

Gaëtan Hulot

## Framing the Senses: Husserl and the Historical and Cultural Shaping of Sensory Experience

### Introduction

In the 1980s and 1990s, French historian Alain Corbin initiated the field of “sensory history” or “history of the senses” by exploring past perceptions and the significance of smell and noise in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries<sup>1</sup>. This field grew alongside “sensory anthropology”, inspired by thinkers like Marshall McLuhan, Walter Ong, and Edward T. Hall, who explored the cultural variation in the valorization of the senses. From the 1990s onwards, scholars such as David Howes, Constance Classen, Kathryn Linn Geurts, Mark Smith, and William Tullett, advanced sensory history and anthropology, which are now part of the broader field of “sensory studies”<sup>2</sup>. The central claim of the “history of the senses” is sometimes encapsulated in a quote by Karl Marx: “The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present”<sup>3</sup>. According to sensory scholars, our sensory experience, should not be understood as a fact of nature, but as a product of culture, suggesting that “[...] people from different cultures [...] inhabit different sensory worlds”<sup>4</sup>.

Is this idea sound, and how should it be interpreted? How must we understand the historical and cultural shaping of our sensory experience? In this paper, I explore this notion from a phenomenological, Husserlian perspective. Should we accept the idea of a historical determination of the senses, or should we defend the view that our sensory experience is ahistorical?

<sup>1</sup> A. Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant. Odor and the French Social Imagination*, tr. M.L. Kochan, R. Porter, C. Prendergast, B. Publishers, Leamington Spa, 1986; A. Corbin, *Village Bells. Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside*, tr. M. Thoms, European Perspectives, Columbia University Press, New York 1998.

<sup>2</sup> D. Howes, *The Sensory Studies Manifesto. Tracking the Sensorial Revolution in the Arts and Human Sciences*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto-Buffalo-London 2022.

<sup>3</sup> K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto*, tr. M. Milligan, Prometheus Books, Amherst 1988, p. 109.

<sup>4</sup> E.T. Hall, *The Hidden Dimension*, Anchor Books, New York 1990, p. 2.

In Section I, I examine Husserl's genetic account of sensory experience, which maintains that while there is a core aspect of our senses unaffected by historical and cultural factors, there is also a more superficial "framing" of the senses that is subject to these influences. In Section II, I consider passive syntheses, namely temporalization and association, and question how they can account for the historical and cultural shaping of the senses. In Section III, I analyze active mechanisms – receptivity and higher-level activity, namely cognitive, evaluative, and practical activity – and explore their contributions to the historicization of the senses.

### **I. Is our sensory experience a product of history?**

Here I examine the idea that personal and cultural history influences the phenomenality of sensory contents, and I do so within the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. In this section, I first examine two theories to account for the social and cultural influence on the senses. The first theory argues that history shapes sensory content through cognitive functions, which, in turn, affect lower-level sensory processes. Supporters of this view believe that how individuals perceive colors is influenced by the color categories in their language or the significance of colors in their cultural traditions. The second version posits that history influences sensory content through direct exposure to past or present sensory experiences, without cognitive mediation. Advocates of this view maintain that repeated exposure to certain colors attunes perceivers to noticing them more readily or that surfaces, inherently colorless, acquire their appearance only in contrast to their surroundings. After I show that both claims are rejected by Husserl, I consider his likely perspective on the broader question of a social and cultural determination of the senses.

In *Ideas I*, Husserl makes a well-known distinction between acts or *noesis* and sensory contents or *hyle*. The former are intentional, while the latter lack intentionality. However, this distinction is made within a specific context – that of the abstraction of time constitution<sup>5</sup>. Sixteen years later, in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Husserl acknowledges that, while useful for beginners, this distinction leads to a fallback into the

<sup>5</sup> E. Husserl, *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. D.O. Dahlstrom, Hackett, Indianapolis-Cambridge 2014, pp. 156-165.

problematic “sensualism of data” [*Daten-Sensualismus*]<sup>6</sup>. Indeed, Husserl had long recognized that hyletic or primary content is itself the result of a process of constitution involving intentionality. Rather than being limited to the level of *noesis*, the model of intentionality also applies to *hyle*: “the sensuous data [...] are themselves also already the product of a constitutive synthesis”<sup>7</sup>. Husserl’s lectures on time and subsequent manuscripts on time constitution from 1905-1911 and 1917-1918, clarify the roles of retentive and protentive intentionalities. Meanwhile, his lessons on transcendental logic in the 1920s explore the role of associative intentionalities in the shaping of *hyle*. The original distinction between *noesis* and *hyle* can then be clarified by introducing two levels of intentionality: higher-level intentional acts of receptivity and intellectual activity, and lower-level intentional, passive syntheses of temporalization and association.

This distinction allows us to reject a criticism often directed against static phenomenology, accused of dealing with essentially inert, “dead” data, and to fall back into sensualism, or even, atomism. In order to avoid sensualism and atomism, Gestalt psychologists from the Berlin school emphasized the importance of dismissing the “constancy hypothesis” [*Konstanzannahme*], according to which sensory contents exist independently of the meanings attributed to them and remain constant despite the acts that inform them, a position that Husserl still upheld<sup>8</sup>. Indeed, Husserl accepted both the idea that “one and the same stock of hyletic data” could form “the common support for two overlapping apprehensions”<sup>9</sup>, and the converse idea, that various hyletic data could support one and the same perception:

We have already mentioned the evidence indicating that the complex of the contents of sensation is quite varied, and yet the corresponding perceptions, by their very essence, pass themselves off as perceptions of the same object. Conversely, it is also holds that the same complex of contents of sensation can be the basis of diverse perceptions, perceptions of diverse objects, as every

<sup>6</sup> E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, tr. D. Cairns, M. Nijhoff, The Hague 1969, p. 286.

<sup>7</sup> Id., *Experience and Judgment. Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, a cura di L. Landgrebe, tr. J.S. Churchill, K. Ameriks, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973, p. 73.

<sup>8</sup> E. Holenstein, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl*, Martinus Nijhoff-Springer Netherlands, Den Haag 1972, pp. 283-86, pp. 293-96.

<sup>9</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, tr. A. Steinbock, in “Edmund Husserl Collected Works”, vol. 9, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston 2001, p. 73.

mannequin proves, inasmuch as here, from a fixed viewpoint, two perceptions stand in conflict, that of the mannequin as a thing and that of the presented man, both constructed on the same fundament of sensation.<sup>10</sup>

As Gurwitsch notes, “The constancy hypothesis is admitted by Husserl and implicitly by von Ehrenfels. Both authors maintain that sense-data are not modified nor are they qualified by the sensory facts of a higher order which they found and support”<sup>11</sup>. By contrast, the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology views sensory content as a by-product of analysis, lacking absolute properties. However, in Husserl’s view, introducing genesis to the level of sensory contents is the only way to avoid the “sensualism of ready-made data”, and that’s why Gestalt psychology – from both the Graz and Berlin schools – failed to reject sensualism<sup>12</sup>.

It is now clear that Husserl would refuse the cognitive theory of the influence of social and cultural history on sensations, namely the idea that cognitive (intentional in the strong sense) functions “penetrate” low-level sensory functions.

Yet, by introducing the idea of genesis at the level of sensory content, Husserl seems to open a possibility for our sensory experience to be shaped by both personal and collective history at the sensory level. Our visual experience of color patches, our auditory impressions of sounds, our tactile encounters with texture, heat, and pressure, and our olfactory and gustatory sense of smells and tastes are all determined by the context in which they are given, but also by our prior acquaintance with sensory content, our current sensitivity, and the physical and cultural environment in which we grew up, and possibly by the cultural context of our time.

In the remainder of this section, I examine the second theory of the claim that history influences hyletic data without the mediation of cognitive functions, through exposure to similar content. I conclude that, according to Husserl, a core or nucleus of sensory content remains unaltered by any historical influence.

<sup>10</sup> E. Husserl *Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907*, tr. R. Rojcewicz, Springer, 1998, p. 39; see also M.K. Shim, *Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology*, in “Husserl Studies”, 27, n. 3, 2011, pp. 197-215, doi:10.1007/s10743-011-9093-y.

<sup>11</sup> A. Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness. Phenomenology of Theme, Thematic Field, and Marginal Consciousness*, a cura di R.M. Zaner L. Embree, Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973), vol. III, Springer, Dordrecht-New York 2010, p. 88.

<sup>12</sup> E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, p. 286; Id. *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, a cura di S. Strasser, Hua I, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1991, pp. 76-77; E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, 1927-1931*, tr. T. Sheehan and R.E. Palmer, Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Collected Work 6, Springer, Dordrecht 1997, p. 220.

This stance is held by Carl Stumpf, one of Husserl's two mentors, who regularly opposes "relativism" in the domain of sensory experience, for example, in the first volume of his *Tone psychology*<sup>13</sup> or in "Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen":

The tone which is followed by other sounds won't be subsequently endowed with a height and an intensity by those which follow it; it must already have possessed them during its lifetime and in isolation. The objection that the height of a sound consists only in its relations to other sounds would become entangled in the absurdities of a theory of relativity that I have characterized elsewhere.<sup>14</sup>

As Arnaud Dewalque puts it, "The best way to summarize Stumpf's thesis, it seems to me, lies in the following idea: we never deal with an indeterminate hylè or any kind of phenomenal material, but always with sensible phenomena endowed with determined properties"<sup>15</sup>. This thesis suggests that sensory contents have determined properties as objective features that constrain our sensory experience of them, rather than being influenced by the subject or context. Until the end of his life, Stumpf continued to affirm the existence of "purely sensory properties" or "absolute properties" of sensations, thus opposing his former disciples from the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology<sup>16</sup>. The absolute properties that sensory contents intrinsically possess are, in the case of a *datum* of sound, its duration, its spatial extension and location, its quality or pitch/height [*Tonhöhe*], its intensity [*Stärke*]<sup>17</sup>; in the case of a sensation of color, its duration, its spatial extension and location, its quality or hue [*Farbenton*], its lightness [*Helligkeit*], and its intensity [*Stärke*]<sup>18</sup>. Sensory contents must not only possess the relevant properties of their category to belong to it; these properties must also have a determined value regardless of the context in which they are given.

<sup>13</sup> C. Stumpf, *Tone Psychology*, tr. R.D. Rollinger, Classic European Studies in the Science of Music 1, Routledge, Abingdon New York (NY) 2020, pp. 5-12.

<sup>14</sup> C. Stumpf, *Erscheinungen Und Psychische Funktionen*, Verlag der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften vom Jahre 1906, Berlin 1907, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> A. Dewalque, *Intentionnalité cum fundamento in re. La constitution des champs sensoriels chez Stumpf et Husserl*, in "Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique", n. 1, 2012, p. 91, my translation.

<sup>16</sup> C. Stumpf, *Erkenntnislehre. Band 1*, Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig 1939, p. 250.

<sup>17</sup> C. Stumpf, *Tone Psychology*, cit., pp. 89 ss.

<sup>18</sup> C. Stumpf, *Die Attribute der Gesichtsempfindungen*, Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften – Philosophisch-Historische Klasse 8, Verlag der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1917, pp. 85–87.

Similarly to Stumpf, Husserl rejects relativism and acknowledges the existence of absolute properties of sensations, though he articulates this less explicitly. In his lessons on passive syntheses, he speaks of immanent data and their color as they are “originally” “in themselves”:

[...] these surface color moments are immanent data, and we are thus conscious of them in themselves just as originally as, say, red or black. The manifold changing red-data in which, e.g., any surface side of a red cube and its unaltered red is exhibited, are immanent data.<sup>19</sup>

In *Experience and judgment*, he also examines the role of syntheses of homogeneity in forming hyletic unities such as a splatter of red stains against a white background. Red patches blend – at a distance – because they are inherently similar, or affine, while they remain distinct from the white background due to the differences in their inherent properties<sup>20</sup>. In other words, rather than the broader context shaping the properties of sensuous data, it is the inherent properties of the sensuous data themselves that ground the syntheses of homogeneity, which, in turn, shape the general context. As Holenstein concludes, “This means that he [Husserl] did not go beyond the position of his teacher Stumpf”<sup>21</sup>.

In conclusion, Husserl rejects both theories I had suggested to account for the cultural relativism of sensory data. Sensory data are not influenced by cognitive function, nor by the sensory context in which they take place. In line with this rejection of the relativism of data, does Husserl reject historical and cultural relativism altogether?

Any discrepancy in appearances between two subjects cannot be ascertained by directly experiencing the other’s sensory fields, as the other’s experience lies beyond the reach of my direct grasp. Indeed, as Husserl repeatedly emphasizes, having an original experience of another’s stream of consciousness – as opposed to experiencing it through the “mediate intentionality” of presentation – is absurd, for it would render that experience my own rather than the other’s<sup>22</sup>. Under these conditions, rejecting historical relativism can only rely on indirect arguments. In addition, the universality of the senses can only be contingent rather than necessary, as sensory contents are governed by a “‘contingent’ *A priori*”<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 54.

<sup>20</sup> E. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, cit., p. 74; see also *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 178, p. 185.

<sup>21</sup> E. Holenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

<sup>22</sup> E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*, tr. D. Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1982, p. 109.

<sup>23</sup> E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, cit., p. 29.

This seemingly paradoxical concept means that if a subject has auditory experiences, these must, by the essence of sounds, possess attributes such as intensity or pitch. However, there is no necessity for subjects to have sensory experiences of a certain type at all<sup>24</sup>.

Although Husserl does not explicitly reject historical relativism, his work contains three indirect, contingent, arguments against the cultural relativism of the senses: the thought experiment of removing cultural layers, the possibility of scientific objectivity, and the correspondence between bodily features and sensations, as demonstrated by somatology. How do these arguments manifest in Husserl's confrontation with relativism?

1. The existence of an unaffected core in our sensory experience is first evidenced by the ability of members of different cultures to agree on a pure experience of nature. To emphasize the specificity of the cultural world, Husserl sometimes alludes to anthropology. For example, "the European world of culture [...] is not readily experienceable" for the Chinese<sup>25</sup>, and conversely, Europeans may not grasp the cultural features of Chinese art<sup>26</sup>. However, despite disagreements about the cultural life-world, there is a shared understanding of the natural world. Thus, the Bantu, who does not understand the cultural features of European buildings, still perceives them as spatial objects:

The Bantu would 'see' our 'park', our houses, our churches, and there would be spatial things for him, and things that, perhaps, would have, for him as well, the character of constructions, of gardens. But there is a difference here. Regarding the spatiotemporal determinations, the pure nature, a common ground must exist, but regarding what the architect aimed at with this building, and regarding what holds a 'sense', an aesthetic and practical one, correlatively to this building as such, that, the Bantu cannot understand.<sup>27</sup>

In this regard, the fundamental interindividual and intercultural agreement about the "natural nucleus of the world" [*der naturale*

<sup>24</sup> E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, tr. R. Rojcewicz, A. Schuer, Martinus Nijhoff-Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague-Dordrecht-Boston 1989, pp. 85-86; E. Husserl, *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, cit., p. 30.

<sup>25</sup> E. Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937)*, a cura di T. Nenon and H.R. Sepp, Hua XXVII, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989, p. 163.

<sup>26</sup> E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. 3. Dritter Teil. 1929-1935*, a cura di I. Kern, Hua XV, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, p. 442.

<sup>27</sup> E. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, a cura di D. Lohmar, Hua IX, Meiner, Hamburg 2003, p. 498.



*Kern der Welt*]<sup>28</sup> makes possible the “constitution of a common world of the senses”<sup>29</sup>, where “even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized”<sup>30</sup>. While our experience of the world can be affected by our culture and history, a sensory core remains which is unaffected by cultural and historical differences, and as such, universally shared across cultures.

Husserl acknowledges intercultural differences and the relativity of cultures and historical formations. In this context, he uses the concept of lifeworld or *Lebenswelt*, albeit in a rather ambiguous way. At times, the concept of “lifeworld” points at a particular, historical world correlating to a specific “humanity” or people, and differing from one culture to another – this is oftentimes labeled as “concrete lifeworld”. But, elsewhere, *the* lifeworld is the universal, perceptual, pre-cultural world which serves as a foundation for science: “Husserl speaks of the life-world both in the singular and plural. In the plural, it refers to relative, local, and cultural environments [...]; on the other hand, all plural worlds get their sense from the life-world for which a plural gets no sense”<sup>31</sup>. If the concrete lifeworlds of members of different cultures are variegated, it seems that this does not apply to sensory contents, which are thus part of the universal lifeworld:

But when we are thrown into an alien social sphere, that of the Negroes in the Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that for them are fixed, generally verified or verifiable, are by no means the same as ours. But if we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that on which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc., agree in spite of all relativity – beginning, that is, with what makes objects of the life-world, common to all, identifiable for them and for us (even though conceptions of them may differ), such as spatial shape, motion, sense-quality, and the like – then we are on the way to objective science.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> E. Husserl, *Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen Der Vorgegebenen Welt Und Ihrer Konstitution. Texte Aus Dem Nachlass (1916-1937)*, a cura di R. Sowa, Hua XXXIX, Springer, New York 2008, p. 275.

<sup>29</sup> E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. 2. Zweiter Teil. 1921-28*, a cura di I. Kern, Hua XIV, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, p. 196.

<sup>30</sup> E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, tr. D. Carr, Studies in “Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy”, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1984, p. 163.

<sup>31</sup> D. Moran, ‘*Even the Papuan is a man and not a beast. Husserl on universalism and the relativity of cultures*, in “Journal of the History of Philosophy”, 49, n. 4, 2011, p. 486, doi:10.1353/hph.2011.0088; see also G. Soffer, *Husserl and the Question of Relativism*, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht-Boston 1991, pp. 149 ss.

<sup>32</sup> E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, cit., p. 139.



Certainly, variations can be found, both within a certain individual across time and between individuals, depending on the spatial location of the observers, their momentary bodily disposition (intake of *santonin*, wearing glasses with colored filters), the proper functioning of their sensory organs (color blindness, hearing loss), and the external conditions (lightning). However, a common ground exists. First, we assume *normal* external conditions of perception: clear daylight, vision in air, touching by immediate contact, etc<sup>33</sup>. In addition, we assume “a ‘normal’ Ego-community and Bodies of ‘normal,’ i.e., typically ‘standard,’ structure”, which warrants the “exchangeability” of perspectives, in such a way that “we see the ‘same’ Object, each of us from his own position, but also with the mode of appearance which would be ours if we were, instead of here, there in the other’s place”<sup>34</sup>.

2. The independence of the layer of nature from culture is further confirmed by the possibility of establishing a shared scientific knowledge about nature. The existence of natural sciences demonstrates that the senses are not entirely subjective or culture-bound; instead, they transcend cultural boundaries and personal dispositions. Natural sciences consist mainly of an intersubjective understanding of the world about abstract shapes in space-time. But even “subjective” experiences, such as those of secondary qualities – colors, sounds, heat, odors – can indirectly be incorporated into natural sciences and made intersubjective, i.e., objective, through their linkage to underlying spatial objects, with their extension, shape, and movement – frequency, wavelengths, thermal radiation, odorant particles, etc. This process, initiated by Galileo, is termed by Husserl the “mathematization of the ‘plena’”<sup>35</sup>. It results in a tendency to universalize subjective qualities. Yet, it must be noted that the mathematization of colors is still an ongoing debate. As a matter of fact, the traditional association between wavelength and colors fails to account for the full range of color experiences<sup>36</sup>. Physicalist theories of colors, particularly the surface spectral reflectance (SSR) theory advocated by Byrne and Hilbert<sup>37</sup>, remain under discussion, as they continue to be challenged by primitivist and dispositionalist accounts.

<sup>33</sup> E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, cit., p. 65.

<sup>34</sup> *Ivi*, p. 321.

<sup>35</sup> E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, cit., pp. 34-37.

<sup>36</sup> C.L. Hardin, *Color for Philosophers. Unweaving the Rainbow*, Hackett Pub. Co, Indianapolis 1988, pp. 2-3.

<sup>37</sup> A. Byrne, D.R. Hilbert, *Color realism and color science*, in “Behavioral and Brain Sciences”, 26, n. 1, 2003, pp. 4-63, doi:10.1017/S0140525X03000013.

3. Lastly, the universality of the senses is indirectly confirmed by the correspondence between bodily features and inner sensations, as studied by somatology. This argument is not based on the similarity of experience, rather on the similarity of objective bodily features. From a first-person perspective, the relationship to the body is experienced as a “realizing connection” [*realisierende Anknüpfung*], through which the sense fields are connected to the soma [*Leib*]<sup>38</sup>. This connection is not limited to a vague correspondence between the sense fields and the body but involves a detailed one-to-one correspondence between sense fields and sense organs: “Thus, the universum of sensations (of the sensuous impressions) of every ego receives a relationship to the soma and to its parts, characterized thereby precisely as ‘sense organs’”<sup>39</sup>. An argument can be made that the converse is also true: despite not having direct access to the first-person experience of others or animals, we can gain indirect access to their surrounding world [*Umwelt*] by understanding their sense organs in analogy to our own<sup>40</sup>. In the experience of empathy, differences in sense organs (such as an injured hand or eye, or missing or additional organs) influence the empathetic apperceptive transfer of my experience onto the other; I represent the other as having altered sense fields compared to mine<sup>41</sup>. Thus, the similarity – or difference – in my bodily organs and those of another provides a clue to the similarity – or difference – in our sensory experiences.

In conclusion, much like his mentor Stumpf, Husserl rejects relativism by asserting that a qualitative core of sensory content remains unaffected by personal or collective history. The redness of a colored patch is not subject to cultural or historical influence, but belongs to the sensory content itself or, in the objective view, to the natural properties of things that lie beyond cultural influence.

At the same time, Husserl acknowledges that sensory data arise through a process of transcendental constitution or genesis. While the core of sensory data remains solely determined by the original impression, the constituted sensory unity is also shaped by its context. For example, the intensity of a sudden noise may seem amplified when I am focused on my research at my desk. Similarly, regular exposure to hot pepper

<sup>38</sup> E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, Third Book*, tr. T.E. Klein, W.E. Pohl, Martinus Nijhoff-Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague-Dordrecht-Boston 1980, p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, modified translation.

<sup>40</sup> E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Zweiter Teil*, cit., p. 116.

<sup>41</sup> Ivi, p. 88.

makes it feel less intense, just as coffee or wine are “acquired tastes.” On a historical scale, in eras where pungent smells are common or bells hold significant meaning, people become less sensitive to the former and more attuned to the latter<sup>42</sup>. Thus, Husserl’s doctrine of affection seems to leave room for a historical and cultural influence on the senses. What mechanisms of passive and active syntheses account for sensitization or desensitization, i.e., the historical determination of the senses?

## II. Passive mechanisms involved in the determination of the senses

In Section II, I review the mechanisms of passivity involved in the historical determination of the senses. Passivity can be defined as the domain of consciousness that lies below the threshold of the affected, alert ego. It encompasses two mechanisms: temporalization and association.

Temporalization is the intentional process through which a sensory content is anticipated, gains a starting point, duration, end-point, and a rhythm of change, and then recedes into the background, sinking into oblivion while retaining a fixed position in the sequence of inner time, until it is eventually recalled through associative awakening and remembering.

Husserl defines association as any passive, intentional synthesis between two or more contents – whether simultaneous or separated in time – that results in both contents being identified as one and the same, or paired (e.g., this cup and that cup, her body and mine, signifier and signified, model and image). Association operates first at the most fundamental level of passivity, in the formation of sensory content itself, where it is referred to as pre-affective association. For example, red specks form a unity that stands out against a white background<sup>43</sup>, although no explicit focus of the ego is required. Association also plays a role in the transition toward affection, where an already affecting content spreads its affective power to a content not yet noticed by the ego; for instance, when a single light in the Rhine valley becomes affective, it draws attention to the entire string of lights<sup>44</sup>. Finally, association can occur between contents of which the ego is already aware, in such a way that the meaning of one is analogously transferred to the other. This “post-affective” association can take place within the sphere of presence, as a consciousness of duplication (e.g., her body and mine appear as “paired”), or across temporal distance, as reproduction and anticipation on one hand, and typification

<sup>42</sup> A. Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant*, cit.

<sup>43</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 185.

<sup>44</sup> Ivi, p. 202.

on the other (e.g., a distant pair of scissors from my childhood continually shapes how I perceive newly encountered pairs of scissors)<sup>45</sup>.

While temporalization and association are always intertwined, they can be distinguished by the fact that temporalization operates regardless of content, whereas association is content-sensitive. Do temporalization and association play a role in the historical determination of the sensory contents we experience?

At first glance, the automatism and formality of the temporalizing process, with its disregard for specific content, might seem to sideline it. The “general form” of time-consciousness processes any occurring content in the same way: it is first anticipated, then presented, held in retention for a moment, and finally, it sinks into oblivion. Certainly, echoes of the history of consciousness can be sensed along the protentional path of time-constitution: the content of expectations is shaped by retentive memory<sup>46</sup>, and the satisfaction or disappointment of these expectations is accompanied by feelings of confirmation or surprise. It is understandable, then, that prior exposure to certain types of sensory content can lead to sensitization or desensitization: if I have learned to associate the color of a ripe fruit with a sweet taste, I will expect that taste every time I am about to bite into a fruit of that color. The shaping of protentions by retentions is an associative process<sup>47</sup>, where present experience awakens expectations based on past experience.

But could it be that the *form* of time-constitution itself is affected by past experience? Husserl makes a passing remark that opens the door to this possibility when he suggests that the “general form of time” is a mere abstraction<sup>48</sup>. This implies that the time-constituting process is itself constituted and may be dependent on the history of consciousness. A possible manifestation of this phenomenon could be that the duration, rhythm (experienced cyclicity), or tempo (speed) of appearing sensory units are influenced by the type of content, such as the type of qualia. This is supported by experiments demonstrating that durations are judged shorter for visual signals than for auditory ones<sup>49</sup> and that they depend on arousal and attention<sup>50</sup>, which are themselves influenced by associative processes.

<sup>45</sup> E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, cit., p. 111.

<sup>46</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 237.

<sup>47</sup> Ivi, pp. 119-120.

<sup>48</sup> Ivi, p. 173.

<sup>49</sup> S. Droit-Volet, W.H. Meck, T.B. Penney, *Sensory modality and time perception in children and adults*, in “Behavioural Processes”, 74, n. 2, 2007, pp. 244-250, doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2006.09.012.

<sup>50</sup> S. Gil, S. Rousset, S. Droit-Volet, *How liked and disliked foods affect time perception*, in “Emotion”, 9, n. 4, 2009, pp. 457-463, doi:10.1037/a0015751.

Additionally, living conditions – such as climate, environment, and life-style – affect the perception of time<sup>51</sup>. Some cultures encourage stretching time to the point that it seems to stand still, as in the state of *nirvana*, while others put a different emphasis on the passing of time. Duration of events can then be perceived differently depending on prior experience and cultural values.

Association plays a key role in the framing of sensory contents. It first comes into play prior to affection, participating in the unification of hyletic data into a sensory unity – such as a sound, a color patch, or a smell. Through association, a content is granted its temporal and, in most cases, spatial unity: a sound persists from a beginning to an end-point, and a color patch extends from one portion of the visual field to another. The “traditional laws of the association of similarity, contiguity, and contrast”<sup>52</sup> are responsible for the prominence of a content as it is given, within the boundaries of its temporal and spatial extension. Are similarity, contiguity, and contrast shaped by the history of consciousness, or does the associative synthesis operate exclusively within the living present?

Husserl answers this question by acknowledging the relativity of affective tendencies, which leaves room for a historical determination of association. While each sensory content possesses an inherent affective force due to its contrast with its surroundings, all sensory contents compete for the attention of the ego, and it is the respective weight of all contents that determines which datum consciousness will focus on. The affective force of a sensory content is not only relative to affective forces exerted by other contents within the field of presence, but also to past contents exerting their affective forces and propagating their affectivity to currently affecting contents, as I’ll show later. This means that the intensity of a sound, for instance, is not a relative property that depends on past or present sounds. The intensity is an absolute property of the sound in itself. The effect of contrast is to increase the sound’s *affective tendency*, not its volume. When the explosion resounds, its pull on the ego is enhanced by this sudden break of silence, but the sound itself doesn’t gain increased intensity.

However, Husserl’s account of sensory experience is challenged by Gestalt theory and the criticisms of the “constancy hypothesis” that have been mentioned in Section I. According to these criticisms, properties of

<sup>51</sup> R. Levine, *A Geography of Time. The Temporal Misadventures of a Social Psychologist, or How Every Culture Keeps Time Just a Little Bit Differently*, Basic Books, New York 1999, pp. 30-31.

<sup>52</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 231.

sensory content (and not just its affective force) should be seen as relative to the surrounding field of contents. In other words, the assumption that a color patch has an intrinsic color, which is then modified by its insertion into a field of other patches, is fundamentally flawed. Psychologists and neuroscientists have created images that challenge the idea of a constant underlying sensory quality. For example, applying a colored filter or illumination to the surroundings (e.g., blue) can make a neutral gray surface appear to be the opponent color (e.g., yellow) to that of the filter<sup>53</sup>. How should we interpret this effect? Should we say that a color patch seen as gray is subsequently reinterpreted as yellow? Is its grayness unconscious? Similarly, the “checker shadow illusion” challenges the notion of a constant, intrinsic lightness: a square of the same lightness (dark gray) can appear black when perceived as being directly illuminated and white when perceived as being in the shadow of another object<sup>54</sup>. These examples demonstrate the role of surroundings in determining the phenomenality (quality, lightness, affectivity) of a given content. The same argument can be made about the influence of personal and cultural history: don’t they co-determine the quality of sensory contents in such a way that maintaining absolute properties of sensory contents is an illusion to which Husserl falls prey? It seems that the only way to avoid this objection is to admit an unconscious gray surface and to distinguish from it an illusory yellow color, a postulate that proponents of Gestalt theory were unwilling to support.

Association is also the underlying mechanism by which a content crosses the threshold of affection, and brings the ego to turn to it. Association is finally at work in the pairing of objects that have crossed the threshold of affection and of which the ego has become aware. Husserl labels this form of passivity “secondary passivity” because it occurs after an activity of the ego has taken place. He also speaks of habitualities. Both associations involve the so-called “laws of the propagation of affection”<sup>55</sup>. A content possesses a certain inherent tendency to affect, which it owes to contrast, while the propagation of affection refers to the “push” a content receives from other contents. Husserl describes four different instances of the propagation of affection: 1. Propagation within the spatial field (e.g., a flash of light in one place reveals the rest of a

<sup>53</sup> See the Rubik’s cube in D. Purves, R.B. Lotto, S. Nundy, *Why We See What We Do*, in “American Scientist”, 90, n. 3, 2002, p. 236, doi:10.1511/2002.9.784; and strawberries by A. Kitaoka, *Strawberries*, 2018, <https://x.com/AkiyoshiKitaoka/status/1075204290375905282>.

<sup>54</sup> E.H. Adelson, *Checker Shadow Illusion*, MIT, 1995, <https://persci.mit.edu/gallery/checkershadow>.

<sup>55</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 198.



string of lights); 2. Propagation within the extended now (e.g., a tonal phrase “points back” to the rest of the melody still held in fresh retention and awakens it); 3. Propagation from present to past (e.g., a current event awakens a long-lost memory); 4. Propagation from past to present or present to future (e.g., a past or current event shapes expectations about the future).

Historical influence on sensory contents belongs to the last type of propagation, which Husserl describes as analogous to empirical reasoning: if  $p$  has once surfaced in connection with  $q$ , any occurrence of  $p'$  is expected to be accompanied by  $q$ <sup>56</sup>. Thus, the odor of a meal once associated with a particular taste makes me expect a similar taste when I encounter the smell again; in other words, this previous encounter makes the likelihood of this taste being co-presented more affective. This phenomenon is amplified through repetition: “It is further evident that the anticipatory belief of expectation has a differentiation of force, that is, a gradation, and that this force grows with the number of inductive ‘instances’, that is, with the frequency of what has occurred under similar circumstances”<sup>57</sup>. This account is flawed in that it doesn’t explain desensitization through exposure, as demonstrated in cross-cultural taste detection experiments<sup>58</sup>.

In conclusion, passive phenomena can account for a historical determination of sensory contents. The temporalizing process, which retains a fixed structure, can be affected as the history of consciousness influences the pace of inner time. Association also influences sensory experience, by means of an effect on the content’s affective tendency, while leaving intact its absolute properties. The effect of association is felt prior to affection, in the conversion to affection and after the affection.

### III. Active mechanisms involved in the determination of the senses

The phenomenality of sensory contents is also influenced by active mechanisms, in which the ego plays an explicit role. Activity roughly consists of two steps: first, the “lowest level of the activity of the ego”<sup>59</sup>, namely receptivity, where pregiven sensory units are converted into given objects under the ego’s gaze; and second, higher-level activity, which

<sup>56</sup> Ivi, p. 237.

<sup>57</sup> Ivi, p. 238.

<sup>58</sup> D. Trachootham *et al.*, *Differences in Taste Perception and Spicy Preference. A Thai-Japanese Cross-cultural Study*, in “Chemical Senses”, 43, n. 1, 2018, pp. 65-74, doi:10.1093/chemse/bjx071.

<sup>59</sup> E. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, cit., p. 76.

includes doxic acts, such as judgment and conceptualization, e.g., judging that a book is green and the general notions of “fish” or “thing”, as well as valuing and practical functions, like appraising the beauty of a landscape or orienting the will towards a mountain top taken as the goal of a hike.

Receptivity corresponds to the turning of the ego toward affecting contents and the grasping of an object proper in thematic attention. A counterpart to doxic, thematic attention exists in the sphere of emotion and will, for example, when I contemplate a piece of art or am entirely devoted to a task. Attention, whether doxic, affective or practical, marks the first step into active territory, characterized by the implication of the attentive ego: “All genuine activity is carried out in the scope of attentiveness”<sup>60</sup>. Yet, contrary to what the spotlight metaphor suggests, attention needs not be experienced as a voluntary shift of the ego’s glance<sup>61</sup>. Rather it be understood as a gradation from early, passive forms, to full-fledged voluntary attention, a progression charted by Steinbock<sup>62</sup>.

Is receptivity affected by the past of consciousness and cultural history at large? It should first be noted that attention does not alter the content itself, as Bégout remarks using the language of noema and noesis: “Whereas attention brings constantly to light new aspects of the object, Husserl considers however that the noematic core on its side doesn’t change. The attentional mutation affects directly the relation between noesis and noema, but not the internal components of the noema”<sup>63</sup>. This leaves room for an influence of culture and history on the “relation between noesis and noema”. And indeed, in the last decades, substantial evidence has shown that cultural exposure influences modes of attention. American subjects tend to notice changes around the center of an image, while Japanese subjects are more likely to detect changes in the margin or in the background, reflecting a more general bias towards local feature in Western subjects and towards global features in Eastern subjects<sup>64</sup>. In

<sup>60</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 276.

<sup>61</sup> H. Jacobs, *A Phenomenology of the Work of Attention*, in “Journal of Speculative Philosophy”, 36, n. 2, 2022, pp. 264-276.

<sup>62</sup> A.J. Steinbock, *Affection and attention. On the phenomenology of becoming aware*, in “Continental Philosophy Review”, 37, n. 1, 2004, pp. 27-28, doi:10.1023/B:MAWO.0000049298.44397.be.

<sup>63</sup> B. Bégout, *Husserl and the Phenomenology of Attention*, in L. Boi, P. Kerszberg, F. Patras (a cura di), *Rediscovering Phenomenology*, vol. 182, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht 2007, pp. 8-9, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-5881-3\_1.

<sup>64</sup> T. Masuda, R.E. Nisbett, *Attending holistically versus analytically. Comparing the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans*, in “Journal of Personality and Social Psychology”, 81, n. 5, 2001, pp. 922-934, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.922; Y. Miyamoto, R.E. Nisbett, T. Masuda, *Culture and the Physical Environment. Holistic Versus Analytic Perceptual*

other words, Western cultures are characterized by an analytic thinking style, while Eastern Asian cultures tend to be holistic. Classic observations by anthropologists about the acuity of indigenous hunters, compared to Western anthropologists, in spotting prey in dense jungles can also be explained by a specific orientation of attention and attunement to certain types of content, and not by physical differences<sup>65</sup>.

Receptivity encompasses a second aspect. According to Husserl, thematic attention can be supplemented by doxic “explication” – the detailing of the properties of an object. Just as history can direct attention to local or global features of a scenery by focusing either on the object or on the background, attention can selectively overlook or highlight the details of an object. Americans tend to detect changes of features in salient objects more easily than Japanese subjects, as demonstrated about color changes<sup>66</sup>.

The influence of history on receptivity and attention mean that these must be conceived as acquired dispositions. The history of consciousness, including certain practices learnt at a young age and familiarity with certain types of contents, shapes our sensitivity by orienting our attention: we become more attuned to certain contents or contrasts, and we “scan” the environment in certain ways that make us more sensitive to certain phenomena.

Higher-level activity involves both intellectual operations, such as judging or generalizing, and axiological and practical operations, such as assigning value to an object or turning it into a goal for action. Judgment and conceptualization often frame sensory contents through linguistic expression. Linguistic categorization of colors is known to vary across cultures, with some languages having as few as two basic color terms and others having up to eleven or twelve<sup>67</sup>. Evidence shows that these categorizations, which do not influence early sensory processes, allow for faster decisions in tasks that require color matching<sup>68</sup>.

*Affordances*, in “Psychological Science”, 17, n. 2, 2006, pp. 113-119, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01673.x.

<sup>65</sup> As already noticed by Rivers and Meyers in 1901, in A.C. Haddon et al., *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits. Volume 2*, in *Physiology and Psychology* (1901), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.

<sup>66</sup> A. Boduroglu, P. Shah, R.E. Nisbett, *Cultural Differences in Allocation of Attention in Visual Information Processing*, in “Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology”, 40, n. 3, 2009, pp. 349-360, doi:10.1177/0022022108331005.

<sup>67</sup> B. Berlin, P. Kay, *Basic Color Terms. Their Universality and Evolution*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969.

<sup>68</sup> J. Winawer et al., *Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination*, in “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences”, 104, n. 19, 2007, pp. 7780-785, doi:10.1073/pnas.0701644104.

Axiological and practical acts also belong to higher-level activity. As Husserl notes, the objects of these acts “are laden with objective value predicates” which “arise from the intentionality of feeling”<sup>69</sup>. In our experience, sensory objects receive value predicates founded upon the feelings they awake: red is “aggressive”, blue is “soothing”, etc. While the sensory feelings can natively be awakened by sensory contents as such, it is also possible that cultural history mediates this awakening. Indeed, cultures promote worldviews, which consist of cognitive but also of value judgments, and they establish models for action: some foods are considered suitable for everyday consumption, appropriate only on certain occasions or for specific categories of people, harmless or dangerous in large amounts, or they should or should not be eaten in combination with other foods. Through education, repetition and exposure, value predicates such as “dangerous” or “not suitable” can awaken sensory feelings, which form the basis for the endorsement of the value predicates by the child. Among the value judgments, are found color preferences. As often pointed out, a preference for blue can be observed across time and space in many cultures. Yet, the available evidence points to cultural explanations, as there are other cultures, i.e., the Himba, where no evidence could be found of the “so-called ‘universal’ preference for bluish hues or aversion to yellow-green, which can be clearly seen in the British data”<sup>70</sup>.

Both senses as such – sight, touch... – and particular sensations are imbued with cultural significance, value and symbolism. This cultural inscription is the level of analysis that sensory history and anthropology emphasize: “It is the task of the scholar to uncover the distinctions and interrelationships of sensory meaning and practice particular to a culture”<sup>71</sup>; in sum, to unearth the *sensory model* of a given culture.

## Conclusion

In this paper, I have investigated Husserl’s account of the influence of history and culture on sensory experience. Section I demonstrated that Husserl and Stumpf oppose relativism by rejecting the idea that the properties of sensory contents depend on sensory context or personal and cultural history. While sensory contents possess a “core” of absolute

<sup>69</sup> E. Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, cit., p. 279.

<sup>70</sup> C. Taylor, A. Clifford, A. Franklin, *Color preferences are not universal*, in “*Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*”, 142, n. 4, 2013, p. 1019, doi:10.1037/a0030273.

<sup>71</sup> C. Classen, *Foundations for an anthropology of the senses*, in “*International Social Science Journal*”, 49, n. 153, 1997, p. 401, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2451.1997.tb00032.x.

properties unaffected by history, they are also “framed” by passive and active genesis. Section II illustrated how passive genesis manifests through temporalization and association, the latter prior to affection, at the time of affection, and posteriorly. Section III examined how active genesis manifests through receptivity and differential attentiveness, as well as higher-level activity, including cognitive, evaluative and conative acts.

## References

- Adelson E.H., *Checker Shadow Illusion*, MIT, 1995.  
<https://persci.mit.edu/gallery/checkershadow>.
- Bégout B., *Husserl and the Phenomenology of Attention*, in L. Boi, P. Kerszberg, F. Patras (a cura di), *Rediscovering Phenomenology*, vol. 182, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht 2007, pp. 8-9, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-5881-3\_1.
- Berlin B., Kay P., *Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1969.
- Boduroglu A., Shah P., Nisbett R.E., *Cultural Differences in Allocation of Attention in Visual Information Processing*, in “Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology”, 40, n. 3, 2009, pp. 349-360. doi:10.1177/0022022108331005.
- Byrne A., Hilbert D.R., *Color realism and color science*, in “Behavioral and Brain Sciences”, 26, n. 1, 2003, pp. 4-63, doi:10.1017/S0140525X03000013.
- Classen C., *Foundations for an anthropology of the senses*, in “International Social Science Journal”, 49, n. 153, 1997, pp. 401-12. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2451.1997.tb00032.x.
- Corbin A., *The Foul and the Fragrant. Odor and the French Social Imagination*, tr. M.L. Kochan, R. Porter, C. Prendergast, Berg Publishers, Leamington Spa 1986.
- Id., *Village Bells. Sound and Meaning in the Nineteenth-Century French Countryside. European Perspectives*. Columbia University Press, New York 1998.
- Dewalque A., *Intentionnalité cum fundamento in re. La constitution des champs sensoriels chez Stumpf et Husserl*, in “Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique”, n. 1, 2012, pp. 70-96.
- Droit-Volet S., Meck W.H., Penney T.B., *Sensory modality and time perception in children and adults*, in “Behavioural Processes”, 74, n. 2, 2007, pp. 244-250. doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2006.09.012.
- Gil S., Rousset S., Droit-Volet S., *How liked and disliked foods affect time perception*, in “Emotion”, 9, n. 4, 2009, p. 457-463. doi:10.1037/a0015751.
- Gurwitsch A., *The Field of Consciousness: Phenomenology of Theme, Thematic Field, and Marginal Consciousness*, a cura di R.M. Zaner and L. Embree. Collected Works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973), vol. III. Springer, Dordrecht-New York 2010.
- Haddon A.C., Rivers W.H.R., Myers C.S., et al., *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits. Volume 2, Physiology and Psychology* (1901), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.
- Hall E.T., *The Hidden Dimension*, Anchor Books, New York 1990.

- Hardin C.L., *Color for Philosophers. Unweaving the Rainbow*, Hackett Pub. Co, Indianapolis 1988.
- Holenstein E., *Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl*, Martinus Nijhoff-Springer Netherlands, Den Haag 1972.
- Howes D., *The Sensory Studies Manifesto. Tracking the Sensorial Revolution in the Arts and Human Sciences*. University of Toronto Press, Toronto-Buffalo-London 2022.
- Husserl E., *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, tr. A. Steinbock. Edmund Husserl Collected Works, vol. 9. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston 2001.
- Id., *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937)*, a cura di T. Nenon and H.R. Sepp. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke 27. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989.
- Id., *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*, tr. D. Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1982.
- Id., *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, a cura di S. Strasser. Hua I, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1991.
- Id., *Die Lebenswelt: Auslegungen Der Vorgegebenen Welt Und Ihrer Konstitution. Texte Aus Dem Nachlass (1916-1937)*, Hua XXXIX, a cura di R. Sowa. Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 39. Springer, New York 2008.
- Id., *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, a cura di L. Landgrebe. tr. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks. Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1973.
- Id., *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, tr. D. Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1969.
- Id., *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. D.O. Dahlstrom, Hackett, Indianapolis-Cambridge 2014.
- Id., *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences*, Third Book, tr. T.E. Klein and W.E. Pohl, Martinus Nijhoff; Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague/Dordrecht/ Boston 1980.
- Id., *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, Second Book, tr. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Martinus Nijhoff; Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague/Dordrecht/ Boston 1989.
- Id., *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, a cura di D. Lohmar. Hua IX, Meiner, Hamburg 2003.
- Id., *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, a cura di D. Carr. Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1984.
- Id., *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, tr. R. Rojcewicz. Springer 1998.
- Id., *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. 2. Zweiter Teil. 1921-28*, a cura di I. Kern, Hua XIV, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973.



- Id., *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. 3. Dritter Teil. 1929-1935*, a cura di I. Kern. Hua XV, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973.
- Husserl E., and Heidegger M., *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger, 1927-1931*, tr. T. Sheehan and R.E. Palmer. Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Collected Work 6. Springer, Dordrecht 1997.
- Jacobs H., *A Phenomenology of the Work of Attention*, in “Journal of Speculative Philosophy”, 36, 2, 2022, pp. 264-276.
- Kitaoka A., *Strawberries*, 2018.  
<https://x.com/AkiyoshiKitaoka/status/1075204290375905282>.
- Levine R., *A Geography of Time. The Temporal Misadventures of a Social Psychologist, or How Every Culture Keeps Time Just a Little Bit Differently*, Repr. Basic Books, New York 1999.
- Marx K., *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto*, tr. M. Milligan, Prometheus Books, Amherst 1988.
- Masuda T., Nisbett R.E., *Attending holistically versus analytically. Comparing the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans*, in “Journal of Personality and Social Psychology”, 81, n. 5, 2001, pp. 922-34. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.922.
- Miyamoto Y., Nisbett R.E., Masuda T., *Culture and the Physical Environment. Holistic Versus Analytic Perceptual Affordances*, in “Psychological Science”, 17, n. 2, 2006, p. 113-19. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01673.x.
- Moran D., ‘*Even the Papuan is a man and not a beast*’. Husserl on universalism and the relativity of cultures, in “Journal of the History of Philosophy”, 49, n. 4, 2011, p. 463-94. doi:10.1353/hph.2011.0088.
- Purves D., Lotto R.B., Nundy S., *Why We See What We Do*, in “American Scientist”, 90, n. 3, 2002, p. 236. doi:10.1511/2002.9.784.
- Shim M.K., *Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology*, in “Husserl Studies”, 27, n. 3, 2011, pp. 197-215. doi:10.1007/s10743-011-9093-y.
- Soffer G., *Husserl and the Question of Relativism*, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht-Boston 1991.
- Steinbock A.J., *Affection and attention. On the phenomenology of becoming aware*, in “Continental Philosophy Review”, 37, n. 1, 2004, pp. 21-43, doi:10.1023/B:MAWO.0000049298.44397.be.
- Stumpf C., *Die Attribute der Gesichtsempfindungen*, Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften – Philosophisch-Historische Klasse 8, Verlag der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1917.
- Id., *Erkenntnislehre. Band 1*, Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig 1939.
- Id., *Erscheinungen Und Psychische Funktionen*, Verlag der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften vom Jahre 1906, Berlin 1907.
- Id., *Tone Psychology*. Translated by R.D. Rollinger, “Classic European Studies in the Science of Music” 1, 2020.
- Taylor C., Clifford A., Franklin A., *Color preferences are not universal*, in “Journal of Experimental Psychology: General”, 142, n. 4, 2013, pp. 1015-27. doi:10.1037/a0030273.

- Trachootham D., Satoh-Kuriwada S., Lam-ubol A., *et al.*, *Differences in Taste Perception and Spicy Preference. A Thai–Japanese Cross-cultural Study*, in “Chemical Senses”, 43, n. 1, 2018, pp. 65-74. doi:10.1093/chemse/bjx071.
- Winawer J., Witthoft N., Frank M.C., *et al.*, *Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination*, in “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences”, 104, n. 19, 2007, pp. 7780-85. doi:10.1073/pnas.0701644104.