di K. Joisten-J. Schapp, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2015.
- Scholtz, G., *Das Verhältnis der Geschichte und Geschichten. Studien zur Geschichtenphänomenologie Wilhelm Schapps*, K. Lembeck (a cura di), *Geschichte und Geschichten. Studien zur Geschichtenphänomenologie Wilhelm Schapps*, Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 57-71.