

Re-examining traditional concepts in aesthetics from the lens of AI

Nicola Di Stefano*

ABSTRACT

The advent of generative artificial intelligence (AI) compels a reconsideration of long-standing debates in aesthetics concerning creativity, novelty, and originality. Traditionally understood as distinctively human qualities, these concepts are now being challenged by AI systems capable of producing poems, artworks, and music that appear original and innovative. This paper argues that AI art can reinvigorate aesthetic theory by compelling sharper distinctions between creation, generation, and interpretation. The consideration of the AI-generated *Portrait of Edmond de Belamy* exemplifies how questions of authorship, authenticity, and intentionality persist, resonating with issues already raised by conceptual art and ready-mades. Furthermore, empirical studies revealing biases in audience perception – such as favouring works attributed to human creators – underscore how notions of creativity are entangled with expectations about agency and personhood. Leveraging philosophical frameworks from Danto to Foucault, the paper highlights how artistic value and creativity are conferred institutionally and interpretively, not algorithmically. Ultimately, AI art challenges us to reconsider the foundations of artistic authorship and meaning, positioning artificially generated artworks as catalysts for reexamining the conceptual core of aesthetics.

KEYWORDS

Aesthetics; AI Art; Conceptual Art; Creativity; Originality; *Portrait of Edmond de Belamy*.

1. Introduction

The advent of generative AI has profoundly impacted a wide range of disciplines, extending from related fields such as computer science and informatics to more distant ones, such as philology and classical studies (e.g., Graziosi *et al.* 2023; Riemenschneider & Frank 2023; Yousef *et al.* 2023). Philosophy, too, has been significantly affected by the AI revolution. In the domain of aesthetics, long-standing philosophical debates around key concepts such as creativity and originality have been re-examined.

* Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione (ISTC), Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR), nicola.distefano@istc.cnr.it

talized, as these features – traditionally regarded as distinctively human and essential to the nature of art – are being provokingly emulated by AI-driven creative processes (e.g., McCormack *et al.* 2019).

The ability of AI systems to generate original poems, visual artworks, and musical compositions, and even produce sculptures or design objects through 3D printing (e.g., Elgammal *et al.* 2017; Yu 2020), raise pressing conceptual questions about the nature of creativity and its presumed exclusive connection to human agency (see, e.g., chapter 4 in Manovich & Arielli 2023, titled “AI and Myths of Creativity”). These developments raise not only practical questions about the role of AI in creative domains, but also theoretical ones about how we should understand key concepts in aesthetics such as creativity, originality, and novelty. These issues are not without precedent in philosophical aesthetics. Several scholars, such as Nelson Goodman, Arthur Danto, and Margaret Boden, have long interrogated how creativity in arts relates to originality, novelty, and interpretation. Their work underscores that these concepts are neither straightforward nor interchangeable, and that artistic value often depends as much on context and meaning as on material or thematic innovation. What AI brings to this discussion is not entirely new problems, but rather a fresh lens through which enduring questions about authorship, creativity, and aesthetic judgment must be reconsidered.

An underlying issue concerns the fact that AI art, as observed by Zylinska (2017, 2023), seems not to be *of*, *by*, or *for* humans. Much like in photography, AI increasingly assumes all creative roles: it selects subjects, determines composition, and produces the final image, sometimes even autonomously generating a narrative or reportage. Yet, a non-human dimension has always been embedded within many human artistic practices, if we understand this as involving subprocesses of creation in which humans play no direct role. The way film registers light and develops images, for instance, is itself a largely autonomous process, a form of self-impression that anticipates today’s machinic creativity.

This makes it all the more urgent to examine the algorithms that generate AI content. As Somaini (2023, p. 77) notes with regard to images, “within the current media landscape, the status, agencies, and affordances of images across contemporary visual culture – the

ways in which images are captured, modified, circulated, and seen within different social and cultural contexts – are intrinsically connected to their being processed by deep-learning algorithms trained with large datasets.”

In this paper, I combine theoretical reflection with two concrete examples – i.e., an AI-generated painting and thought-provoking empirical findings on the perception of an AI art – to argue that the very emergence of AI as an allegedly creative agent compels us to re-examine the philosophical foundations of artistic creation. In this sense, AI can be understood as a conceptual provocation – one that revitalizes aesthetic theory by reopening fundamental questions about perception, interpretation, and meaning. To illustrate this position, I will first examine the notion of creativity with the aim of disentangling it from related concepts of novelty and originality. Thereafter, I will move on to considering key aspects that define an artwork, such as the intention attributed to the creator, focusing especially on how these notions affect the observer’s bias. Finally, I will draw some conclusions on the broader implications of AI-generated art for our understanding of aesthetic theory, perception, and the nature of artistic meaning.

2. Disentangling creativity, originality, and novelty

Within the domain of aesthetics, the concept of creativity has frequently been conflated with the qualities of novelty and originality (e.g., Crowther 1991). The inherent relationship between creativity, originality, and novelty is often seen as central to how artistic value is assessed, how authorship is conceived, and how cultural innovation is recognized. For instance, Nelson Goodman (1976) has argued that originality is essential for distinguishing authentic artworks from mere replicas. Harold Bloom (1973) highlighted the dialectic tension between creativity and past masters that marks innovation in history of arts. More recently, Margaret Boden (1990) has taken a more cognitive account of creativity, by exploring how creativity arises from structured mental processes and can be understood through cognitive science. She defines three types of creativity: combinational, exploratory, and transformational, with the latter being the most radical. Boden argues that creativity involves navigating or reshaping conceptual spaces, and that even artificial intelligences can model some aspects of these processes.

In parallel to these theoretical reflections, a closer historical examination of artistic practice reveals that the assumption that creativity is synonymous with novelty and originality rests on a tenuous and reductive foundation. While many artworks celebrated as exemplary are indeed novel, the designation of a work as “artistic” has not always depended on radical innovation, at least not in a naïve way. Indeed, the history of art is replete with examples of artworks that result from repetition, variation, and reinterpretation of canonical works, rather than through wholesale invention. As we will see, ready-made objects represent the most paradigmatic example of this claim, by merely representing ordinary objects as such but placed in an art gallery.

By contrast, if prompted in the correct way, generative models, which operate by sampling from latent spaces conditioned on symbolic or textual prompts, may yield outputs that are materially unprecedented and, in this sense, can be rightly considered original and new. However, attributing creativity to these artificial products remains both ungrounded and contested. Hereinafter, by considering the provocative case of AI art, I will reflect on the relationship between creativity and originality/novelty in order to highlight overlaps and differences across these three key concepts in aesthetics.

To begin with, one must observe that the mere production of new and original aesthetic objects – such as poems or music generated by AI – cannot be uncritically accepted as evidence of any form of artistic/aesthetic agency or intelligence on the part of the creator. This allows us to trace a preliminary distinction between creativity, originality, and novelty. While novelty and originality might denote statistical or formal newness – the appearance of something never observed previously –, creativity can be properly attributed also to the act of realizing something that does not present any novelty or originality. Artistic creativity cannot be merely considered as the act of creating something but is more often to be interpreted as a broader and deeper concept, encompassing the perceptual and interpretive processes through which artistic meaning is shaped. To summarize, a work can be creative without being novel or original, at least not in any intuitive or naïve way. I will try to support this claim by considering a few examples from history of art.

Consider Michelangelo’s *Pietà*, widely regarded as one of the greatest masterpieces of sculpture in history. On what does this

claim rest? The subject – the Virgin holding the dead Christ – is a deeply traditional one, and many examples were available at the time Michelangelo started to conceive his own artwork. In particular, *Vesperbilder* were early devotional sculptures from 14th-century Germany that depict the Virgin Mary cradling the dead body of Christ. Thus, no evident thematic originality in Michelangelo's *Pietà*. One could observe that *Vesperbilder* were often carved from wood and painted, and therefore the originality of Michelangelo's one could lie in the material chosen, i.e., marble. However, few would accept reducing the originality of the artwork to the mere choice of marble as material, also because artworks with similar subjects existed in marble also. Is, after all, Michelangelo's *Pietà* a creative piece of art, then? Should one answer this question in the affirmative, then, creativity must refer to some *novelty* and *originality* in the way the sculpture presents its subject, perhaps evoking aspects such as emotional affect, bodily proportion, and compositional flow masterfully managed to offer an unprecedented experience of tenderness and stillness, especially if compared to *Vesperbilder* exaggerated traits. Novelty and originality, here, do not refer to the material used, nor to the subject, but to the quite intangible way the material and the subject were combined and presented to the observer.

This example is paradigmatic of countless cases in the history of art, where the artistic value of a work is not grounded in the novelty of its subject but in the way that subject is represented. Museums are full of Christian devotional paintings – nativities, crucifixions, last suppers – as well as still lifes and portraits that endlessly reiterate the same motifs. What sets a masterpiece apart is not the thematic content itself, which is often shared by thousands of works, but rather the particular handling of form, style, and expression that confers singularity and aesthetic significance.

The case of conceptual art represents the opposite occurrence and complicates matters somewhat. Andy Warhol's Campbell's Soup Cans gain creative power not from the image itself, nor from the physical object, but from its recontextualization as art. This move shifted the locus of creativity from the production of a formally novel object to the act of positioning an everyday commodity within the space of artistic discourse. Here, the "newness" lies not in the soup can's form – perfectly ordinary and mass-produced – but in the interpretive provocation it generates, that is, questioning the boundaries between art and commerce, originality and reproduc-

tion, high culture and mass culture. By presenting an object that is in no sense visually or materially unique, Warhol foregrounds the conceptual gesture as the seat of artistic creativity. In this sense, Campbell's Soup Cans demonstrate that creativity can reside entirely in the framing of meaning, rather than in any material or thematic novelty.

This case, likewise, is far from isolated. Much of twentieth-century and contemporary art shows that the creative act may consist less in fabricating materially unprecedented objects than in reframing the status of existing ones. From Duchamp's readymades to conceptual installations, countless works derive their significance not from any innovation of subject or medium but from the interpretive displacement they enact, for instance, by transforming urinals, bicycles, or piles of bricks into artworks by situating them within the field of art. Just as in earlier periods the originality of religious paintings or portraits lay in their handling rather than their subject, so here creativity lies in the reconfiguration of context and meaning, rather than in the thing being represented or the material employed.

Taken together, the Pietà and Campbell's Soup Cans illustrate two distinct but convergent ways in which creativity can be dissociated from straightforward novelty or originality. Michelangelo's work reimagines a familiar religious subject through subtle, affective, and compositional refinements that transform inherited forms without altering their thematic core. Warhol's work, by contrast, leaves the object itself untouched, locating creativity in the act of recontextualization and in the interpretive challenge posed to the viewer. In both cases, the creative force emerges not from inventing new subjects or materials, but from reshaping perception, whether through masterful formal execution or through conceptual reframing. Creativity, then, can operate either within the bounds of tradition or through the radical redefinition of context, underscoring its independence from naive notions of originality.

Despite representing completely different artistic currents, these two cases point toward a deeper question: if neither thematic novelty nor material innovation fully explains their creative force, where does that force reside?

It might be worth going back to Danto's reflections here, for they illuminate the thread connecting the Pietà and Campbell's

Soup Cans. In *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (1981), Danto famously argued that two visually indistinguishable objects can have radically different aesthetic statuses depending on their conceptual, not material, framing. A painted canvas in a gallery may be an artwork, while an identical canvas in a hardware store may be mere decoration; their difference lies not in material or form but in the intentions, contexts, and interpretive practices that surround them. For Danto, if materiality is necessary – artworks must have some physical embodiment – it is never sufficient to confer artistic status. The title of a work, its “aboutness”, and its position within art history all help to transform matter into art, shaping how we perceive and interpret the object before us.

From this standpoint, Michelangelo’s Pietà and Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans demonstrate different ways in which context, title, and aboutness relate to artworks and shape creativity. In both cases, artistic meaning is forged at the intersection of material form, conceptual framing, and historical position, thus demonstrating the intricate relationship between art and creativity, novelty and originality.

3. *The case of the Portrait of Edmond de Belamy*

Coming closer to AI, I consider the 2018 sale of Portrait of Edmond de Belamy, an AI-generated image by the French collective Obvious. Its commercial success – selling for \$432,000 – and the controversy over its use of open-source code by artist-programmer Robbie Barrat raised questions of autonomy, authenticity, authorship, and intention in digital art. My claim is that AI art does not generate fundamentally new philosophical problems; rather, it intensifies issues already present in debates on conceptual art and ready-mades.

The Portrait was produced using a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), a system of two neural networks: one generating images based on patterns in classical portraiture, the other evaluating their realism. Through this adversarial training, the system produced a visually convincing portrait. Obvious adapted Barrat’s code on machine learning frameworks such as TensorFlow to realize the work. While technically impressive, this process foregrounds philosophical questions: Who, if anyone, authored the portrait? Can the AI developer be likened to a Renaissance patron, commissioning rather than creating? Or is authorship inseparable from person-

hood, as historically conceived? Questions of authenticity follow. Is the portrait “authentic” because it is algorithmically generated? If deemed a “fake,” what would it be false to, since no prior original exists? These questions reveal that the categories at stake – authorship, authenticity, creativity – are not settled by technical novelty but by philosophical interpretation.

Regarding authorship, traditional accounts often presuppose an identifiable human author as the fabricator of the object. Yet ready-made as Duchamp’s Bicycle Wheel or Warhol’s Campbell’s Soup Cans show that authorship can be detached from fabrication. The philosophical point here is that authorship is constituted by an intentional act of framing: choosing, presenting, declaring.

Regarding authenticity/originality, the Portrait is not a fake in any meaningful sense, because there is no original it imitates. Its artistic status depends on human use and framing. The work becomes art only through the actions of Obvious, selecting the outputs, signing the print with a fragment of the algorithm, and situating it in the art market. In this respect, the GAN is more akin to a tool or medium, like a brush or a camera, than to an autonomous agent. The art status depends not on the algorithm’s generation but on a human decision to treat its product as a candidate for appreciation. This parallels Arthur Danto’s and George Dickie’s institutional theories: art is not defined by material properties but by its placement within the “artworld.” Thus, Portrait of Edmond de Belamy is art not because the algorithm “created” it, but because a human collective framed and deployed it as such.

Some critics might argue that GAN outputs lack legitimacy because the creative process is opaque if not inaccessible. But the opacity of the process is hardly unique to AI. The creative processes that led Beethoven to compose the Fifth Symphony or Van Gogh to paint the Sunflowers are as inaccessible as the training of a GAN. Yet we do not attribute authorship to Beethoven’s piano or manuscript paper nor to Van Gogh brushes or canvases. The relevant distinction here is between mechanical causation and artistic intention. Engineers who design frameworks like TensorFlow or train generative systems contribute to the conditions of possibility, but their role is analogous to instrument-makers rather than composers. They supply tools, not intentions. Again, what makes the Portrait art is not transparency of process but the intentional framing of its output in a cultural and historical context.

Other commentators might argue, however, that AI-generated works introduce a genuinely new form of distributed authorship. On this view, the GAN is not merely a tool like a brush but a quasi-collaborator: its stochastic training, capacity for surprise, and partial independence from human foresight make its outputs less predictable than those of traditional instruments. The resulting image, then, could be seen as the joint product of human programmers, curators, and the algorithm itself – an instance of “co-creativity” or “shared-creativity” rather than mere tool use. Advocates of the “co-creativity” view often point to precedents such as Harold Cohen’s AARON, David Cope’s EMI, or Sougwen Chung’s collaborative robotic performances, where the artist explicitly frames the system as a creative partner. They also highlight how the unpredictability of GAN outputs and the role of datasets as “hidden collaborators” complicate the simple tool–user model.

Philosophers sympathetic to this line suggest that authorship in digital contexts should be reconceived less as an individual property and more as a networked process, spanning engineers, datasets, curatorial selection, and market recognition. For instance, Goodfellow (2024) has recently observed that AI-generated works operate in the middle of the spectrum of authorship between human and machine, as they are the consequences of a highly distributed model of production that sit across the algorithms and the underlying information systems and data that support them and the artists who both contribute and extract value. This highly distributed state further transforms the role of the artist from the creator of objects containing aesthetic and conceptual potential to the translator and curator of such objects.

Yet even if such a distributed model captures something of the collaborative texture of AI practice, it does not displace the minimal requirement that intentional meaning, and artistic status of artifacts, eventually originates with humans only. The GAN, unlike a co-artist, has no stake in the act of representation; it neither intends nor interprets. Its contributions, however unpredictable, are causal but not conceptual. For this reason, a more cautious reading is that AI systems function as powerful medium whose unpredictability complicates authorship, but does not transform it into a genuinely autonomous or shared intentional act.

Framed from Danto’s perspective, the Portrait’s creative/artistic status hinges less on mechanics than on conceptual and institutional framing. Like Warhol’s Soup Cans, its material novelty is insuffi-

cient; it becomes art only within a context that assigns meaning, situates it historically, and invites reflection. The novelty lies not in aesthetic substance but in the cultural discourse around AI and creativity thus replaying, with new tools, questions about intention, authorship, and transfiguration posed in the 20th century.

This ambiguity over authorship, and the tension between the fabricator and the conceptual framer, is not unique to AI. A parallel can be drawn from the legal dispute over the famous case of “monkey selfies”. In 2011, the photographer David Slater set up his camera in Indonesia, and macaque monkeys triggered the shutter, capturing self-portraits. A legal battle ensued over who held the copyright: the photographer who created the conditions for the photo, the monkeys who technically “took” it, or no one at all. From a philosophical standpoint, the artistic status of the images was determined less by the monkey’s intent than by the viewer’s reaction. The photos were expressive enough that viewers could easily construct an “author function” for the monkey itself, making the authorship debate a matter of aesthetic interpretation rather than technical causality. In this case, authorship clearly results as a “projected” fiction and the “meta-artist”, that is, the human who sets the conditions, remains a central figure in the viewer’s interpretation.

That being said, an important distinction must be noted when it comes to how Danto’s view applies to AI-generated art. AI-generated images invert Danto’s process: rather than elevating the mundane into art through recontextualization, they reproduce the visual appearance of museum artworks without an underlying intentional or conceptual framework. While Campbell’s Soup Cans are aesthetically void but ontologically robust, the *Portrait of Edmond de Belamy* is aesthetically salient yet ontologically hollow, mimicking art without many of the features Danto considered essential, such as “aboutness” and intentional meaning. Its significance arises only when humans situate it within interpretive frameworks, at auction, in a gallery, or within cultural debate. In short, this case underscores that for AI, meaning is conferred externally rather than generated autonomously.

4. AI will never act like humans! *The observer’s bias*

Commenting on the AI Portrait, a journalist from *The Guardian* observed: “From a distance, Portrait of Edmond de Belamy [...]

looks almost plausible. Up close, however, the paintwork becomes a grid of mechanical-looking dots, the man's face a golden blur with black holes for eyes. Look into those eyes. They show no sign of feeling or life. Did a computer make this? The answer is yes.”¹ Such reactions encapsulate a recurrent bias: the tendency to equate AI authorship with emotional absence and coldness, thereby drawing a definitive line between human and artificial intelligence. AI acts in a mechanical and cold way, while humans put the feelings and emotions in it. Not surprisingly, a similar perceptual dynamic emerges outside the visual arts, where audience judgments of AI-authored performances can be shaped less by the work itself than by prior beliefs about its source.

A recent, thought-provoking study demonstrated in a unique way the psychological biases that subtly shape the perception and evaluation of AI-generated art. In an online protocol, Ansani and colleagues (2025) asked participants to rate three videos of classical piano performances, each presented in two conditions with identical audio tracks: one showing a professional pianist miming the performance, and one showing an automated piano purportedly driven by AI. Results showed that performances attributed to the human pianist were rated as more likeable, engaging, emotionally rich, and of higher quality. These effects were consistent across levels of musical expertise but were moderated by participants' attitudes toward AI. Strikingly, when participants were asked to describe differences between the two renditions, they confabulated changes in rhythm, tempo, dynamics, and even dissonance – differences that did not exist – revealing how expectations and beliefs about humanness shape perception.

From a theoretical perspective, these effects resonate with the expectancy effect, where prior beliefs systematically shape perceptual judgments (Rosenthal & Jacobson 1968), and the media equation framework, which argues that people respond to media agents using the same social and psychological heuristics applied to humans, yet still differentiate them in terms of authenticity and agency (Reeves & Nass 1996). In this case, the AI label appears to trigger culturally reinforced associations with mechanicalness, detachment, and lack of inner experience. The implication is that humans may not (yet) be able to approach AI-generated performances or artworks from a truly neutral standpoint, rather grounding their judgements

¹ Article published on 26 Oct 2018, available here: <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter>

on perceptual and evaluative frameworks that are already primed by narratives about authenticity, agency, and personhood, making AI's "human-likeness" as much a matter of belief as of behaviour.

The viewer's perception of AI-generated art can also be understood through the lens of the "author function," as articulated by philosopher Michel Foucault. Foucault (1998) argued that an "author" is not simply the individual who produces a work, but rather a social construct that viewers infer and attach to a work to make sense of it. As Foucault (1998) put it: "The author is an ideological product" (p. 221). In encountering AI-generated art, viewers often construct dual "artist functions": a limited one for the non-human machine and a "meta-artist function" for the human who designed and trained it. Studies on observer bias illustrate this in action. Participants who believed a performance was human attributing changes in the music to align with expectations of human emotion, while those aware of AI authorship attributed less creative skill. In this perspective, the empirical findings underscore that, in art history and aesthetic judgment, the "artist" may matter less as a concrete creator than as an "ideological" construct within the beholder's mind.

Taken together, these observations point to a broader insight: many debates surrounding AI and aesthetics trace back to insufficient clarification of foundational concepts such as intelligence, artificiality, agency, and creativity. Without such conceptual grounding, audiences are prone to rely on preexisting biases and assumptions about authenticity when evaluating AI-generated works. Yet, AI art also opens a reflective space for aesthetics itself, challenging conventional ideas about authorship, causality, and the nature of the work of art. By provoking questions about who – or what – creates, and how intention and skill are attributed, AI-generated artworks compel a reconsideration of long-standing assumptions, making them not only technological innovations but also instruments for philosophical inquiry into the nature of art and artistic value.

5. Conclusions

To conclude, the rise of AI invigorates aesthetic theory by forcing us to confront key questions about authorship, interpretation, and meaning of artworks. What constitutes an artistic gesture as creative? What defines novelty and originality? How is aesthetic meaning

framed, and by whom? AI brings these questions into sharper focus, compelling us to clarify the distinction between the mere fabrication of artifacts and the creation of artistic meaning. Cases such as the *Portrait of Edmond de Belamy* remind us to refine our vocabulary for creativity, paying close attention to conceptual distinctions often overlooked, between creativity, originality, and novelty.

In this paper, I have argued that creativity should be understood not as a property of producing or fabricating novel objects, but as a capacity for generating meaning and significance. Originality and novelty, while frequently associated with creativity, are better understood as potential byproducts rather than defining features. AI-generated art thus serves as a powerful mirror, revealing both the contours of human creativity and the conceptual frameworks we use to evaluate it. By examining these new forms of artistic production, we gain a deeper understanding of what it means to create, interpret, and value art in the age of intelligent machines.

Looking ahead, AI-generated artworks also challenge us to reconsider the boundaries of authorship, artistic identity and the very notion of audience (see, e.g., Audry & Ippolito 2019; Manovich & Arielli 2024). Could the paintings of an AI agent – carefully interpreted, analysed, and curated – ever be meaningfully treated as the “works” of an artist? Imagine a hypothetical volume titled *The Works of Algorithm 3.1415*: while strange, it forces us to ask whether attribution in art necessarily requires human intentionality, or whether significance might emerge from interaction, context, and interpretation. To put it with Manovich & Arielli (2024) and Zylinska (2017, 2023), AI generated art raises the issue of aesthetic alignment, that is, the fact that non-AI art is “made by and for humans”. Relatedly, AI prompts a re-examination of the distinction between creation and generation. While traditional creation implies conscious agency, intention, and meaning-making, AI-generated works foreground the production of artifacts without intrinsic intentionality, raising the question: can generation alone ever be equated with artistic creation, or does it merely provide a canvas upon which human interpretation constructs value? In both cases, AI is not simply producing new forms, but is rather provoking deeper reflection on the philosophical and conceptual foundations of art itself. Perhaps we can imagine a future where AI art exists as an autonomous expression of autonomous agents, that is, “art made for and by AI”. In this world, a new field might arise, “AIsthetics,” in which artificial intelligences reflect upon the nature and history of a(i)rtistic creation itself.

References

- Ansani, A., Koehler, F., Giombini, L., Härmäläinen, M., Meng, C., Marini, M., & Saarikallio, S. (2025). AI performer bias: Listeners like music less when they think it was performed by an AI. *Empirical Studies of the Arts*, 43(2), 1137-1161.
- Audry, S., & Ippolito, J. (2019). Can Artificial Intelligence Make Art without Artists? Ask the Viewer. *Arts*, 8(1), 35. <https://doi.org/10.3390/arts8010035>
- Boden, M. (1990). *The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms*. Weidenfeld/Abacus & Basic Books.
- Bloom, H. (1973). *The anxiety of influence*. New York: Oxford UP.
- Crowther, P. (1991). Creativity and originality in art. *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 31(4), 301-309.
- Danto, A. C. (1981). *The transfiguration of the commonplace: A philosophy of art*. Harvard University Press.
- Di Dio, C., Ardizzi, M., Schieppati, S. V., Massaro, D., Gilli, G., Gallese, V., & Marchetti, A. (2023). Art made by artificial intelligence: The effect of authorship on aesthetic judgments. *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*. <https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000602>
- Elgammal, A., Liu, B., Elhoseiny, M., & Mazzone, M. (2017). CAN: Creative Adversarial Networks, Generating “Art” by Learning About Styles and Deviating from Style Norms. <https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07068>
- Foucault, M. (1998). *What is an author?* In *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology*. The New Press, New York.
- Goodfellow, P. (2024). The Distributed Authorship of Art in the Age of AI. *Arts*, 13(5), 149. <https://doi.org/10.3390/arts13050149>
- Goodman, N. (1976). *Languages of art: An approach to a theory of symbols*. Hackett publishing.
- Graziosi, B., Haubold, J., Cowen-Breen, C., & Brooks, C. (2023). Machine learning and the future of philology: A case study. *TAPA*, 153(1), 253-284.
- Lucifora, C., Scorolli, C., & Gangemi, A. (2025). Attribution of creative skills to human and artificial artists in alethic and epistemic possible worlds. *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*. <https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000757>
- Manovich, L., & Arielli, E. (2024). Artificial aesthetics. <https://manovich.net/index.php/projects/artificial-aesthetics>
- McCormack, J., Gifford, T., & Hutchings, P. (2019). Autonomy, authenticity, authorship and intention in computer generated

- art. In *International conference on computational intelligence in music, sound, art and design* (pp. 35-50). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Reeves, B., & Nass, C. (1996). *The media equation: How people treat computers, television, and new media like real people and places*. Cambridge University Press.
- Riemenschneider, F., & Frank, A. (2023). Exploring large language models for classical philology. *arXiv:2305.13698*.
- Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). *Pygmalion in the classroom: Teacher expectation and pupils' intellectual development*. Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Yousef, T., Palladino, C., & Shamsian, F. (2023). Classical Philology in the Time of AI: Exploring the Potential of Parallel Corpora in Ancient Language. In *Proceedings of the Ancient Language Processing Workshop* (pp. 179-192).
- Yu, J. (2020). The application of 3D printing technology in sculpture. In *International Conference on Machine Learning and Big Data Analytics for IoT Security and Privacy* (pp. 755-759). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Zylinska, J. (2017). *Nonhuman Photography*. MIT press.
- Zylinska, J. (2023). *The Perception Machine. Our Photographic Future between the Eye and AI*. MIT press

