

# *Conceptual and Pictorial Looking Through in Emilio Garroni's Aesthetics*

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## ABSTRACT

With the notion of aesthetics as looking-through, Emilio Garroni encapsulates in two words the necessary condition for the existence of the work of art. In relation to the contemporary art scene, the looking-through outlined in its theoretical nuances, becomes a filter for interpreting the nature of the work, nowadays in the guise of the most varied hybrids. Two great poles – the conceptual and the pictorial – direct new artistic trends. Even if contaminated, the form of the work always appears referable to the influence of one of the two poles. By bringing Garroni's *Aesthetics* into the field of the conceptual or pictorial, the work of art acquires new light. In particular, topics such as the spectator-entity and its looking-through, aesthetic experience as a possible experience, questioning and the effort of understanding, find a place in relation to the conceptual. Instead, the exemplarity of aesthetic experience, the artwork as a source of possible schemata, 'sensefulness' and the 'must-make-sense' find the same in relation to the pictorial. A new looking-through arises which renews the aesthetic experience and turns its exemplarity into a must-make-sense image. While the work changes, its demand to be looked at 'in the middle' remains, where the observer's gaze becomes a part of the form. Where the possibility of the work itself lies, there also lies the viewer who questions himself, striving. Therefore, the work generates constantly new and ever-changing schemata for understanding reality, getting the original sensefulness precisely from its placement balanced between sense and non-sense.

## KEYWORDS

Conceptual Art, Painting, Looking-Through, New Schematism, Sensefulness

## 1. Introduction

The conceptual language is today clearly the most popular language among young artists. However, it is not a language-based conceptual, like the one emerged at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. Evolving in the most different media, conceptual artworks today are able to incorporate the characteristics of apparently very distant expressions. Sometimes the conceptual work of art can also be performative or pictorial. Just like the conceptual, painting tries to

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incorporate multiple relationships, attempting – especially in the last decade – to wake up from a status of silent presence. Painting has become ever more impure in its form. For example, it quickly became sculptural with the increasing use of the most varied materials combined with pure colour. At the same time, it has also become conceptual due to the new relation it demands from its viewer.

When the coexistence of multiple media in the structure of a single work is the usual pattern, two major poles, the pictorial and the conceptual, guide the trends of the contemporary scene. The work is polymorphic, i.e. able of adapting its own form to the form of several media, imitating their features. Two parallel and magnetic poles now orient all artistic trends in a completely new way. They include the observer and the artist themselves in a new manner compared to the past: the viewer is required to look at the work with a somewhat uncommon sensibility, and the artist to be responsible for it.

Emilio Garroni, in 1992, using his concept of aesthetics as a looking-through<sup>1</sup> (*sguardo-atravverso*), traced the essential conditions for the rise of the pictorial and the conceptual as described above. In Garroni we find the theoretical tools to answer why they have become the two poles we know today. The aim of this paper is to discuss Garroni's devices by placing them in the context of the conceptual and pictorial, in order to find a possible legitimation for their appearance on the contemporary scene. Following this brief introduction (1.) the purpose is to relate the conceptual (2.) and the pictorial (3.) to some main questions raised by Garroni. They are: the spectator-entity and its looking-through; aesthetic experience as a possible experience; questioning and the effort of understanding; the exemplarity of aesthetic experience; artwork as a source of possible schemata; sensefulness and the must-make-sense (*dover-far-senso*).

## 2. *The conceptual: the spectator-entity and its looking-through*

Although today's conceptual work is different from the past, in order to approach contemporary conceptual work, it is necessary to make some brief considerations starting from the origins. Joseph

<sup>1</sup> On the translation of the term *sguardo-atravverso* the debate is still open. The latest translated and revised edition of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* – from which Garroni borrows the term – opts for the expression “see right into” (Cf. Wittgenstein L., *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (1953); transl. *Philosophical Investigations*, translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, J. Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 250). However, ‘looking-through’ seems more appropriate to us.

Kosuth's *Art After Philosophy* outlines the borders of a new concept of art that begins where its bodily nature ends. Conceptual art claims the possibility of a new kind of aesthetic experience where the role of the spectator-entity is at the centre. At the very beginnings of conceptualism, there is a different concept of the observer, since his or her look is different, and no longer optical: "What is at state in the Conceptual aesthetic is a critique of the modernist notion of visibility, here defined as a separate, autonomous sphere of aesthetic experience" (Buchloh 2016, pp. 603-4). The conceptual object migrates from the sphere of visibility to that of intuition, in a close connection to its user, who must create a well-defined relationship with it, otherwise the work will be misinterpreted.

In the conceptual work of art, the observer finds himself involved in the work, in a paradoxical situation of confinement that is well understood in the Garroni's metaphor of the insect encased in amber:

Let us imagine an entity – says Garroni – that, in order to subsist and have an experience, must be encapsulated, like a fossil insect in amber, inside a block of translucent material: this and only this is its living and sensorial environment (Garroni 2020, p. 32).<sup>2</sup>

In this sense, the conceptual work is an internal world closed on itself but not impenetrable, designed either to lose its viewer or to include him in it, with no middle ground. This is well demonstrated by the first Conceptual works, in which the spectator was literally called upon to read the work, on the risk of not being able to understand it. This is what happens, for example, in Sol LeWitt's *Red Square, White Letters* (1963) where "LeWitt transforms the work's spectator into a reader [...] the viewing relationship becomes a performative reader relationship" (Buchloh 2016, p. 604).

A new viewer is placed in this context, involved in the middle of what he is looking at, i. e. in the vital and sensorial environment created by the contact with the work. As a result, looking itself is what makes it special, since it is the *looking of another*. Not only the artwork and the viewer are involved, but also the looking itself, which becomes a way of crossing the filter or diaphragm (the amber of the insect). Here the definition of entity appears as inseparable from the activity that makes it such: "The looking entity is someone who is in the middle of which he looks and cannot get out of it without his looking stopping being a looking" (Garroni 2020, p. 32). The meaning of the gaze Garroni found, lies in the

<sup>2</sup> The translation of the passages quoted from Garroni's essay is our own.

entity and conditions that link his look to an impossible existence outside the object. As if forced into this status, the entity is bound to place itself into the work in order to enjoy it. In the precarious position of one who stands in the middle and cannot go in any direction except the one that makes it similar to the work itself.

### 2.1 *Aesthetic experience as a possible experience*

In Garroni's Aesthetics, possibility is one of the elements common to philosophical exercise and art (Garroni 2020, pp. 34-5). But we also find other small references elsewhere (Bogue 2007). Philosophical research turns to the possibility of phenomena<sup>3</sup> just as a work of art exists as a possible; it appears to us as such, precisely because it exists in this alien form that displaces our intellect and we do not seem to understand. Yet we have seen that looking-through can make us insects in amber, entities trapped in a medium that is not totally inaccessible. Although this is the ideal and necessary condition for the fruition of the work, it does not necessarily happen. Garroni notes in his paradox of philosophy: "It is possible that we simply look only on the condition of a looking-through [...] but looking-through is not possible, if one simply looks" (*Ibid*). However, looking-through is a unique condition from which we cannot escape:

Our common looking is possible precisely on this condition: that we stand [...] in a medium that works as a set of inputs, and without looking simultaneously at that common looking and the medium in which it is possible in another looking or in the looking of another (Garroni 1992, p. 33).

The work of art, like the philosophical practice, legitimates itself precisely through its character of possibility, opening up to a possible future achievement beyond its self-referentiality. Both of them must have as a starting point a question.

An example shows the importance of possibility. When we see the artwork of an unknown artist for the first time – going to a gallery or a new museum – we make an act of trust. Our reasons for leaving home and going can of course be many. However, a good part of our motivation can be found in the possibility of the experience itself. We know that the aesthetic experience can give us satisfaction or dissatisfaction (this could be valid for many other non-aesthetic experiences, but our choice is not random, as we shall see later) (Kant 2001, p. 96). We go to a new gallery or a new

<sup>3</sup> Like the looking-through, possibility is also found by Garroni in Wittgenstein, cf. Garroni 1992, p. 33.

museum because we believe that the work of art is possible and because we believe we can meet it. The work matches its possibility. So why?

The spectator-entity perceives the other's presence of the work through an intuition since, as we have already observed, our own common looking is possible within "a medium that works as a set of inputs" (Garroni 2020, p. 33). Through intuition, the possibility of the work becomes clear – 'ideas are discovered by intuition' said Sol LeWitt –. By calling intuition into question, we inevitably enter into the Kantian system dear to Garroni, and in particular, into the development of sensible intuition in relation to art found in the *Dialectic of the Aesthetic Power of Judgement*. The importance of intuition in Garroni's system can be said to be directly proportional to that one in Kant. Since we do not have the space here for a discussion of the topic that would require a dedicated paragraph, we will limit ourselves to citing an occasion – particularly favourable to us – in which the meaning of intuition would seem to be both current and precursor. To define the pictorial arts, Kant refers to intuition: "The pictorial arts or those of the expression of ideas in sensible intuition [...] are either those of sensible truth or of sensible illusion. The first are called the plastic arts, the second painting" (Kant 2001, p. 199). Introducing intuition is useful in order to relate it to the category of possibility, with which it establishes an interesting relationship.

From a completely different point of view, if we refer intuition to the possibility of the work of art, the matter becomes problematic. In fact, the two concepts do not seem to agree on the first instance. Affirming the possibility of the work means uniforming intuition by legitimizing it in the same way each time, which is problematic – "an adequate metaphysics of art should be responsive to how intuitive think about art's nature and especially to how we think art [...] in different circumstances" – (Currie 2010, p. 235). Indeed, intuition is highly variable: different intuitions correspond to different conceptions of the work: "When I talk about our concept of art, I mean something distinguished by intuitions [...] people with different but fully reflective intuitions about what would be art" (*Ibid*). In order to overcome the problem and put possibility and intuition on an equal level, Gregory Currie found the expression "intuitions about possible art"<sup>4</sup> (*Ibid*). There is intuition only when the work of art is given as *possible*. While the two

<sup>4</sup> Although Currie develops the argument about possibility and intuition with the purpose of finding a definition of art, it seems possible to us to extent the concept from art to the artwork specifically.

stand apart, they seem to live together thanks to the work.

There is a particular reason why we have considered the relationship between possibility and intuition in the light of conceptualism. The subject matter takes us directly to the nature of today's artwork. The conceptual work is not only about an idea as it is well known (Cray 2014; Goldie & Schellekens 2010; Buchloh 1990), which is both unique and necessary to itself, but it is also about an intuition that is always possible. Conceptual work appears to be the only artwork that is always possible. There are three main reasons for this: 1) it is an *idea*; 2) it is a *possible idea*; 3) it is an *ever possible intuition*. To these three reasons we can add two more: 4) the artwork is being dematerialized (Goldie & Schellekens 2010); 5) the artwork is being dislocated.

The last point shows some clear problems: how can we say that the work does not take place if it is physically in the place where I have to go in order to enjoy it? If it is dislocated, should I be able to deduce that I can enjoy it even if only through an idea (my idea of that artwork)? Following this line of thinking we would conclude that, for example, my idea of Duchamp's *Fountain* is the same as someone else's because it is simply the same work (Cray 2014). Obviously, this cannot be the case. However, the problem is not unsolvable, quite the opposite. The work finds reason to be de-located because at its birth and even afterwards, it is an aesthetic idea (Kant 2001, pp. 191-6). And here is the point where the importance that Garroni gives to possibility is explained, allowing us to conclude the circle between possibility, intuition and idea: every time we have 'this or that experience' we cannot avoid asking ourselves about the 'possibility' of our experience. In the case of aesthetic experience it is self-evident, and this is why aesthetic experience has an exemplary value (Garroni 2020, pp. 34, 44, 204, 221).

## 2.2 *Questioning and the effort of understanding*

Being means questioning. Asking is the identity element "which makes us what we are and which builds the world in which we are" (Garroni 2020, p. 40). Questioning allows us to create the horizon of meaning in which we can be. It holds a crucial status in the work as much as the philosophical one, and this is why interrogation is for Garroni one of the tools of his Aesthetics. Questioning implies the need for understanding. At the same time, it is also a key to open the door where the artwork can reveal itself as a sensible object. Garroni's aesthetics makes the questioning value typical of philosophy, the same as that of the work of art, increasing its

exemplarity:

The question, insofar as it cannot be properly confused with an interrogative preposition, is not an external voice of experience, it is not a question not posed in question itself and formulated neutrally with reference to an experience as object. It is a part of experience that already has its ontological substance (*Ibid*).

This concrete value the question takes on in Garroni's definition is what the contemporary work of art is made up of, we could say that it is the 'ontological substance' of the work itself. In the conceptual artwork, the question gives legitimacy to the artistic act because it is constantly fed by concepts in the form of questions. Above all, the conceptual work prompts its viewer to elaborate thoughts not by wondering about the question 'is this art or not?' as about the components of the work itself, i.e. the concepts. The artwork problematizes in the form of questions issues that previously appeared not problematic: "Works of art [...] problematize what had previously seemed unproblematic. They highlight tacit [...] presuppositions and ask why we consider ourselves justified in them" (Elgin 2002, p. 9). Most of all, it leads us to reconsider factors we are usually used to passing over – "works of art often provoke reclassification by forcing us to focus on factors we ordinarily overlook" – (Elgin 2002, p. 8).

In this framework, the looking-through comes up as a putting into question of some concepts:

Our looking is not a simple looking only, but also and at the same time a looking-through – [...] a *putting into question* – the looking inside the looking. To put into question and to look through [...] thereby become equivalent expressions as they represent the same need for understanding (Garroni 2020, p. 37).

Questioning is impossible without a driven and intentional effort, an effort of understanding. Garroni's looking-through is only possible by effort, as well as the kind of questioning we typically experience when we see a work of art.

It is in the effort of understanding – which comes about by questioning ourselves about feeling, doing, knowing – that simple looking shows itself as possible only on the condition of a looking-through (Garroni 2020, p. 34).

By setting ourselves the task of answering questions and finding possible answers in the work, we are able to look at it in terms we might not previously have done.

However, the effort to understand does not imply a hard mental exercise, the work of art simply asks to be recognized beyond

the perceptual experience. Alva Noë has recently spoken<sup>5</sup> on the question of recognition of the art object, comparing it to the philosophical object that cannot be understood (a further point between the two). The issue concerns intentionality and the ‘inability to see’ – ‘If you do not see anything it is because you *do not want* to see’ – challenged by the work that allows us to achieve ‘the ability to see originally’. Although there is intentionality and the effort of understanding in helping me to understand the work, on the other hand there is the institutionalisation of the work (galleries and museums telling me ‘art is here’). Despite this, Noë underlines the belonging of the work of art to the sphere of aesthetic competence since ‘achieving the object is the function of aesthetics’.

### 3. *The pictorial: the exemplarity of aesthetic experience*

In Garroni’s view, the work of art has always been – yesterday in history as today in the contemporary world – the paradigm of critical thought, and in aesthetics it finds the perfect exemplification of an all-round critical philosophy. Straight in line with Kant’s thought, the aesthetic experience is exemplary because it identifies the work as its ‘natural place’ – “it is essentially a critical use of thought that has in art [...] a privileged referent” (Garroni 2020, p. 44). Exemplarity is possible especially thanks to the role of the imagination which, through its schematisation without concept, makes the work “an exhibition of sense through particular meanings and an opening to possible meanings” (Garroni 2020, p. 204). The aesthetic experience ‘reveals itself to be exemplary’.

Why should exemplarity be included in the category of the pictorial? Painting literally shows, one might say, what an aesthetic experience is. It unfolds on canvas in a revealing manner, the process through which we come into contact with the work. There are, however, many reasons that need to be discussed in detail.

Without a doubt, the pictorial understanding is prior to the aesthetic appreciation of an image (Pelletier & Voltolini 2019, p. 3) but it is not a simple optical-perceptual issue. When we stand in front of a painting, our visual sense together with our faculties enable us to understand an object of reality. Only apparently, the vision of a painting is dissimilar to that of a bottle of water. The

<sup>5</sup> *In the Making – Artistic practices, Aesthetics, Anthropology* (Sapienza University of Rome, March 2022); lecture presented by CIEG – Cattedra Internazionale Emilio Garroni – in collaboration with Sapienza Department of Philosophy in the framework of PhD in Philosophy – Seminario Permanente di Estetica. The following quotations are all taken from this speech.



difference, as we know, lies in the fact that in addition to the normal processing of the sensitive material, the ‘free play of imagination and intellect’ must necessarily follow. But this is not what leads us to link the pictorial to the exemplarity of the work and thus of the aesthetic experience.

The relation between a painting and its observer is the ideal place for looking-through: the gaze lives ‘in the middle’ of the medium being looked at, becoming a part of it. Painting demands an ‘absorption’ of the looking of its user, both literal and in terms of content, since it implies the recognition of a familiar, human gesture, ‘that I could have made’; it makes us “more subjects” (Rugoff 2021, p. 16). Painting – like drawing – is still the only artistic practice that reveals itself, behind which the man-artist cannot hide. Think of the highly advanced art-making processes possible today. The involvement of the machine in the artistic process is an arm extended to replace man’s technical imperfection.<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, in pictorial art we recognise ourselves both through our gaze and its exercise, *looking at us*. This recognition is not just sensible. A double identification is involved. One starting with the sign, the other with its content (Lim 2021; Greenberg 2021).

The pictorial in this way is a possible patchwork of experiential moments that belong to others and to us at the same time – “every painting is composed from a collection of distinct moments, each of which might accommodate slight shifts in perspective or thinking” (Rugoff 2021, p. 8) –. Just like the looking-through, we are swallowed up by the work. Here lies the sense in which artwork emerges as ‘the most exemplary place’. Painting challenges the concept-less schematisation of the imagination as “the exhibition of sense through particular meanings” (Garroni, p. 204) turning out to be exemplary. What the painter subjectively paints for and about himself is found by the viewer as his own. Through the combined work of imagination and intellect, the painting is a fluid layering of interchangeable experiences.

Far from the solipsism of the artist’s feeling, the pictorial claims a recognition due to our being observers in between. Moreover, the inclusion of the most varied and disparate knowledge enables painting to surpass itself and to move into ‘non-pictorial’ bodies (the performance, the sculpture, the installation).

Last but not least, the exponential growth of possible connections originated by the sign. It testifies the attempt to create correspondences between apparently unrelated subjects and objects. “Painting

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Carboni & Montani (2005, pp. 5-39).

offers an invaluable forum for exploring intersections of individual and collective identities” (*Ibid*). In doing so, it enables us to recognise ourselves as “the entities-that-we-are in the world-in-which-we-are” (Garroni 1992, p. 40) according to our aesthetic nature. These are the reasons that lead us to consider the painting as the place where the exemplarity of aesthetic experience is most evident.

### 3.1 *Artwork as a source of possible schemata*

The pictorial creates a special intellectual, sensitive and experiential stratification in the work naturally. It allows us to have new cognitive experiences and to relive some already had, thanks to the physical nature of the image provided by the gesture. The effect does not change if we distinguish between an abstract, figurative or narrative piece of art (a work that has the capacity to tell a story without figuration). Let us consider two cases: in the first case I am in front of a work in which I distinguish images that I identify with figures; in the second, I see a work of pure colour fields. In both cases, I recognise in the same way that the artwork satisfies my nature, coming towards me, for two reasons. The manufacture of the object makes me think that I could have made it, I perceive its humanity, in a certain sense *it resembles me*; to the same extent I note a multitude of possible emotional experiences that concern me, I feel *touched by the work* (Deleuze 2002, p. 85).

As well as being a source of possible knowledge, the work is, in Kantian terms, a source of possible cognitive schemata. Like transcendental schematism, in the middle between sensible intuitions and the categories of the intellect, the work sits with Garroni’s looking-through, right in the middle. The faculty in between that makes this design work is the imagination.

The image of the work is no longer that enclosed and unknowable world. It is itself, in some ways, a cognitive faculty, “the image is seen [...] from the point of view of the very faculty of images, as a source of possible schemes” (Garroni 2020, p. 202). At the same time the work appears to me as a unitary world.<sup>7</sup> The typical fullness of the pictorial image can be exemplified by the white canvas, not an empty surface but full of actual or virtual images just as they appear in the artist’s mind (Deleuze 2008, p. 85). The artist would paint “over images that are already there [...] data present on the canvas before the painter’s work begins” (*Ibid*). This is another reason why the imagination in painting becomes “a condition in act, looked at through

<sup>7</sup> “Il mondo che si appropria di me, richiudendosi su di me, il mio io che si apre al mondo e che apre il mondo” (Deleuze 2002, p. 99).

determined experience, of every possible experience, imaginative and cognitive, aesthetic and intellectual” (Garroni 2020, p. 201).

Behind this new type of schematism, there is clearly another of Garroni’s great intuitions, Kantian philosophy as ‘philosophy of sense’. The issue of sense, as well as the opening of the imagination to concepts that are not already determined and only possible, is pertinent to the nature of the pictorial work. It opens up the perspective to the sensefulness<sup>8</sup> of the work and to its ‘must-make-sense’ (*dover-far-senso*). For Garroni, this is “a second and new schematism, which consists no longer in the question of signification or intuitive exhibition” (Garroni 2020, p. 202).

### 3.2 *Sensefulness and the must-make-sense*

At the heart of the question of sense lies Garroni’s conviction that aesthetic experience stands out as meaningful experience. Aesthetic judgement would have as its principle sense itself, or rather, the sensefulness of aesthetic experience. Sense is a necessary and contingent principle that qualifies, in contact with the work, the sensation whereby “we feel at home in the experience” (Garroni 2020, p. 221). In other words, we are in a place that naturally belongs to us. As we know, Kant was the first to relate sense to aesthetic experience in a direct way, through the identification of a possible common sense (Kant 2001, pp. 122-4).

The imagination’s openness to non-determined and only possible concepts automatically implies, for Garroni, the “openness to the sensefulness of experience, the established moment of signification in general, the preliminary sense to any determined meaning” (Garroni 2020, p. 202). The preliminary sense is in the very possibility of the work because it is a source of exemplary experience. The sensefulness of experience is therefore something that properly belongs to the work of art in general. Garroni gives many possible explanations for this. We group them into three main ones:

1. “Sense is a risk that we cannot pass up, that we have to run” (Garroni 2020, p. 222): every time we find ourselves in front of a work of art we search for the meaningfulness of that aesthetic experience, in accordance with our ‘being-in-experience’ (it is a ‘transcendental risk’, says Garroni);

<sup>8</sup> The most appropriate term to translate the Italian word *sensatezza* according to Garroni’s definition seems to be ‘sensefulness’. However, in some cases ‘meaningfulness’ seemed preferable, so the reader will find both, being used according to the context of reference.

2. “Sense is inseparable from non-sense” (*Ibid*): the work shows itself as a chaos of sense and non-sense; it surprises us with its strange way of producing sensefulness; we cannot understand it except through the faculty of imagination;

3. “It is a a making-sense that is rather a must-make-sense” (Garroni 2020, p. 223): sense is the true principle of the faculty of judgement and makes three ideas of the supersensible possible. The supersensible in general as the substratum of nature; the supersensible as the principle of the subjective finality of nature for our faculty of knowing; the supersensible as the principle of the aims of freedom and the principle of their agreement with freedom in morality.

Risk is certainly what most links Garroni’s sense to the contemporary artwork. He locates the unique capacity of the work to test us, to test how much we are ready to risk in the search for a meaning beyond its showing. The work of art asks for trust and effort:

The fine arts [...] do not ‘give anything for certain’ in advance, but each time they update the effort of ‘giving something for sure’. They never give us a ready-made sense, but each time they try to produce it in us through more or less successful attempts, and sometimes even failures (*Ibid*).

The pictorial is implicated in the argument to the extent that the same kind of aesthetic sensefulness described by Garroni can be found in painting. If we intend painting as being the home of sense, Garroni’s definition of sensefulness gains an extra value. Although apparently far from a philosophical meaning, in his book *The Incarnated Painting*, Didi-Huberman argues how sense is directly related to painting as a material body. Three types of sense are a demonstration of this. Similar to the uncertainty of sense outlined by Garroni in the figurative arts, according to Didi-Huberman, sense in painting is a blurred character somewhere between sense and non-sense, “an interweave, a perversion” (Didi-Huberman 2008, p. 11). Metaphorically similar to the structure of a skin, sense is superficial but at the same time, visceral and innate to our experiential need. The three types of sense in question are: the *sense-sema* associated with the intellect; the *sense-aisthesis* associated with the sensible; the *sense-pathos* associated with feeling. Together they represent the fullness of sense in the pictorial artwork, a living image according to Didi-Huberman because rich of sensefulness. At the same time, they seem to encapsulate some of the fundamental characteristics underlying aesthetic judgement itself (the role of intellect, sensible intuition, feeling) as intended by Kant and therefore, directly, by Garroni. Combining Garroni’s sensefulness with Didi-Huberman’s

sense, we obtain the most complete definition of sense in the pictorial work of art.

#### 4. *Conclusions*

Today, unaware of Garroni – we wonder if he would approve or not – a new looking-through lives embodied in the contemporary artwork. Lacking every language criteria, the work no longer represents the art's attempt to bring sense to experience – “art [...] that brought sense or was under the illusion of being able to bring sense” – (Garroni 2020, p. 230). Instead, it is the image of a new sensefulness itself, which is therefore also the image of our exemplary experience in general. The element and unique feature of the work which has remained unchanged – as it will always be – is its request to be deeply looked at and through. The same might be said for the artwork, being a source of new schemata to understand reality. While the spectator is asked to make an effort to place himself where the work lies, in between, the artist is asked to be more aware of being “always, exemplarily, on the invisible borderline between sense and non-sense, as well as, not exemplarily, all of us” (Garroni 2020, p. 224).

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