

Aisthesis



«We lay the path by walking on it»: *Kant, Bergson and the Power of Space*

Citation: Campo, A. (2024). «We lay the path by walking on it»: Kant, Bergson and the Power of Space. *Aisthesis* 18(2): 119-142. doi: 10.7413/2035-8466030

ALESSANDRA CAMPO

Università degli Studi di Urbino
alessandra.campo@uniurb.it

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Abstract. It is usual to oppose Kant and Bergson as the cartographic reason and its other. Yet, considering the role that space plays in the philosophy of both, it is possible not only to point beyond this opposition. The mediality of space, its natural schematic property, makes it possible to identify a significant proximity between space as a pure form of sensibility and the pure perception with which Bergson opens *Matter and Memory*. The aim of the article is to argue in favour of this kinship by considering above all the role that space plays in the first edition of the *Fourth Paralogism of Pure Reason* and in the *Opus postumum* through the filter of the arguments used by Bergson, in the third chapter of *Creative Evolution*, to demonstrate the simultaneous genesis of matter and intelligence.

Keywords. Kant, Bergson, space, intuition, pure perception.

The only feature of an object outside me are the representations of the vigil concordant with those of other human beings

(I. Kant, *Reflexionen* 5400, AA XVIII:172; our transl.)¹

1. *Kant vs. Bergson*

One would have a good game in opposing Kant and Bergson just as, in his works, Franco Farinelli (see Farinelli [2003]; [2009]; [2016]) opposes the two images of the Earth, Gé and Ctòn, the two ways of travelling, that of Cristoforo Colombo, who did not realise he had found America because the map indicated it as India, and Marco Polo who, instead, modified his maps according to the territorial changes he encountered along the way, and the two eras of what Farinelli calls «cartographic reason» (Farinelli [2016]), the modern one in which the world became the image of its map and the medieval one in which, on the contrary, the map was taken as an image of the world (Farinelli [2003]:16): Kant and Bergson stand in front of each other as the cartographic reason and its other, the a priori knowledge and that which a priori is never known insofar as it «constitutes the real difference [*der eigentliche Unterschied*] between empirical [*des Empirischen*] and a priori cognition» (KRV A167-B209: 291), namely sensation: «the irreplaceable giver of the concrete and unforeseeable qualitative aspects of the world» (Luporini [1967]: 203; our transl.). Where critical reason is a reason that reduces the world to its map or representation, Bergson's reason is in fact a global reason, in the sense that the term "globe" acquires in the works of Farinelli: a concrete and living reason which is insensitive to the sirens of the Renaissance's perspective thanks to which Kant's *natura formaliter spectata* was constituted. For Farinelli, today we need this kind of reason because *globalisation* means that «it is no longer possible to rely, in our relationship with reality, on the extremely powerful cartographic mediation which, by reducing the terrestrial sphere to a plane, has so far made it possible to avoid coming to terms with the Earth as it really is, i.e. with the globe» (Farinelli [2016]: 107; our transl.) in which *vivimus, movemur et sumus*. When the world becomes spherical again, the *simple location* of the perceptual datum in three-dimensional space and linear time characteristic of the *scientific materialism*, an expression with which Alfred North Whitehead refers to the fatal mixture of idealism, mechanism and Aristotelian logic responsible for the formation of the *idolum mentis* of a nature composed «of an irreducible brute matter spread throughout space in a flux of configurations» (Whitehead [1926]: 22), is no longer possible. In what Marshall McLuhan called the «global village» and Farinelli proposes to understand as «landscape», directions «no longer correspond to fixed relations between one part and another, but are instead mobile and interchangeable indications, depending on how the subject, the same subject who, in front of the map, remains motionless, moves» (Farinelli [2016]: 107-108; our transl.). The world wide web asks us to vary our maps as places change, that is, to relativise Kant's a priori in such a way as to make our understanding intuitive and sensible otherwise from how Kant did. According to Farinelli, Kant's pure understanding, unlike Kant's

physical teaching of geography, is not a good guide to orient us in the field of unified consciousness-experience created by the new technologies because, as Bergson says in the third chapter of the *Creative Evolution* (henceforth *CE*), it «only finds again in matter the mathematical properties which our perception has already deposited there» (Bergson [1907]: 224). Kant, as we know, confirms this from the beginning to the end of the critical period, i.e. from the *Critique of Pure Reason* (henceforth *KRV*) to the *Opus postumum* (henceforth *OP*)². In the second edition of the preface to the *KRV*, he writes that «reason has insight only into what itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles of its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions rather than letting nature guide its movements» (*KRV* B XIII: 109), while, in the *OP*, he repeats relentlessly that «we make everything ourselves» (*OP*: 189; AA XXII:82), even ourselves, because even the *Setzung* of the outer object is a *Selbstsetzung*. Indeed, by separating space from being, transcendental idealism gains from the very beginning the possibility of reaching the outer world without leaving the subject: «the outer world is the phenomenon of the outside, which feeling, with its spatiality, gives us as distinct from the phenomenon of the inside, which feeling itself gives us with its temporality» (Carabellese [1969]: 425; our transl.). Insofar as it is a «perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state» (*KRV* A320-B377: 398), sensation is in fact only a species of the genus *representatio* «which designates a reality in space and time» (*KRV* A374: 428). Educated by criticism sensation becomes luminous for science only as graduated (read: qualified) matter whose presence makes intuition empirical, that is only when perception extracts from sensation what can be anticipated a priori – the degree of reality of all phenomena (*KRV* B208A166-B218A176) – anticipation being, after all, this same extraction. It follows that, what the *Critique* calls “empirical” is nothing more than an object *represented* as given as to its existence. Sensation is «that *through which* things are given to us [*das wodurch die Dinge gegeben sind*]» (*Refl.* 4629, AA XVII: 614; our transl. and italics) and intuition is a reference to the object by means of sensation (*KRV* A20-B34), i.e. «*how* things are given to us [*wie sie gegeben sind*]» (*Refl.* 4629, AA XVII: 614; our transl. and italics). Yet only intuition, for Kant, is transcendental; only intuition is a *mode of* receiving that is worth a *form*, a priori, of receiving. Still in the *Critique of Judgement* sensation is defined as «the material through which something existing is given [*das Materielle wodurch etwas Existierende gegeben wird*]» (*KDU*: 75). But if there is *Critique* only on the condition that this sensitive *wodurch* is translated into the intellectual medium of perception – a «representation accompanied by consciousness» (*KRV* B209: 291) or «by sensation» (*KRV* B147: 254) – is because Kant’s understanding, to borrow an image that Bergson uses in the third chapter of the *CE*, «is bathed in an atmosphere of spatiality to which it is as inseparably united

as the living body to the air it breathes» (Bergson [1907]: 223). All that it feels, therefore, reaches it only «after having passed through this atmosphere» (Ibid.) because perception is a preliminary plan with which we meet that which meets us that, for both Bergson and Farinelli, seals the *productive*, because *projective*, character of the pure reason.

For Kant, in short, *we receive* because *we can receive*. But since everything that we cannot receive (read: anticipate a priori), is «left to experience [*der Erfahrung überlassen*]» (*KRV* B218: 295) insofar as «constructing sense impressions is impossible» (*Refl.* 3940, *AA* 17: 356; our transl.), the reduction of matter to form undertaken from the outset of the *Transcendental Aesthetics* because of the embarrassment – made explicit later by Jacobi in his famous invitation to criticism (Jacobi [1912]: 336) – that the *affizieren* procures for criticism, is never complete (an incompleteness that, as is well known, embarrasses both post and neo-Kantians). For Kant, in fact, everything is form, even matter, but outside form, the *Anticipations of Perception* tell us there remains all the life, dynamism and organicity of nature. «That which is really merely empirical [*was eigentlich und bloß empirisch ist*] and pertains to sensation» (*KRV* A165/B217: 295) represents an a posteriori which can fill the forms that condition its giving but it is not something that these forms can give to themselves. Hence, between the anticipation of perception as it is described in the *Critique* and the *Amphibolia*'s statement, within the same *Critique*, that there is no matter that is not form, that even transcendental matter is only a requirement of which we could not even understand what it is, even if someone could tell us (*KRV* A277-B333), there is a patent cleavage: the *Critique*, as a whole, claims that matter is given and cannot be contrived at will because existence is «the most of the concept» (Carabellese [1969]: 53; our transl.); the *Amphibolia*, within the *Critique*, specifies that all that is given is a form that refers back to a matter which is a form as well. A cleavage, moreover, that seems irrecoverable given that nobody can anticipate affection, i.e. sensation as «the effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it» (*KRV* A20-B34: 155). Sensation is «that by means of which we become conscious of something and not something of which we are conscious» (Lange [1988]: 52; our transl.). Its transcendental function as «*Erzeugung des Empirischen*» (*Brief.*, *AA* 12: 213) cannot be planned because the transcendentality of sensation is the very transcendentality of the empirical: an «autonomous and radical» (Henry [2001]: 78) transcendentality that also escapes the purest of forms according to Hermann Cohen (see Cohen [1883]), namely “reality”. Within the critical framework we can only know its *eidolon*, i.e. sensation as the matter of the appearances, through the atmosphere of the *Urteilstkraft* – a refraction from which, according to Bergson, we get the hybrid and abusive notion of intensive magnitude (Bergson [1889]: 123) – because, even when the understanding, in the *OP*, starts inventing – *erdichten* (*OP*, *AA* XXII: 476; our transl.) – those problematic concepts to which only

a new schematism can provide a solid basis, i.e. the ether as hypostatized space, intuition will still be sensible. Indeed, it is always a matter of schematism because, and this is Kant's conclusion in the *OP*, «we have before us the finite and not the infinite spirit» which «only by means of a subjection becomes active, only insofar as it receives a material can work and form» (*OP*, AA XXI: 76; our transl.). Infinite, on the contrary, is the spirit *in front* of which, *within* which, Bergson installs himself. “Feeling” is the name that, almost in the same years, his friend William James reserved for it, inviting us to understand the term “feeling” as a synonym for «pure experience» (James [1912]: 99), i.e. the experience drawn out in its immediacy before the distinction between knowing subject and known object can take place and which is not devoid of theory, i.e. of forms, relations and concepts. With the term “feeling”, which can be replaced also by “thought” or “idea” in the sense that John Locke gave to this term (James [1909]: 2), James refers to what Bergson calls «durée»: every act or state of thought which is not yet determined by a specific cognitive function or a specific representational content. This experience, like Bergson's global duration, precedes and founds the understanding we have of it because it is an experience neither constructible nor plannable but continually becoming and creating. Nonetheless, feeling is not an unknowable thing-in-itself. In contrast to Kant, Bergson bets on the possibility of going beyond the human condition and rejoining, thanks to a metaphysical intuition – an absolute and direct knowledge of the thing (Bergson [1903]: 1) –, to the inexhaustible source from which our intelligence – which Bergson opposes to intuition – derives as a local concretion or function. To do this, Bergson's transcendental empiricism replaces Kant's possible conditions of experience anticipated by perception with the real and genetic conditions emerging *in* and *from* sensation. The latter are conditions tailored to the conditioned because they are not a priori forms, but strange «a-posteriori a priori» (Bryant [2008]: 229) or maps-territories which, instead of anticipating experience, are dictated by it. When it is transcendental, in other words, empiricism renounces neither the transcendental nor the concept, both of which are conditions of experience, but makes them the objects of an encounter: intensities that are not distinguished from the thing they refer to because they are materially inherent to its thisness. For Farinelli we need such empiricism capable of illuminate a denser, though more obscure and confused, reality than that of Kantian experience reduced to (human) cognition, because

[i]t is by no means true that the postmodern epoch, as ours is usually referred to, is determined by the «precession of the simulacrum», by the precedence of the map over the territory (Baudrillard [1981]: 10). This has certainly been true throughout the modern era and was already true for Anaximander. On the contrary, our world is founded precisely *on the end of such an anticipation*, because by now the map and the territory are no longer distinguishable from each other, *in the sense that what we can see of the latter has fully assumed the form* and nature of the former, and we can therefore understand little of how the world works. (Farinelli [2016]: 10; our italics)

2. *The intuition of space*

In his works, Bergson calls «space» what Farinelli calls «map» and «plan»: a scheme of decomposition and recomposition of reality following which our intelligence substitutes the already made for the *se faisante*, the solid for the fluid, «the corpse for the living», to use the terms with which Carl Ritter qualified the cartographic gesture (Ritter [1852]: 34-35). If intelligence feels at home among inert objects and triumphs in both geometry and cartography, it is because it constructs its concepts with the frames that perception cuts out and picks up from the becoming unimultiplicity of duration, that is to say, because intelligence is a particular function of the mind essentially related «to a certain aspect of inert matter» (Bergson [1907]: XXII) in virtue of a reciprocal adaptation that, in the third chapter of the *CE*, a chapter devoted to answering the Kantian problem “how is science possible?”, Bergson presents as the «simultaneous genesis of matter and intelligence» (Ibid.: 204). In his opinion, Kant did not solve it because, «he did not think that the mind overflowed the intellect, and in the second place (and this is at bottom the same thing) because he did not attribute to duration an absolute existence, having put time, a priori, on the same plane as space» (Ibid.: 225). To space yes, making it something akin to «a veritable *deus ex machina*, of which we see neither how it arises, nor why it is what it is rather than anything else» (Ibid.: 224). But Kant’s space, like any space for Bergson, is only a simulacrum of duration as real time. In *Time and Free Will* (henceforth *TFW*), Bergson criticises it as an abstract symbol: a map of territory different in kind from territory and yet mistaken for it by virtue of what Whitehead denounced as the *fallacy of misplaced concreteness*. Yet, Kant’s space is not, as Bergson said in *TWF*, «the conception of an empty homogeneous medium» (Bergson [1889]: 95). Kant’s space is an intuition. Bergson can understand it as a conception because, by criticising it, he holds together what Kant distinguishes: the space as pure intuition and formal intuition of the *Transcendental Aesthetics*; the space as extensive magnitude of the *Axioms of Intuition* and the space as empirical intuition of the *Anticipations of Perception*, the latter two principles, like the entire *Analytic*, never being considered by Bergson in his works. The result is that Bergson imputes to Kant’s space what, in the *KRV*, results from different functions. In his *Aesthetics*, in fact, Kant distinguishes scrupulously between perceived and conceived, empirical and pure space, just as he generally distinguishes, contrary to what is said in *TFW* (Ibid.: 232-236), between duration and its symbol, between duration, which for Bergson is real time, and spatialised, or homogenous, time, which is its intelligent counterpart. Moreover, this distinction, although not formulated in the same terms (in the language of the *Transcendental Deduction*, to give just one example, it is the distinction between the «synthetic unity of apperception» and the «I think»), is the lintel of the *Critique*. Therefore, as emerges

most clearly in the *CE*, the real difference between Kant and Bergson is the way of understanding the relationship between representation and its other³ rather than the difference between space and duration.

As intuition, Kant's space escapes Bergson's accusations for the same reason that, according to Bergson, doctrines based on intuition escape Kant's critique (Bergson [1903]: 88), i.e. because it is an intuition. And what is more important, as intuition, as pure intuition, Kant's space recalls what Bergson entrusts, in the opening of *Matter and Memory* (henceforth *MM*), the resolution of the dualism between mind and matter, soul and body, intensity and extension, namely «pure perception». In resolving the fourth paralogism in the first edition of the *KRV*, Kant invited to reformulate the old, metaphysical question about the relationship between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* in the one, new and transcendental, that asks «how is outer intuition, namely that of space (the filling of it by figure and movement), possible at all in a thinking subject?» (*KRV* A 393: 438). Such a reformulation is particularly valuable, although usually little considered, because, even if this new question is not critically answered either (space, as pure intuition, is not perceptible), in the *OP*, while elaborating the *Selbstsetzungslehre* and revising *Transcendental Aesthetics*, Kant still seems to be faithful to it. Between the possibility of this space that takes the place of a *commercium* among heterogeneous substances and that of a space indistinguishable from a pure self that *actively suffers* itself, i.e. space as «the formal element of pure (not empirical) intuition [that] represents the self-determination, how the subject affects itself» (*OP*: 136, AA XXII: 480), there is more than one correspondence. The new space that, in the *OP*, replaces the old imagination of the *KRV* in the new schematism is in fact a space that undergoes, acts and *is given as a given space* in such a way that the self-consciousness of both intuition and thought comes together in a representation that allows Kant to write: «I am, at the same time, conscious of myself as the thinking subject and of myself as the object of intuition» (*OP*, AA XXII: 22; our transl.), *cogitable* and *dabile*, intense and extended, even in a corporeal sense. In the *OP*, space and time form a pure representation, given a priori, «with which the subject posits itself and makes itself the object of the senses [...] not only analytically but synthetically, by means of a construction of concepts in the complex of the manifold of intuition as the true object» (Ibid.: 25; our transl.) which – this is the novelty of the *OP* with respect to the fourth paralogism – presupposes the body. And if the possibility of space, so understood, also ends up resembling the possibility of pure perception – the perception of bodies, or matter, in space in the sense that space is this very perception of the universe as an «aggregate [*ensemble*] of images» (Bergson [1896]: 18) – it is not only because pure perception is pure space and the aggregate of images that Bergson calls «matter» resembles the aggregate of atomic sensations that space unifies a priori as a pure form of sensibility: as phenomena, these sensations are already

the relations of which the ether as thought-matter given a priori constitutes, in the late *OP*, the imperceptible basis of determinability. The aggregate of images with which *MM* opens is the world grasped *sub specie physicae* (Ibid.: 17), and pure perception is a boundary-perception which, like the perception of the ether, and the perception of pure space «exists in theory rather than in fact and would be possessed by a being placed where I am, living as I live, but absorbed in the present and capable, by giving up every form of memory, of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous» (Ibid.: 34). It is pointless, in this regard, to object that, for Bergson, the images whose aggregate forms the matter of the world are not representations but «an existence placed halfway between the “thing” and the “representation”» (Ibid.: 9): ether too, as was already the case with the first scheme, with the first common root thought by western philosophy, i.e. the Platonic *Chōra*, is halfway between the intelligible and the sensible, the transcendental structures and the physical entities insofar as it is a matter prior to every sensible body. Indeed, in the *OP* ether lies at the foundation of every possible experience as, one might say, another *Erzeugung des Empirischen* because, as soon as it ceases to be understood as matter-substance or physical object and becomes, rather, an object of physics, it also ceases to be something merely hypotheticalal.

As the non-empirical condition of the material unity of experience related to the I-think as the formal unity of this same experience, ether gains the status of an inevitable appearance, a necessary *ens rationis*: not an empirical fact but a great, maybe the greatest *etwas*, the greatest what-character⁴ which gives itself to thought by affecting reason without being experienced. And that is why, if seen as an act, pure perception is so similar to space as the *formale* of the *dabile* required by the schematism of the *OP*, i.e. to that space which is «the very intuition of the sensible object insofar as the subject is affected by it and, therefore, is only given as phenomena according to the formal» (*OP*, AA XXII: 10; our transl.): both pure perception, which is pure insofar as it is devoid of memory as well as of sensation, and the phenomenality without phenomena thanks to which phenomena are given, i.e. space as *ens imaginarium*, are limits of our capacity to think in which that «initial freedom of phenomenality» (Taminiaux [1967]: 44) – *Chōra* as the manoeuvring space of being, *Chōra* as the being’s becoming – takes place. We can grasp it with a «*loghismos tis nothos*», a bastard reasoning, says Plato, adding, as rarely noted, that this reasoning occurs «*met’anaesthesias*» (*Tim.*, 52b2), with an absence of sensation, «with the sense of this absence» (Diano [1973]: 179)⁵. As in dreaming, we read in *Tim.* 52b5-7, *erdichten* writes Kant in the *OP*. And what does it mean to perceive, to feel with an absence of sensation, if not to experience, exactly as happens in the last *Konvolute* of the *OP*, the giving of an empty intuition, of a «pure receptivity with no object but itself»? (Agamben [2019]: 71; our transl.). Moreover, in the light of Kant’s last

manuscript notes, one can even argue that the traceability to which, commenting on the *Axioms of Intuition*, Kant had referred when writing that «we cannot represent ourselves any line, no matter how small it may be, without drawing it in thought» (*KRV* A162: 287), does not differ, in the end, from the space in terms of whose possibility Kant had invited to reformulate the *vexata quaestio* of the relationship between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* in 1781. The A-text of the fourth paralogism seems in fact to say that the mind's influence on the body is nothing other than the possibility, for the mind, of perceiving or intuiting the body (in Bergson's terms: the possibility for an intensity to intuit its opposite, i.e. the extended thing), because that the mind's influence on the body is an outer intuition, i.e. an intuition of space and of what fills it, suggests that this influence is intuition itself: the perception of the body as other and outer in relation to me⁶, as I am other and outer in relation to the other bodies I see and these are so in relation to each other. Yet, to the extent that the *potentia* of this, almost forgotten, space is indiscernible from a *patentia* that pays homage to space etymon – “space” comes from the Latin “spatium” and this, in turn, from the verb “patere” meaning “to open up”, “to extend”, “to span”, “to manifest” (and note that the adjective “spontaneous”, from the root “span”, also has the same meanings) –, the space of 1781 already resembles the realised space that, in the *OP*, allows for a new schematism. If, nevertheless, we must wait for the *OP* to see all these connections made explicit, is because it is only in the *OP* that Kant, replacing the imagination with the “new” space, can think pure space and matter through a self-affection in which the subject is affected by its own receptivity. In the *OP*, the *possibility* of the critical space becomes the *actuality* of a *Setzung* that is, at the same time, a *Selbstsetzung*. What here becomes clear is that the possibility of space and of what fills it, i.e. sensation as matter of perception, like the possibility of the thinking being in general, would not be actual without a concomitant affection and the idea we have of it: an idea, as we have seen, that is nothing but the “pure receptivity with no object but itself”. Almost as if, what is lately developed, it was not only the need to transvaluate the question about the reality of a *commercium* between heterogeneous substances into a question about the possibility of a single kind of intuition, but also the fact that outer perception is «the real in space» (*KRV* A375: 429) in the meantime that this same space, «with all its phenomena, is exclusively in us» (*Ibid.*), as the form of receptivity, the form of being affected by this real.

For Kant, although «space is nothing other than mere representation, only what is represented in it can count as real» because «every outer perception immediately proves something real in space or rather is itself the real» (*Ibid.*). This immediacy, as is well known, constitutes the *demonstrandum* of the future *Refutation of Idealism* where perception, i.e. «the mere, but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence», immediately «proves the existence of ob-

jects in space outside of me» (*KRV*B275:326). Yet, this immediacy also precludes the immediacy with which, in the *OP*, the self posits itself as both *cogitable* and *dabile* passing, just as in the *Refutation* (Desideri [2013]: 173-175), from the simple logical consciousness to the determinately given (actual) consciousness in intuition: it is space, indeed, that plays somehow this passage both in the first edition of the *Fourth Paralogism* and in the *Refutation of idealism*, and finally in the *OP*. In all these textual places we find that space is the preferred reference to show how the simple apriority of pure reason constitutes, by itself, the empirical. If, in fact, according to the postulate of empirical thought to which the *Refutation* is added as an insert, reality extends as far as our perception extends (*KRV*A226-B273), it is space, somehow, the agent of this extension, not to say it is this extension itself. As a form of sensibility, space is a psychic function that, «exercising itself over sensations, is called intuition» (Simmel [1913]: 60; our transl.): *a forma formans* that can neither be intuited within us nor extracted from the relations of what appears outside us in the manner of an empirical concept: as pure intuition, space is a necessary representation that is a priori in the soul. For Kant it is the foundation of all outer intuitions as well as of all conceptions of space because, on the fact that space cannot not be presupposed (its absence is not representable), on space's character, to paraphrase Henry More, of «unavoidable imagination» (More [1662]: 163), depend both the apodictic certainty of all the principles of geometry, and space's a priori givenness. And it is this inevitability of space that now is at stake and we must investigate. The *Aesthetics* tell us that space is given as something unique in a way that critical reason cannot understand, namely as an original intuition, a «primitive product» (*OP*: 176, AA XXII: 37) that must be in us *before any perception*, even if not in a psychological sense. As early as 1768, Kant made it a principle of possibility of the composition of matter, at the same time refusing it the title of geometric principle. The space of geometry is *gemacht*, thus made, composed, and *abgeleitet*, i.e. derived, while space as pure form of sensibility is *gegeben*, given, and given originally, subjectively and not objectively insofar as it is an «actu infinitum a parte cogitantis» and not a «potentiale infinitum» (Fichant [2004]: 537). Therefore, it is difficult to reduce Kant's space to a homogeneous, abstract and merely conceptual medium as Bergson did. The *Axioms of Intuition* tell us that space is an extensive magnitude but, just as Leibniz distinguishes between *spatium* and *extensio*, understanding the latter as an extensive magnitude and the extensive magnitude as a discursive concept abstracted from the properties of bodies perceived *partes extra partes* even though well founded in the intermonadic relation (Gueroult [1946]), Kant too seems to admit that geometric extension is something that space receives by materialising itself into magnitude. However, if this is the case, it is also difficult to think that such a space is “in us” spatially, i.e. extensively.

In *MM*, after all, Bergson too says that we can get out of *extensio* without getting out of that other, qualitative and psychic extension, which, in 1896, he defines in the same terms in which, until then, he had defined duration: a continuity of heterogeneity (Bergson [1896]: 210). To resolve *TWF*'s reactive dualism, indeed, in *MM* Bergson deploys a soul that is not only inextended and an extension that is not only spatial: the extensive as something intermediate (like a scheme?) «between divided extension and pure inextension» (Bergson [1896]: 245). The extensive is neither the extension nor the extended but a tension towards the outside *before* the outside is constituted and *so that* («zum Behuf» Kant repeats in the *OP* – see, e.g. *OP*, AA XXII: 309; AA XXII: 550) it is constituted: a sort of tracing before the tracing from which mathematical space derives as a physical line drawn by its psychical sign, i.e. as the image «that intelligence renews itself when it is exercised» (Riquier [2009]: 33; our transl.). In the *MM*, Bergson states that this drawing begins when the tension of duration stretches out until it almost vanishes and the heterogeneity of the qualities that succeed one another in our perception is «sufficiently diluted to become, from our point of view, practically negligible» (Bergson [1896]: 182). With the consequence, only implicit in *TWF*, that it is duration itself, which Bergson compares, not by chance, to an elastic band (Ibid.: 104), that contributes to the formation of the blade with which intelligence attempts to divide its undivided act; it is «the same movement by which the mind is brought to form itself into intellect, that is to say, into distinct concepts, brings matter to break itself up into objects excluding one another. The more consciousness is intellectualized, the more is matter spatialized» (Bergson [1907]: 207). In the third chapter of the *CE*, matter is in fact said to consist of the movement of the consciousness pushed further and the latter, therefore, «feels at its ease, moves about naturally in space, when matter suggests the more distinct idea of it. *This space is already possessed as an implicit idea in its own eventual detention, that is to say, of its own possible extension*» (Ibid.: 221; our italics). The mind finds space in things but, and the passage deserves to be quoted in full,

could have got it without them if it had had *imagination* strong enough to push the inversion of its own natural movement to the end. On the other hand, we are able to explain how matter accentuates still more its materiality, when *viewed* by the mind. Matter, at first, aided mind to run down its own incline; it gave the impulsion. But the impulsion once received, mind continues its course. The idea that it forms of pure space is only the *schema* of the limit at which this movement would end. Once in possession of the form of space, mind uses it like a net with meshes that can be made and unmade at will, which, thrown over matter, divides it as the needs of our action demand. Thus, the space of our geometry and the spatiality of things are *mutually engendered* by the reciprocal action and reaction of *two terms which are essentially the same*, but which move each in the direction inverse of the other. (Ibid.: 221-222; our italics).

3. *The intelligence of matter*

Mind, for Bergson, materialises while matter idealises, and this identity of movement is another way of stating that *res cogitans* and *res extensa* coincide, reaffirming, in 1907, the monist result drawn in *MM*. Only intensity, in fact, extends itself being nothing other than a need for extension, and Bergson does not hesitate to call «consciousness» this principle – the intensive *élan* – «that has only to let go its tension may we say to defend in order to extend», taking care to specify right after that this consciousness is not «the narrowed consciousness that functions in each of us», i.e. empirical consciousness (Ibid.: 259). Yet, precisely in attempting to solve the Kantian problem – how matter bends to our reasoning and our forms accord with objects that we have not produced –, in the third chapter of the *CE*, Bergson ends up greatly complicating *MM*'s monism by working four terms together: matter and intelligence, space and *élan*. Not only that: abetted by a certain dogmatism about matter inherited from Plotinus to whom, in the years preceding the drafting of the *CE*, Bergson had dedicated several studies and courses, sometimes he now seems to conceive of matter as something transcendent with respect to the intelligence, without the clarity of certain statements succeeding in dispelling the confusion that hovers over all these terms. Nothing in these pages suggests interpreting the nexus matter/intelligence as the empirical translation of the transcendentality of the nexus space/*élan*. Bergson, indeed, inherits from both *TWF* and *MM* the ambiguity about space⁷ without inheriting, at the same time, *MM*'s conception of matter as an aggregate of images, i.e. a phenomenal conception of matter. Consequently, while in *MM* the dualism of soul and body was given as resolved in the opening – the theory of pure perception serves this purpose – in the third chapter of *CE* – the chapter in which, so to speak, Bergsonian transcendental deduction takes place – a kind of substantial dualism seems to loom large again although the passage we have quoted at the end of the previous paragraph seems to hold true to the monistic instance of the 1896's work. Consequently, it is only by pointing to the latter that it is possible to argue that the thinking of the simultaneous genesis between intelligence and a matter, if matter is a phenomenon, is not so different from that which Kant arrives at in the *OP* by resolving the *Anticipations* in an amphibolic sense. Matter, for Bergson, is in fact not transcendent with respect to the intelligence one has of it because this intelligence is the *élan*'s own anticipation of the *res extensa* as the end of its creative impetus: an end never reached because «neither is space so foreign to our nature as we imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it» (Ibid.: 222). For Bergson space is the never-achieved limit of matter because the integral or perfect spatiality, which Bergson thinks of here only extensively, coincides with a perfect exteriority of the parts that is never given, and is never given because,

for the Leibnizian Bergson, there is no point of matter that does not act and is not connected with any other. Yet, also for Kant space as pure intuition is never given (read: never perceivable) for a similar reason to that put forward by Bergson: one never stops having sensations and the anticipation of the degree of reality of all phenomena is also the anticipation of the fullness of space at every point. That every sensation has a degree or that the real of the phenomenon always has an intensive quantity, albeit infinitely small, allows Kant to deny the existence of the void (*KRV* A 168B210/A172B214) and, given Bergson's misunderstanding of Kantian space, there are good reasons to believe that what is said in the *CE* about geometric space also applies to space as pure intuition: empty space is never given, i.e. is imperceptible, because the absence of reality-sensation is a *nihil privatum*. Moreover, even if he does not speak of simultaneous genesis, Kant also suggests that «in all that it has that is intelligible, matter is our own work» (Bergson [1907]: 224), and that this work, after all, is also of matter.

For Kant, in all that it has that is intelligible, matter is a work of ours and it is so even before he anticipates matter, in the late *OP*, in the form of a hypostatised space – ether as the basis of all relations of motive forces – such that to place (*setzen*) this place as determinable is to subject oneself to determination, i.e. to place (*setzen*) oneself as determinable. In the *OP*, and especially here, space is the form in which we are affected but, another novelty of the *OP*, is that the space of *Transcendental Aesthetics*, thanks to ether, becomes now perceptible and this perception is a self-perception: the effect of the “I think” on the “I feel” analogous to that «effect of the understanding on the sensibility» in whose terms the second edition of the *Critique* defines imagination (*KRV* B152: 257). Yet, as «Mittelbegriff» (Lachièz-Rey [1950]: 460) whose task is to signify the affection of the senses once it has occurred, and maybe also when it occurs, already in the *Aesthetics* matter is an idea of sensation as a modification of our sensibility. The definition of *Empfindung* in *KRV* (A20-B34: 155) says no more, even though it is the *Anticipations* that inscribe sensation in thought, that objectify sensation by making it a noema for the understanding. Hence, even if Kant never denied the existence of objects outside of us in a transcendental sense, we could say that already in the *Aesthetics* and the *Anticipations*, namely before the *Anfangsgründe* (henceforth *MAN*) undertake the construction of matter, Kant admits that the empirical manifold is a form produced by thinking. The resolution of the cleavage between *Anticipation* and *Amphibolia* is in fact also prepared by that reduction of the outside to the form of our feeling – the outside that results to us – which is a consequence of the transcendental ideality of space and thus, in addition to *Transcendental Aesthetics*, also by that correction of 1781's fourth paralogism which is 1787's *Refutation of Idealism*. The latter, after all, is a confirmation of the *Transcendental Aesthetics* rather than a real refutation: a *petitio principium* with the value of a «tautology» (Benoist [2006]: 306). Kant there

merely restates his thesis on knowledge – «the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience» (*KRV* A158-B197: 283) – because what he wants to show there is that «every empirical interiority is conditioned by an empirical exteriority» (Luporini [1967]: 185). Nonetheless, if it is always a matter of interiority, given that outer things exist in the same way as the subject exists – as representations of whose reality one is immediately conscious – it is because what here really interests Kant is the condition, i.e. the determination. The evidence of the I-world correlation can indeed only be ascertained insofar as it results from the interaction of a complex of forms that constitute it, because, from a transcendental perspective, an empirically determined consciousness can only be given if, at the same time as it, a determination is also given. With respect to this *petitio*, the construction of the matter initiated in the *MAN* and completed in the *OP* undoubtedly marks a more conscious resolution of the cleavage between *Anticipation* and *Amphibolia* because Kant will fully assume the formalism and productivity of pure reason, going so far as to radicalise the proleptic movement that the first *Critique* limited to the form of sensation alone «to extend it to sensation as a whole, hence to sensation not only for its “being impression”, but, metaphysically, *for its being*» (Branca [2024]: 304; our transl.). If, in fact, the dynamic anticipation of the force at work in *MAN* is the realisation of the anticipation of perception that gives mathematics the “material” to delineate and construct, in the *OP* Kant undertakes an anticipation «*quoad materiale*» (*OP*, AA XXII: 345) of the experience by researching what the conditions are for sensation to occur. The old Kant wants «to present a priori that which depend on perception» (*OP*: 141, AA XXII: 493), that is «to anticipate the data *materially*» (Mathieu [1991]: 136; our transl.), to *anticipate the material formally*. *Forma dat esse rei* is the motto of the entire science of the *Übergang* because its task is to investigate how form determines the thing itself grounding the experience of a given object. Yet, without in any way detracting from the objective advancement, not to say completion, of transcendental idealism that is realised in the convulsive pages in which Kant demonstrates the existence of the ether – the protagonist of the “passage” in the sense that it does the passage from the form of experience (a transcendental structure) to empirical matter (a physical entity) –, it is worth noting that, to the extent that the degree of reality of all phenomena is the what-like form which is present a priori in the soul, the anticipation of this *form of a content as content* is not so dissimilar to that *enunciation of a presupposition* that is indiscernible from the *assumption of this presupposition as the anticipation of the presupposition itself*, in which the analytical proof of the existence of the ether – the greatest *etwas*, the greatest what-like form – is resolved. The latter is the paradox of a thought, of an idea that indicates existence itself: «the *position of thought* insofar as it turns out to be the *thought of the position* itself» (Branca

[2024]: 361; our transl.). But even though it is only in the case of the ether that Kant admits a *consequentia* from *posse* to *esse* (*OP*, AA XXI: 592), the *esse* is always thought because ether is an idea. Moreover, to the extent that, for any givenness to be given, for there to be the giving of sensation, there must already be an apprehension, even the real materiality of sensation is, in the end, «an internal effect of thinking itself in which it suffers, so to speak, its own operation» (Branca [2024]: 227; our transl.) becoming impassioned with itself. The presupposition of a non-phenomenal trigger of the phenomenon is still a phenomenon because, even that of a *solicitatio* activating the capacity of judgement is, like the ether, the thought of experience as the thought of something existing that acts on me and, only to this extent, exists. This means that even colours, tastes and sounds are thought in their non-predictable, empirical quality: they are always the way, to apply what Kant says of space-time, «in which the mind is affected by its own activity» (*KRV* B67: 189). Perception is in fact «an intuitive grasp» (Alexandre [1978]: 60; our transl.) by which we give ourselves an impression instead of receiving it. And so, despite the fact that in the *Critique* only «that which is connected [*zusammenhängt*] with the material conditions of experience (of sensation) is actual» (*KRV* A218-B266: 295) and not these same conditions; despite the fact that the thing itself is not yet, as it will be in the *OP*, «another *respectus* of the representation to the same object» (*OP*, AA XXII: 26; our transl.), thus a phenomenon; and despite the fact, finally, that pure forms are never self-active, that is to say, capable of provoking their coming into operation (reduced to the matter of phenomena, the critical sensation is the most intense *conception* of the need for forms to be actuated but, indeed, it is a conception), one should recognise that the premises for the future amphibolic resolution of the *Anticipations* are already contained in the *KRV*. It is not only in the *OP*, in other words, that intellectual spontaneity stimulates outer affection. So often, although not with the same clarity, we find in the *KRV* that «the material element of sensible representation lies in perception – that is, in the act through which the subject affects itself and becomes appearance of an object for itself» (*OP*: 146, AA XXII: 502) and «the inner phenomena in perception that the subject arouses in itself, i.e. sensations, are simply phenomena of itself» (*OP*, AA XXII: 483; our transl.). Matter, in those rare moments in the *KRV* in which Kant thinks about it, and which are, significantly, the moments in which transcendental idealism defines itself («that of empirical is its ultimate theme» – Benoit [2006]: 306; our transl.), is always «a thought in us» (*KRV* A385: 434) which, «thanks to the outer sense, is represented as «being found outside of us» (*KRV* A385: 434), albeit only empirically. Therefore, everything lies in understanding what this representation can and how far it goes, what its otherness is, what pure thought can do (a question at the heart of Cohen's reinterpretation, in terms of scientific idealism, of the *Anticipations of perception*).

Contrary to Bergson's admission, Kant knows very well that duration exceeds intelligence, i.e. that thinking is not knowing. And the question that arises in the light of the *OP* is to understand whether the other from representation is thinking which, in its incessant and always presupposed exercise, never coincides with the constructions we make of it in the sense that the latter are like rules waiting (but where? and how?) to be implemented in order to become actual (in the *OP*, from this point of view, forms reach the apex of waiting: «the possibility of the possibility of experience» – *OP*, AA XXI: 76; our transl.), or that *feeling-thought* which is absolutely invadable because it is absolutely immanent, which Bergson calls both «duration» and «qualitative extension», meaning the act in act of consciousness which is ours only in the sense that it makes us, as its, to itself (*MM*'s monism tells us that, with respect to this absolute, our constructions are local crystallisations differing only in degree because even stillness is a motion, albeit a slowed one). To put it differently, we must ask *if* and *why* space as pure form is an *ens imaginarium* different from *nihil privativum* as a state in which, only temporarily, nothing is felt. Does *met'anaesthesias* indicate an insensibility *de iure*, i.e. the *anaestheton* that Plato reserves for the intelligible, or an insensibility *de facto*, i.e. the absence of sensation caused by its being relativised, frozen, overwhelmed by something else, e.g. that time that makes sensation flow away, «with all the magnitude of its intensity» (Scaravelli [1973]: 173; our transl.)? Which, given that affections do not give rise to sensibility despite arising in it, means asking: how can something give itself *in* a source? How can something give itself *as* a source? How can we think of a pure receptivity, of a phenomenality before any phenomenon? If space and time, as imaginary entities, are a pure nothingness, a simple and vacuous reasoning, why – and this is the *OP*'s problem – do they not remain empty but instead offer principles to perception, such as matter and gravitational forces? In short: how does the ether, which is *de iure* imperceptible, make space perceptible, if space, for its part, is imperceptible both with the senses of physiology and with those educated senses that are empirical intuitions, i.e. perceptions? What perception are here we talking about? How does an «empty concept without object» fill «an empty intuition without object» (*KRV* A292B349: 383)? And *where*, especially, does this filling take place?

4. *The perception of thought*

In the answer to all these questions, as is easy to guess, the status of what, according to Heidegger, is «Kant's greatest achievement» (Heidegger [1962]: 158) – the non-sensitive sensibility – is at stake. Hence, also that of pure perception as pure space or pure intuition. For Bergson, indeed, the adjective “pure” does not only indicate that this perception exists *de iure*. Precisely because we know

that, when pure, space is not conceived, “pure” next to “perception” also indicates the absence of judgement, i.e. the absence of that category which, as the third analogy of experience, comes to remedy, in the *Analytics*, the deficit of both the space of the *Aesthetics* and the space of the *Axioms of intuition*: the reciprocal action (*KRV* B257-A218). Kant makes use of it because, although space provides the *possibility* of this action, it is not sufficient to establish its *actuality*: in the possibility of a local commonality made comprehensible by outer intuition there is no simultaneity without introducing the logical determination of *commercium*, i.e. without distinguishing the “world” as a mathematical whole from “nature” as a “dynamic whole” based on *Gemeinschaft*. Without grounding space’s formal relations in the category of reciprocal action – the third analogy of experience – there would only be the representation of a geometric coexistence of points or volumes (*communio spatii*), i.e. that matter grasped by the act of pure perception as an «aggregate of images». The matter-Seurat with which *MM* opens is indeed a simultaneity of points-instants that can be expressed mathematically because it is like «a consciousness where everything balances and compensates and neutralizes everything else» (Bergson [1896]: 219). Equilibrium, however, is a limit, a threshold: that in which the elastic of consciousness becomes paralysed and the sensation with which we come and go from the world selecting and releasing images knows a lull. As soon as the lull ceases, without this suggesting that lull is a state, i.e. a delimited portion of time since the instant does not exist as such, the images whose aggregate forms matter, namely the «images that exist themselves» (Ibid.:57), return to relativise themselves in proportion to how much we begin to look at them, breaking the fleeting enchantment of their eyes on us. Pure appearance is thus reduced to empirical appearance and the images become representations, namely images of something for someone. This means, and it is Frédéric Worms who has shown this (see Worms [1997]), that depending on where the emphasis falls in the syntagma «aggregate of images», on “aggregate” or on “images”, we have the two modes, pure and empirical, of perception, i.e. the two modes, pure and empirical, of intuition. As an *aggregate* of images, in fact, matter is nothing other than the event of appearing, the world in its «pictorial» state (Bergson [1896]: 10): the pure, kaleidoscopic, visibility of the real in the double sense of the genitive. In the *OP* Kant calls it «phenomenon of phenomenon», meaning the appearance of what appears. As an aggregate of *images*, on the other hand, matter is simple phenomenon, *Gegenstand*, object for a subject rather than object *in pro* (*zum Behuf*) experience. Yet, given that between the two there is only a difference in accent, whenever finding ourselves in the presence of images, we go towards them by anticipating them, the field looms up as a field of selected figures to the detriment of the background; conversely, if we remain still, simply in presence, and focus, with a transcendental sensation, on the ongoing unity of this field, i.e. on the tension that, vibrating, shapes its edges, we coincide with this pure, non-sensible ex-tension.

Depending on where the emphasis falls, that is, the same field, the same act of perception-consciousness, can be the transcendental field-act of pure perception-intuition as the nexus of appearing/being of appearing, or the empirical field-fact of conscious perception and empirical intuition as the site of the apparent. In the first case we have Farinelli's globe; in the second Farinelli's map, i.e. the environment, the world-globe for us. In between, as medium, there is that slightly misty landscape that, in *The Invention of the Earth*, Farinelli defines, very significantly, as «a formidable model of perception» in that it is what, of the earth, remains «after the map, the cartographic image, has represented what it can represent».

In this intensive rather than extensive “where”, according to Farinelli, «there are no defined objects; no delimited objects with clear and distinct boundaries» (Farinelli [2016]: 100; our transl.). Yet, the spectacle of pure perception is «a harmonious aesthetic-sentimental totality» in which not only are there no individual objects: in this «organic totality that admits of no internal separations» there is – as Farinelli remarks out – «not even the possibility of separating the object from the subject» (Ibid.; our transl.). Pure perception «possesses in very truth the indivisibility of our perception; so, inversely – Bergson adds – we may without scruple attribute to perception something of the extensity of matter» (Bergson [1896]: 219). In this limit state, for every degree of extension, there is in fact a degree of the mind that accompanies it, as if thought were the essence-power of extension and extension, i.e. materialisation or manifestation, were the essence-power of thought. Indeed, when matter is an aggregate of images, the thought that one has of it, precisely because it is the thought-perception of this matter in the twofold sense of the genitive – pure perception belongs to things and these things participate in it (ibid.: 212) – cannot but share its mass and weight, stretching out until it coincides with the immense, ubiquitous and continuous spider web that unfolds before our eyes as soon as we open them again after having closed, says Bergson, with all dogmatic, i.e. substantialist, conceptions of thought and extension (Ibid.:10); that is, we might translate, as soon as the *vexata quaestio* of the union of heterogeneities is posed, as Kant invites us to do in ‘81, in transcendental terms. When this happens, what one witnesses, what one appears in, is a pure appearance, a pure *patentia* or manifestativity: an abyssal phenomenality that appears to itself in the meantime that it appears to someone who appears in it and that does not cease to appear appearing itself according to that «iterative and paralogistic structure of reason» (Branca [2024]: 331; out transl.) such that, seeing itself, seeing itself seeing, reason sees itself in the sense that propose, explodes, ex-tends itself in a vortex that verges on tautology or, it would be better to say, on «tautoegory» (Lyotard [1991]: 8-14). *Giving itself form*, here, is barely discernible from the *form of giving itself* because pure perception images its occurrence, as if its future were nothing more than its appearance, nothing other than the *becoming landscape of its escape*. «Positing

and perception, spontaneity and receptivity, the objective and subjective relation – Kant writes in the *OP* – are simultaneous; because they are identical as to time, as appearances of how the subject is *affected* – thus are given in the same *actus*» (*OP*: 132, AA XXII: 466) in which there is no difference between *thought of space* and *space of thought*. In *MM* Bergson symbolises this act with a point that is, at the same time, the vertex of the cone of memory and a point on the plane of matter (Bergson [1896]: 42-43). This point is the place of the insertion of memory in matter, of soul in body, namely *the place of the having place of pure perception*. This is why pure space is not perceptible: it is perception. As such, it is not in the scopic field as an image among images: it is a vision rather than a thing seen. If it is a receptivity without reception, therefore, it is because in space and time as pure intuitions, in the ether as pure space rendered perceptible, or in the thing itself as other *respectus*, we are not dealing with phenomena, but with the way in which the subject, in the phenomenon, is affected not by the object, but by itself, by its own receptivity. Here, the subject lays its path, the path it is as object, by walking on it insofar as the phenomenon of the phenomenon «is the representation of the formal with which the subject impresses itself and is to itself spontaneously an object» (*OP*, AA XXII: 333 f.; our transl.), thus «the phenomenon of the subject affecting itself» (Ibid.: 401; our transl.). For Bergson this means equality between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. But even in the *OP* it is almost impossible to maintain a firm distinction between subject and object, as is proven by the fact that the one term often appears instead of the other. Pure perception is only the name for the simple fact/act that things appear and are as they are, as they seem to us. There is the aggregate of images, and this is the absolute factum of cognition. Kant takes this fact as *KRV*'s starting point, but he is wrong to interpret this cognition that knows itself only as the cognition that of itself, of itself as object, or of the object, has a subject: it is rather the whole universe, Leibniz had said taking up the Hippocratic *sympnoia panta*, that knows itself through all subjective cognitions. And since the universe is not a universal witness or a maxi-consciousness – it seems to us to be such because “simultaneity” says together the deception and the whole, or the whole as deception, i.e. the whole-hypostasis, the whole or the *Chōra* or the space as a third thing in relation to the two Cartesian – it must be concluded that the universe that is known through each individual cognition is nothing other than the simultaneous happening of the many, infinite, singular cognitions knowing each other: a plurality of *Selbstsetzungen* so similar to that world of pure experience that James, in his *Essays on Radical Empiricism*, compares to a mosaic whose

pieces are held together by their bedding, for which bedding the Substances, transcendental Egos, or Absolutes of other philosophies may be taken to stand. [...] there is no bedding; it is as if the pieces clung together by their edges, the transitions experienced between them forming their cement (James [1912]: 86).

Indeed, the true *commercium*, the *Gemeinschaft* that is the «sorceress and queen of existence» (Scaravelli [1980]: 121; our transl.), is not the map that contains the act that draws it by making it a mere point, that is, by making the act the obscurity of the world's scene, but a map that includes both this point and the act of drawing it. In pure perception, the whole is not given to itself as a drawing that also contains the position in which it is drawn just because, of the act that draws this position, it makes a sign, but a territory that maps, draws itself without a third dimension. Not, then, a pure power simply waiting to pass into action: the non-perceptibility of pure perception, the fact of never being able to transcend or relativise the field of images of whose *quidditas* pure perception is the *quodditas*, is the sign of the *continuous giving of a datum* that, like the territory, does not exist as a separate thing from its inhabitants. To the third analogy, in fact, the *OP* adds that the reciprocal action between substances presupposes an interaction with the body of the subject who, therefore, is a body among others. Where the *KRV* makes space the locus of interaction and interaction, which is true *Gemeinschaft*, the unity of experience of which the transcendental subject, as the synthetic unity of pure apperception, is the principle, the *OP* clarifies that realised or perceived space is the material with which transcendental subject makes the unity. Therefore, the transcendental subject, as bodily, acts at the same time as empirical subject, without its transcendentality being diminished because «the possibility of experience as such depends on the existence of a corporeal subject who makes it» (Mathieu [1991]: 34; our transl.). A consequence, this, unthinkable from the *KRV* and which, in the *OP*, is only explained by the recognition of the transcendental function of a space that «cannot be empty, but, in itself, at every point, must be in its own place moving and moved» (*OP*, AA XXI: 231; our transl.), namely of the space to which, for a moment, the refutation of the fourth paralogism in the first edition of the *Critique* had sketched the outline. Here's why, as Bergson invited his high school students to do already in 1893, we should imagine positions

in an infinite number, simple and analogous to our own, arranged in such a way that their arrangement translates for our perception into the form of visual and tactile extension, which finally acts without pause, without contact in the proper sense, without impulse, but by virtue of a universal law that dictates that every change of state in one affects all the others as if by magnetic influence. (Bergson [1893]: 83; our transl.)

Influence is not a shock or a bump, nor even a category, but that continuous, diffuse and non-local action of which the ether, for a long time, was, even for Kant, just another name. This influence is silenced in that contemplation of the end or beginning of life that Bergson calls «pure perception»: silenced but present, given that, according to the *Anticipations of perception*, the threshold condition of anaesthesia is the completeness of sensation, its ultimate phenomenal-

ity. The sensation that reaches this limit feels itself as lacking an outer sensible object through *the perception of an imperceptible mediated by the absence of perception*. Thanks to this bastard reasoning, for a moment incalculable even by the infinitesimal method, that of self-affection, time merges with space, concept with intuition, form with matter and objectivity with objectuality. It is a qualitative change, almost a «transference of state» (Bergson [1896]: 202). In the landscape, terrestrial things are grasped, *sub specie aeterni*, as stars in the firmament, Cartesian *raisons de l'astronomie*, indirect phenomena. But all it takes is for an image to rebel and become a picture, phenomenon or physical object, so that from the science of nature we plunge into human ignorance with a «synthesis of uniform increase from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness» (*KRV* 218: 295) with which we try to draw what is already, and always, drawing us.

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Notes

- 1 Kant's *Reflexionen aus dem Nachlaß* have been translated by me and are indicated by the abbreviation *Refl.* followed by the volume of the Akademische Ausgabe, abbreviated *AA*, and the page number in Arabic numerals separated by a colon.
- 2 The fragments of the *OP*, when not available in the cited English edition, have been translated by me. The bibliographical indication appearing in round brackets refers to the Academy edition and is structured by the abbreviation *OP*, a comma, the abbreviation *AA* followed by the Roman numeral for the volume and Arabic numeral for the page.
- 3 In *TWF* Bergson appreciates the Kantian distinction between a form and a content of sensibility and, again in the *CE*, shows that he holds it in the highest regard by elevating this distinction to an emblem of a revolution initiated, but not accomplished, by Kant (Bergson [1907]: 289). Nevertheless, in Bergson's works, it is not always clear what this distinction distinguishes, i.e. what, precisely, form and matter correspond to. Sometimes, especially in the *CE*, the distinction seems to trace that between phenomenon and noumenon insofar as distinct matter is an extra-intellectual matter from which intelligence should derive by diminution just as, in *MM*, conscious perception derives from pure perception (Bergson [1896]: 36; [1907]: 391); sometimes, instead, the difference between pure intuition and empirical intuition, i.e. between the form of sensibility considered in itself, irrespective of any reference to the matter it orders and shapes, and this same form understood as a way and means of immediately referring to an object through sensation; sometimes, finally, the difference between empirical intuition and the matter of phenomena, i.e. between space, what Kant calls «form» in the phenomenon as an indeterminate object and sensation, what, on the contrary, Kant calls «matter» of phenomena.
- 4 For Kant, the objects of perception only show themselves if from the outset they have been made showable. Such an offering and presence «can only be perceivable as present and lying-before insofar as it is represented in advance in the light of a what-character, in the opened domain of the real in general. The sensible can be sensed only on the basis of the open background of the what-like» (Heidegger [2018]: 149), and, in the *Anticipations*, intensive magnitude is this «what-like»: the limit that defines the object as «etwas» instead of as «Gegenstand» opening the transcendental horizon in which phenomena can appear. This is why intensive magnitude does not come *from* sensation but *to* sensation. The form of «what-like» is in us because that which, in the sensible and as sensible, has the character of «what-content» must be known a priori by the mind.
- 5 It is to Agamben's credit having connected *Timaeus*' third kind of knowledge to *OP*'s empty intuition insofar as both are modes of self-affection (Agamben [2019]).

- 6 In the reformulation of paralogism in *KRV*'s second edition we read: «I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs)». This is equally, says Kant, is an «analytic preposition» because «other things are those that I *think of* as distinguished from me» (*KRV* B409: 446).
- 7 Whereas in *TWF* space is a product of the endosmosis between the duration of the facts of consciousness and duration of the objects of the world, i.e. a *succession with exteriority* resulting from the combination of psychic duration as a *succession without exteriority* and worldly duration as an *exteriority without succession* in *MM* it is a pragmatic scheme of divisibility of the undivided. On this ambiguity see Miravete (2023): chapters 3-5.