

Art, Imagination and (Technical) Creativity in the Philosophy of Emilio Garroni

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ABSTRACT

The theory of creativity Emilio Garroni develops in the late 1970s and recovers in the early 2000s inside his original philosophy of the imagination demolishes some of the commonplaces concerning this concept. On the one hand, the human creativity is rooted in the context of an operativity that concerns all the fields of the human action; on the other hand, it is considered a previously unforeseeable capability of designing, discovering and experimenting. From this point of view, art has no superiority in the field of creativity: reconsidering the relationships between art and technics may be rather useful. Garroni eventually thinks of art as a non-finalized exercise of creativity, bound to knowledge and technical operativity, through which *homo sapiens* is able to critically reflect upon the anxiety engendered by the very technical progress started with their creative power. Art can be therefore reconsidered, in the age of the Anthropocene, as a tool for promoting critical thinking.

KEYWORDS

Art, Creativity, Anthropocene, Human evolution, Technics

1.

The philosophical work of Emilio Garroni (1925-2005) spreads out of a life-long reading of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*¹, of which he elaborates a very original interpretation. This interpretation is still one of the most influential perspectives on Kant's critical thought and aesthetics, among those developed in the Italian philosophical panorama during the 20th century. By the way, the modern interpreters of the third Critique in Italy are often either influenced by each other or in a mutual dialogue: with regard

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¹ The translation of the German word *Urteilstkraft*, in the title and text of the third Critique, is the object of several concerns and debates in all languages. Garroni himself translated with Hansmichael Hohenegger the third Critique (Kant 1999). They for instance render *Urteilstkraft* as 'faculty of judgment' (*facoltà di giudizio*), whilst the slightly previous influential Italian translation (Kant 1995) of Leonardo Amoroso proposed 'capability of judgment' (*capacità di giudizio*). The classical Italian translation of the third Critique (Kant 1907), made by Alfredo Gargiulo, distinguished *Urteil* and *Urteilstkraft* only as 'judgment' (*giudizio*) and 'Judgment' (*Giudizio*).

to Garroni, the former case concerns Luigi Scaravelli (1968), whilst the latter case concerns Silvestro Marcucci (1988). Furthermore, Garroni's reflection spans throughout a variety of issues, which include, among other things: firstly, the definition of the status of aesthetics as a non-specialized philosophy, that is, unexclusively a philosophy of art (Garroni 1986; 2020); secondly, the necessity of thinking of an aesthetic condition for making sense of experience, before linguistic and semiotic codes intervene to classify the worldly reality (Garroni 1978); and thirdly, the consideration of the human creativity as a meta-operative capability (Garroni 2010). I will not be able to tackle all of these issues, and will focus on Garroni's theory of the imagination, with regard to his idea of creativity. It is however possible to state here that the image of the aesthetic thought offered by Garroni is very far from its departmentalized versions: not only art deserves no privileged rank in the development of a critical aesthetic theory, its exemplarity being rather the result of a series of historical circumstances combined with philosophical issues (Garroni 2020, pp. 87-93); philosophical aesthetics seems also to be inclined to develop relationships to other areas of philosophy and of the humanities broadly construed. From this point of view, one of the principal objectives of aesthetic thought, if not its first theoretical objective, is no longer the definition of art, but rather the definition of the conditions for the emergence of the aesthetic as a recognizable trait of the human experience, as well as the establishment of the boundaries of this very phenomenon. And these conditions might be recognized in other fields of culture, not art alone.

During his career, Garroni practised for instance an intense confrontation with semiotics and the philosophy of language. The first confrontation has been as intense as destined to end as soon as he realized the limits of the 'semiotic imperialism', that is, the claim that all cultural phenomena could be reduced to semiotic codes – something that Garroni considered impossible. He rather believes that all codes that elaborate an interpretation of cultural phenomena, previously require the acknowledgment of a certain sense. This condition must be aesthetic as far as it claims not acknowledgement of the objective structure of the reality contingently perceived, but only the feeling of the indeterminate adequacy of the subject's interpretation to the very reality interpreted (Garroni 1977). The confrontation with the philosophy of language, on the contrary, lasted until the end of his life, and eventually brought him, as we shall see below, to consider language and imagination as two closely intertwined faculties (Garroni 2005). However, the

attention he paid to the non-artistic dimension of the aesthetic also brought him to highlight the ethical and political features of the aesthetic judgment, as well as be engaged in the understanding of disciplines and phenomena such as psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology (Garroni 1992; 2020, pp. 226-260).

The scope of Garroni's interests is so wide, despite the scrupulousness and coherence of his philosophical style, that I can only focus on a very specific issue, and accordingly consider just his last book, *Immagine Linguaggio Figura [Image Language Figure]*, published in 2005, shortly before his death. It seems indeed to me that his conception of the imagination appears here in the clearest way. However, I will also try to find a link between this book and his previous essay about creativity, *Creatività*, originally published as an article of the *Enciclopedia Einaudi [Einaudi Encyclopaedia]* in 1978, then posthumously republished as an independent volume in 2010.

Garroni's theory of the imagination is of course inspired by Kant, his own philosophy being an original attempt of reformulating Kant's very idea of critical thinking considered as the investigation of the conditions of possibility of the experience. However, Garroni does not consider the transcendental conditions of experience as a sort of 'filter' that exists before reality, and can be superposed to it, distorting the subject's experience. Pointing out to the logic of the reflecting faculty of judgment, as this logic is described in the Introduction of the third Critique, in particular §§ IV, VI and VII, Garroni rather thinks of experience as a process within which the subject is in principle able to go back to the universal conditions of that particular intercourse with reality. The aesthetic judgment is an exemplary case of reflecting judgment as far as it displays this process in a particularly evident way, without even any mediated reference to the possible discovery of the concept, idea or rule broadly construed, upon which the beauty of the object judged may depend. Garroni (2020: 33) qualifies this situation, which is typical of the aesthetic experience, as 'looking-through', an expression borrowed from Wittgenstein's (2001, § 90) *durchschauen*, and newly elaborated. Wittgenstein's *durchschauen* already deals with the 'possibility' of phenomena, rather than phenomena themselves. Garroni emphasizes this statement in a Kantian transcendental sense, and states that seeing-through is not 'bare seeing alone, but also, and at the same time, a seeing-through, or taking-a-distance-from, or question mere seeing, within the act of seeing' (Garroni 2020, p. 37). In other words, looking-through means that the subject reflects upon, and in a way experiments the very conditions of experience in general, without leaving the field of her actual experience, and rather trying

to establish a relation between contingency of this single experience and the necessity of experience as a general horizon of the human intercourse with the world. The aesthetic experience is but the exemplary exhibition of this looking-through and can be therefore considered as an experience in which emerges 'with a particular force the nature of the experience we have' (D'Angelo 2011, p. 89). It is in this very sense that the aesthetic experience displays a reflective power, with regard to more specialized types of experience, such as cognition or empathy, to mention only two very general cases.

Accordingly, Garroni's idea is that the third Critique, in particular its First Part on aesthetic judgments, is not just the accomplishment of the critical philosophy, but its very refoundation (Garroni 2020, pp. 112-153). The aesthetic judgment is therefore not a specialized use of the faculty of judgment, and of the soul's powers engaged in judging, that is, imagination and understanding. On the contrary, the aesthetic judgment is the exemplary form of the reflecting faculty of judgment, which entails judging without relying on previously established intellectual rules or categories of judgment. Consequently, the reflecting judgment points out to experience in its very making; and the aesthetic judgment calls the subject to pay attention to the foundation of her own experience. It follows that the whole critical philosophy could be reconsidered in the light of the theories and claims stated in the third Critique. One of the most characteristic aspects of this way of putting the third Critique at the centre of the Kantian criticism concerns of course the imagination. The theory of the imagination Kant develops in the third Critique is, according to Garroni, very different from that developed in the *Critique of the Pure Reason*, in particular the chapter concerning the 'Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (Transcendental Analytic: 2nd Book, Chapter 1). Nonetheless, this new theory of the imagination is also able to reconfigure the general understanding of this very faculty within the Kantian thought. This theory actually goes through the whole third Critique, especially the First Part, the *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment*, and constitutes one of the axes of this work, one of its constitutive loci being the Second Moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful, namely § 9, in which Kant (2000, p. 103) speaks of a 'free play of the faculties of cognition', namely imagination and understanding. Garroni does not indeed consider the 'free play' of the imagination with the understanding – theorized by Kant in § 9 of the third Critique, with regard to the subject's disposition when she feels a pleasure for the beauty of something – as a secondary activity of the imagination, in comparison with the

schematism of the pure concepts, theorized in the first Critique, with regard to the making of knowledge. Despite the lack of conceptual determinacy, the judgment of taste involves the simultaneous and cooperative activity of the imagination and understanding, and is not just a matter of sensation, as empiricist philosophers like Burke and Hume still claim. As much in cognition as in aesthetic judgment, imagination works 'for the composition of the manifold of intuition', while the understanding works 'for the unity of the concept that unifies the representations' (Kant 2000, p. 102). But unlike cognition, this concept remains indeterminate in the aesthetic judgment, which does not deal with the very cognition of object, and is rather concerned with a feeling of 'animation' (Kant 2000, p. 104) of the cognitive faculties, on the occasion of an object for which they appear particularly adequate. A form of schematism is therefore at work in the aesthetic judgment, but it is a sort of schematizing without a concept, different from, and according to Garroni prior to the 'objective schematism' of the first Critique (Kant 2000, p. 105). This form of free schematism unfolds the original condition of experience, in which the subject does not already know the concept(s) she will need to develop an interpretation of her actual experience. Before doing that, the subject needs to find an orientation in the experience, and make sense of it, though still vaguely. This condition better describes the act of having an experience, rather than imposing the model of the scientific experience on the other kinds of experience. The relationship of experience to knowledge is not contested by this paragraph but is not reduced to the reference of every experience to some cognition, knowledge being rather considered here as the horizon of everything that can be known. Rather than detaching from the field of knowledge, the aesthetic judgment indeed points out to the very conditions that make experience in general possible as the indeterminate horizon of all single experiences. This issue cannot be developed here, because it would entail the question of the 'undetermined concept' of experience in general, eminently formulated in the Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, especially § 57 (Kant 2000, p. 216). This question exceeds however the scope of my article. I can only add that schematizing without a concept does not mean configuring experience arbitrarily. It means instead that, on the occasion of an object felt as beautiful, imagination is free of configuring that experience while keeping a general reference to the general legality of the categories, without referring to any determined concept. This might further clarify why Garroni believes that the free play of the imagination is not the subjective countermark of an allegedly

special experience, namely the aesthetic experience according to the prevailing understanding, but describes a condition that belongs to experience in general. It is on the contrary true that, thanks to this very condition, the subject is able to orient herself in experience and prepare the field for the constitution of specialized experiences, such as knowledge or the wide range of the human 'practical' activities – I am of course using the word 'practical' in the Kantian sense of the German word *praktisch*.

In Garroni's last book, *Immagine Linguaggio Figura*, this conception of the role of the imagination in having an experience leads Garroni to suggest that the primary activity of the human mind is the generation of an inner image [*immagine interna*] that accompanies the whole process of experience, from perception to the rational understanding of the world and the development of various forms of rationally based ethics and politics. By the way, Kant does not aim at creating a 'super-dominion' beyond and above pure and practical reason, by theorizing the autonomy of the faculty of judgment. Yet, he believes that this faculty can be a bridge between those two realms on single exemplary occasions. The inner image is neither only visual nor focused on the representation of a single object: for this reason, it is as much multisensory as dynamic and accompanies the subject's entire interaction with the world. This image is indeed the proof, within the subject's life of the mind, of her 'being essentially involved *in things themselves, or in the world*' (Garroni 2005, p. 6). Some aspects of Garroni's account of the inner image could be even inconsistent with a literal reading of the Kantian philosophy, or are rather based on the premise that the third Critique is the refoundation of this philosophy: he is really developing here his own philosophy of the imagination, which remains Kantian in the spirit, but is now detached from the letter of the Kantian criticism. Garroni includes for instance, among the activities of the inner image, unconscious activities like dreams (Garroni 2005, pp. 69-76), as well as merely associative representations like the 'aggregates', namely perceptual compound whose order depends on no either explicit or implicit rule (Garroni 2005, pp. 11-13). Kant would probably consider these activities more suitable for a psychological and physiological investigation, rather than for the transcendental enquiry upon the conditions of experience. Garroni seems therefore to believe that the third Critique overcomes this rigid distinction between psychological and transcendental investigation, as far as the imagination is concerned. He also seems to believe that a more comprehensive account of the imaginative activity better corresponds to the actual process of experience. Surely enough, he implicitly

rejects Kant's hierarchy between pure 'scheme' and mere 'image', as we find it in the first Critique. The reasons of this rejection are clear: the predominance of knowledge within experience is not at stake in Garroni's appropriation of Kant. The activity of developing an inner image of the world must be therefore considered as primary, in the sense of being prior to the classification of reality, which depends on the faculty of language.² Let me add, however, that 'prior' does not mean here that the imagination exists before the faculty of language. Garroni is not concerned with the genesis of the mind's faculties, and only claims that the imagination's earlier configuration of experience is earlier than the classification of reality according to linguistic classes of meaning, and that this configuration is a necessary condition of classification. In other words, the very classification of reality would be impossible or senseless, that is, it would lack any effective reference to the world, without being intertwined with the imagination's configuration of experience. Linguistic signs, as we know after Saussure, entail a system of differences: according to it, each sign stands for a meaning, which introduces a difference in the understanding of a given object, with regard to other signs. The word 'cathedral' is for instance different from the word 'church', without being its opposite. But if the faculty of language unfolds a system of differences in its analysis of the worldly reality, we must assume a certain indeterminacy of experience, which makes the world appear not as mere chaos but as an organizable whole. Such indeterminacy can only be afforded by the configurative work of the imagination. One sees here the reformulation of the principle of the 'purposiveness of nature', which grounds the possibility of the faculty of judgment according to Kant, who introduces this notion in the Introduction of the third Critique. However, the emphasis is now put on the subject's building of a 'world image', by which she is able to make sense of her experience, not only for the sake of her own interaction with the world, but also in view of sharing her knowledge with others.

² Garroni (1977) started developing in the late 1970s this interpretation of imagination and schematism in Kant, according to which semantics needs an 'aesthetic condition' to be effective. Within this interpretation, the reflecting judgment and the imagination play a key role in the schematism, while the faculty of the understanding is progressively replaced by the faculty of language as the faculty charged of the analysis of reality. During the same years in Germany, Wolfram Högbe (1974) developed a similar 'semantic' interpretation of the schematism, based however on the reading of the first Critique. At any rate, they both claim that the schematism of the imagination is a necessary condition of the instantiation of linguistic meanings. After having supported a more 'imperialistic' point of view of semiotics, Umberto Eco (1999) will come to the same conclusions about the relationship between semantics and the Kantian theory of schematism only later, in the 1990s.

2.

Although the commitment to experience is a very important one, the tasks of the imagination are not limited to the configuration of experience in the narrow sense of the word, that is, experience considered as a process undergone by the subject more or less passively, and entail also the development of creative behaviours in the interaction with the world. In the essay on creativity, Garroni had already formulated the hypothesis that the creativity of *homo sapiens* is unique, in comparison with the creative skills of other animals, even the great apes, because the former displays as a rule a meta-operative quality, which appears only occasionally in the latter. In other words, *homo sapiens* is able to undertake creative actions for the only purpose of experimentation and discovery, having not in mind the solution of any urging problem, or leaving the problems to be solved in the background of a long sequence of independent creative actions. As states André Leroi-Gourhan (1964-1965), by whom Garroni's (2010, pp. 160-167) thoughts on technics are inspired, *homo sapiens* is able, by using a stone, to produce a chopper, which will be used in turn during hunting. In other words, *homo sapiens* is able to use a tool for the sake of producing another tool. This would be impossible to other animals. This feature is the proof that the human creativity is not just a way of varying already established forms of operativity – what Garroni calls, after Noam Chomsky, a 'rule-governed creativity'. The human creativity is, predominantly and as a rule, a 'rule-changing creativity': namely, a creativity in which the meta-operative quality determines the agent's behaviour in its very constitution.

In his last book, Garroni goes back to this hypothesis, and suggests that this special quality of the human creativity depends on the way the imagination expands the range of interpretation of the reality perceived:

The various perceptual interpretability of a stone or a hammer seems to be a perceptual engagement based on a recognition that, without transforming the object and the tool materially, configures them according to a specific declination in suitable situations, and in an implicit analogy with a language that implies a meta-linguistic capability, and organizes all the cases, both the real and the merely possible ones. (Garroni 2005, p. 18, my trans.)

In other words, the development of an inner image of the world entails not only the configuration of the actual experience, for the sake of increasing knowledge, but also the design of possible experiences, for the sake of enhancing the interaction with

the world. Furthermore, the two operations of the imagination, the configuration and the design of the experience, must be conceived as interdependent and overlapping with each other; otherwise, we would be led to think of scientific knowledge and technological operativity as mutually uncommunicable activities, a sort of regress back to the metaphysical separation of the 'realm of nature' from the 'realm of freedom'. On the very contrary, knowledge and operativity coexist and intersect throughout the same experience; and accordingly, the very indeterminacy of the human experience can be felt as either the opacity of the world in front of the effort of reducing it to our knowledge, or the inexhaustibility of the resources available to discovery and experimentation. Garroni indeed highlights the intertwining of language and creative behaviour in the human experience: it seems that neither the human creativity is reducible to natural laws, nor it can get rid of the language's power of scaffolding reality according to classes of meaning. The secret of the human creativity seems to rely upon this ability of 'switching' from the interpretation of the world through language to the operativity with the world through action. In that sense, the free schematism theorized by Kant in the third Critique, and reformulated by Garroni in his last book, is likely to schematize first of all this relationship between language and action.

This power of the imagination, which can at the same time enlarge the horizons of experience, and expand the scope of the human creativity, points out to its own peculiar relationship to perception, whose grasp of reality is literally 'upgraded' by the work of the imagination. Perception may then appear as a sort of 'reflected perception', that manages the different 'styles' by which attention can be directed to the objects, as argues Fabrizio Desideri (2011): by the way, the expression is borrowed from the Introduction (§ VII) to the third Critique (Kant 2000, p. 76). This reflection perception may also become the design of new modalities of the interaction with the world, as argues Pietro Montani (2014).

3.

We have seen that the meta-operativity, which is made possible by this work of the imagination, points out to the development of creativity for its own sake. We have also seen that the varieties of this free exercise of creativity are manifold and unpredictable. In the essay on creativity, Garroni suggests that art is one of them: art

would therefore be an experimentation of creativity that is able to suspend every immediate and even mediated practical consequence of the creative action. One could be tempted to consider art as a sort of creativity for creativity's sake. But this formulation could be misleading as far as it suggests an analogy to the idea of art for the art's sake, whose aim might be the definitive divorce of art from reality.

Garroni seems rather to think that one of the impacts of such a relentless activity of trying experimentations and making discoveries led *homo sapiens* to the highly unpredictable invention of a form of creativity that is purposeless in its very essence because it is bound to the indeterminacy of the world image. Far from being a definitive result, art is therefore bound to its very being dependent on its own experimentation and discovery of new ways of developing a mental image that makes sense of some experience, without being able to establish any ultimate sense of reality. Art has, in that sense, an indirect relationship to knowledge: art is indeed a 'non-cognitive specialization of knowledge itself, which spreads out of knowledge, it poses itself as the latter's formal guarantee, and at the same time integrates the latter, within a sort of all-embracing cognitive or adaptive state of the mind' (Garroni 2010, p. 175, my trans.). In other words, art is not itself a way of knowing reality, but experiments and sometimes discovers new modes of knowing, and so lets *homo sapiens* establish a relationship to their own cognitive intercourse with the world.

Art is therefore no preestablished place within the human experience. It rather accompanies the process that leads to put knowledge at the centre of anthropology – what one would have probably called once 'civilization' – since the cave paintings to the avantgarde, pointing out to the unpredictability of an imagination that works creatively. Garroni has never dealt with philosophical anthropology, but was much engaged in the dialogue with cultural anthropology. The theory of art in the essay on creativity, which slightly differs from his usually historically grounded perspective on the birth of the so-called 'fine arts' (Garroni 2020), is probably one of the most anthropological thoughts he has ever developed. Art always runs the risk of decaying from its own status of exemplary form of creativity. By the way, Garroni (2005, pp. 115-118) seems to be rather pessimistic about the fate of art in his last book. But we do not need to draw any rigid distinction between art and technics in the essay on creativity: the latter unfolds the same meta-operativity shared by the former, if we except that art does not need to display any practical purposiveness, neither immediately nor in the

future. But it is also true that the same lack of utilitarian destination is often present in the technological experimentation.

According to this understanding of the artistic creativity, I think that we should not wonder what art is, but what art makes for the future of creativity broadly speaking. Art seems indeed to be charged of a certain care for the anxiety engendered by this endlessness and unpredictability of the human progress, which is essentially a progress of creative skills, and above all of technological possibilities: 'the human creative capabilities of adaptation unfold at the same time the incessant risks to which one is exposed, the fragmentation and limitedness of the practical-intellectual control, the impossibility of a total adaptation' (Garroni 2010, p. 174, my trans.). Was Garroni theorizing art in the age of the Anthropocene? Of course not, and for chronological reasons. However, I believe Stefano Velotti (2021) is right when he says that his paradigm of the imagination anticipated today's concern. Beside the configuration of the experience and the design of the interaction, it seems that the creative imagination theorized by Garroni claims for taking care of the world: but it would be a claim not for the therapy of our sometimes greedy and unreasonable dreams, needs and behaviours, but for the development of critical tools for investigating what may actually mean to be a human being dwelling this very world. In other words, contemporary art is likely to rediscover its technical background, not for the sake of promoting political agendas or enhancing politics- or ethics-oriented affectivities, which could undermine its genuine aesthetic quality (D'Angelo 2020). On the contrary, art is likely to foster by all means its own power of developing a critical thinking of the world.

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